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THE LIMITS OF LOCALISM
Richard C. Schragger*
"I am thankful for boundaries. I am fond of having the lines drawn
around me."1

INTRODUCTION
In Chicago v. Morales,2 the Supreme Court struck down Chicago's
Gang Congregation Ordinance, which barred "criminal street gang
members from loitering with one another or with other persons in any
public place."3 The stated purpose of the ordinance was to wrest con
trol of public areas from gang members who, simply by their presence,
intimidated the public and established control over identifiable areas
of the city, namely certain inner-city streets, sidewalks, and corners.4
The ordinance required that police officers determine whether at least
one of two or more persons present in a public place were members of
a criminal street gang and whether these persons were loitering. Loi
tering was defined as "remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent
purpose."5 According to the Supreme Court, "the [Chicago] police is
sued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 people for
violating the ordinance" in a three-year period.6
The ordinance's defeat was, in some ways, preordained. Over
twenty-five years earlier the Supreme Court had struck down similarly
broad local vagrancy and loitering statutes as void for vagueness in a

* Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, Visiting Associate Profes
sor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1992, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1993,
University of London; J.D. 1996, Harvard. I am grateful to Greg Alexander, Regina Austin,
David Barron, Curt Bradley, Ariela Dubler, Bob Ellickson, Jerry Frug, Myriam Gilles, Clay
Gillette, Gia Lee, Jennifer Mnookin, and Glen Robinson for helpful comments and conver
sations. I am also indebted to the faculties of the Quinnipiac University School of Law and
the Yale Law School, who provided me with homes while this work was in progress. This
Article would not have been possible without Risa Goluboff, my partner in all things. It is
dedicated to my grandfather, Henry Schragger, Esq. (1906-2001), who taught me the dignity
of the practice of law.

1. SAUL BELLOW, RA VELSTEIN 185 (2000).
2. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
3. Id. at 45-46.
4. See id. at 46-47.
5. Id. at 47 & n.2
6. Id. at 49.
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series of opinions culminating in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.7
These decisions, combined with the earlier constitutionalization of
"street law" by the Warren Court, dramatically curtailed police
authority to "move along" undesirables and informally discipline dis
orderly conduct.8
Indeed, the ordinance at issue in Morales appears to be a straight
forward case of police overreaching, an uncontroversial case for Court
intervention. At least according to proponents, however, the Gang
Congregation Ordinance had significant support in the minority, high
crime, inner-city neighborhoods in which it was implemented. Advo
cates argue that these communities should have substantial autonomy
to adopt norms that are responsive to local conditions. State and fed
eral courts should defer to such norms, even when they deviate from
constitutional guarantees, because local residents are in a better posi
tion to balance liberty and order in light of local circumstances.
The case has thus generated an examination of the role of rights in
minority communities, and of the conflict between individual rights
7. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Those decisions include Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544
(1971), Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), and Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Relying on these precedents, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, held that the term
"loitering" as defined by Chicago's ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it vio
lated the " 'requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law en
forcement.' " 527 U.S. at 60 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)). Noting
that the ordinance could be applied to all kinds of harmless activity, Stevens found that the
standards for enforcement of the ordinance were inherently subjective and thus failed to
cabin police discretion in any meaningful way. In addition, two Justices - Souter and
Ginsburg - agreed with Justice Stevens that the statute did not provide adequate notice so
as "to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law," id. at 58, be
cause the definition of loitering as remaining in one place for "no apparent purpose" and the
standards for obeying an order "to disperse and remove [one]sel(f] from the area," "were
impossible to obey." Id. at 60. Three Justices - Breyer, O'Connor, and Kennedy - con
curred in the j udgment, leaving open the notice issue addressed in Part IV of Stevens's plu
rality opinion. Kennedy also did not join in Part IV of Stevens's opinion, but in his short
concurrence he expressed "many of the same concerns (Stevens] expresses in Part IV with
respect to the sufficiency of notice under the ordinance." Id. at 69. Justices Scalia and
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion expressed concern for the "consequences of gang
violence," and indicated that a statute that defined "loiter" to mean "to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose than to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimi
date others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities" would "avoid the
vagueness problems of the ordinance." See id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In February
2000, the Chicago City Council passed a new antigang loitering ordinance following
O'Connor's suggestion that required that loiterers "remove themselves from within sight
and hearing" of a designated spot for at least three hours. See Dirk Johnson, Chicago Coun
cil Tries Anew with Anti-Gang Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A14.
8. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan
dlers, Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1202-19 (1996) (hereinafter
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct] (discussing history of street disorder and the
constitutional revolution of street law); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality
of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,
606-07 (1997) (discussing the historical context leading up to the Court's decision in
Papachristou, and its impact on policing).
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and community norms - a conversation that often seems to flounder
on competing definitions of rights.9 The discussion surrounding
Morales echoes other debates that appear to pit community-specific
needs against constitutional norms.10 This debate is structured as a
clash between a (minority) community's efforts to solve pressing local
problems and the liberal abstractions of due process imposed by (ma
jority) outsiders, as a choice between community autonomy and pa
ternalism. The conventional story has only two possible endings: either
the wider political community respects the decisions of local people to
adopt laws that are responsive to local conditions or it imposes a norm
by force that the affected community does not share. The alternatives
- respect or force - do not provide much of a choice.
This Article challenges the structure of a debate that presents only
the alternatives of respect or force, autonomy or paternalism, by ex
amining the coherence of the concept of community on which argu
ments on behalf of local autonomy are based. In this way, the Article
reflects local government law scholarship's preoccupation with how
local governance comes into being.1 1 Localism depends on the creation
and maintenance of smaller-than-state associations marked off in geo
graphical space by a definable (and often, defensible) perimeter. Yet,
while boundaries create citizens (or aspire to do so), they must also, by
definition, create noncitizens, and therefore they are invariably de
structive of the ideal of a wider community. Localism tends to sacrifice

9. The debate has taken place in a number of forums. See Albert W. Alschuler &
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black,
White, and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 245-47
[hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Black, White, and Gray]; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan,
The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 197 [hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking]. The de
bate also found its way into the Boston Review with an article by Tracey Meares and Dan
Kahan entitled When Rights Are Wrong, with responses by Alan M. Dershowitz, Jean Be
thke Elshtain, Joel F. Handler, Carol S. Steiker, Wesley G. Skogan, Margaret Burnham,
Franklin Zimring, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard E. Harcourt, Anthony Paul Farley, and
Richard H. Pildes. See URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CITY
COMMUNITIES (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1994) [hereinafter URGENT
TIMES] , available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR24.2/Meares.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2001) .
1 0 . The debate over single-sex African-American schools i s one example. See, e.g. , John
A. Powell, Black Immersion Schools, 21 N.Y U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 669 (1995) (dis
cussing all-male black academies and arguing for an interpretation of constitutional prece
dents to allow African-American communities to opt out of an integrationist, colorblind, or
gender-neutral norm).
.

1 1 . Questions concerning the scope and nature of local power are at the heart of local
government law. See, e.g. , Frank Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145
(1977).
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inclusion for the possibilities of citizenship. This "boundary problem"12
of local government law can be stated as follows: The creation of a
place for meaningful self-government (in space and in politics) for
those inside the (metaphorical and sometimes literal) gates always af
fects (and often injures) those who are outside the gates.'3 The bound
ary problem in local government law thus is the problem of pluralism.
A central thesis of this Article is that in deciding whether a par
ticular community's norm is entitled to respect, we are deciding both
whether the community exists and who gets to be included within it. In
other words, localism does not j ust happen. Before one can assert local
autonomy in the name of community, one needs a theory of insiders
and outsiders that justifies the exercise of autonomy in its name. This
Article tells an alternative story of Morales: a story about how local
autonomy - and the corresponding rhetoric of community - is de
ployed to instantiate a politically and geographically entitled localism
in the first place.
I argue that this "boundary-creating" role of local norms can be
understood by conceiving of the Gang Congregation Ordinance at is
sue in Morales as a form of zoning. Zoning, prosaically understood, is
the primary tool of land use, a mechanism by which local governments
regulate the placement and distribution of the components of our built
environment. Zoning is a means by which groups can encourage uses
of physical spaces that they like and discourage uses they do not like, a
powerful instrument for instituting and transmitting norms of behavior
spatially. Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance can be understood
as a form of exclusionary zoning: a mechanism for discouraging uses of
the public street (loitering by gang members and their associates) that
many (though not all) Chicagoans apparently did not like.
Approaching Morales as a zoning case brings together two dispa
rate bodies of legal scholarship - criminal procedure and local gov
ernment law - both of which point toward the decentralization of
norms "down" the chain of governance to neighborhoods and other
local institutions. Indeed, a burgeoning call for the radical decentrali
zation of constitutional norms down to the city, neighborhood, and
even block level increasingly asserts the rights of small-scale, territori-

12. See Richard Briffault, Surveying Law and Borders: The Local Government Bound
ary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996) (employing the terminol
ogy, though not this formulation).
13. Gregory Alexander offers a comparable account of the "inside/outside" problem, as
do other scholars. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990); see also Clayton P. Gillette,
Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (1994); Martha Minow,
The Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1995); Glen O. Robinson,
Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269 (1997); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That
Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).
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ally defined jurisdictions to govern themselves. Thus, proponents of
the Gang Congregation Ordinance support Chicago's inner-city
neighborhoods' decision to defend themselves as do many wealthy,
suburban neighborhoods: by excluding (through zoning or otherwise)
undesirable uses of space, and, by extension, undesirables. The theo
retical bases for local autonomy that ground the inner-city residents'
claims to govern are similar to those that ground the "rights" of sub
urban municipalities, gated communities, homeowners associations,
and business improvement districts to exclude, police, and regulate
themselves.
This Article objects to grounding local autonomy in the rhetoric of
community. Local norms cannot be understood outside the context of
a dynamic between localities, between neighborhoods within a city,
and between city and suburb. I argue for a shift from a discourse of lo
calism, which takes territorially defined communities as a given, to a
discourse of alternative localisms, which understands communities as
products of contested political norms, arising simultaneously with the
borders that define them. Instead of a refuge of like-minded individu
als bound in a collective pursuit of the good life, community is an ex
plicitly political body that exists in relation to (and to the exclusion of)
other, equally plausible alternative communities. Instead of asking
whether particular residents should be permitted to waive constitu
tional rights to respond to the exigencies of "their" community, we
need to ask whether a particular zoning regime is a justifiable (and de
sirable) means for creating a community - with all the normative
force that term implies - out of a collection of people who live next
door to one another.
My intention is to undermine the naturalness with which we char
acterize the places where people happen to live as communities, and
to question the legal power and implications of that assumption. In
doing so, I want to shift the legal focus from issues about the relation
ship between the center and the periphery to issues about the relation
ship between neighboring and alternative localisms - from questions
concerning the proper exercise of vertical power, authority, and re
sponsibility to questions concerning the proper exercise of horizontal
power, authority, and responsibility.
Part I begins by placing Morales in the context of two streams of
legal thought: a criminal j ustice literature that emphasizes the role of
informal norms of behavior in controlling criminality and a local gov
ernment literature that champions decentralized lawmaking in
smaller-than-state settings. It then develops three accounts of commu
nity - contractarian, deep, and dualist - that provide the most com
mon theoretical grounds for the robust localism that emerges at the
confluence of these two streams.
Part II critically considers these accounts using Morales and three
other cases reimagined in zoning terms. I argue that the Gang Con-
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gregation Ordinance is based on a land use model of controlling devi
ance that is prevalent throughout our metropolitan areas. The fact of
zoned space introduces a spatial dimension to the generation of local
norms, a dimension that localism arguments often overlook. Local
norms are literally and legally boundary creating; norms are not sim
ply the product of pre-existing communities, but are instead constitu
tive of them. The rules governing the terms of inclusion in and exclu
sion from a community form a normative wall between "us" and
"them" by marking us in legal, social, and literal space as insiders or
outsiders, members or nonmembers, shareholders or nonshareholders,
citizens or noncitizens.14 This definitional work is often invisible be
cause we see ourselves and "our community" from only one side; the
"shape" of the normative world "differs depending on which side of
the wall our narrative places us on. "15 Any celebration of the local
must account for the contingency of community, the effect on "who
we are" of a robust localism that relies on building high normative
walls in demarcated space.
Part III returns to the dichotomy between respect and force that
characterizes arguments urging deference to local norms. I argue that
this dichotomy is a false one; the difficult choices are not vertical between respect for the local or the force of a competing higher-level
norm - but horizontal - between the force of alternative localisms.
Expanding on Part II, Part III explores how law institutes one par
ticular version of the local to the exclusion of multiple possible alter
natives. These alternatives often come in the form of a plaintiff's
"claim of belonging" masked as a (usually poorly fitting) assertion of
constitutional right. This Part addresses the limitations of rights talk in
articulating these kinds of claims of belonging and suggests ways in
which such claims turn on how local government law defines insiders
and outsiders. I conclude with a brief discussion of how it may be pos
sible to imagine alternative localisms, returning to the Morales case
with some final observations about the relationship between bounda
ries and a substantive conception of local citizenship.
I.

NEIGHBORHOOD CONSTITUTION-MAKING

Chicago v. Morales sits at the intersection of two large-scale struc
tural developments in law and public policy. The first development is

14. On this account, law is constitutive of both social relations and social space. See
David Delaney et al., Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER xiii
xxi (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2000); Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Ju
risdiction), 97 MICH. L REV. 843, 846-55 (1999); cf Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories,
36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 (1984) (discussing constitutive nature of legal relations).
15. Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (1983).
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the ascendancy of a new approach to policing and criminology that
emphasizes informal norms of behavior as opposed to formal sanc
tions in controlling criminal behavior. Advocates of this approach to
criminal justice emphasize the law enforcement potential of social
norms and champion policies that attempt to encourage the transmis
sion of such norms through the informal channels of the street, the
neighborhood, and the community.16 The second development is the
popularity of more decentralized forms of political organization, and
the migration of government "down" to increasingly local institutions.
This form of localism constitutes both an approach to specific prob
lems of government policy and a political theory informed by a desire
to decentralize political and social power.17
This Part describes how these two movements coalesce in Morales,
and more widely in an emerging legal scholarship that advocates the
devolution of fundamental constitutional norms to the neighborhood
level. This is an admittedly unusual approach to Morales; most com
mentators read Morales from "inside" the criminal procedure litera
ture without emphasizing its devolutionary implications. For ease of
discussion, I call this general devolutionary impulse "neighborhood
constitutionalism." Grounded in theories of local autonomy, neigh
borhood constitutionalism looks to decentralized institutions as sites
for norm generation in general, and for constitutional norm genera
tion in particular. This Part then sketches three accounts of commu
nity that ground arguments for local autonomy. Together, they suggest
a picture of a beneficent localism that provides a powerful justification
for . permitting neighborhoods to depart from background constitu
tional norms. In the next Part, I will challenge that portrait.
A.

The New Policing and the New Devolution

The first large�scale structural trend at work in Morales is a new
policing geared toward fostering norms of order in public spaces. The
16. See, e.g., Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8; Dan Kahan, So
cial Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan,
Social Influence]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning]; Livingston, supra note 8;
Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
191 (1998).
17. Decentralization has been defined as "a form of political organization that permits
local units to exercise wide discretion over what they do or how they do that which is re
quired of a higher authority." Royce Hanson, Toward a New Urban Democracy: Metropoli
tan Consolidation and Decentralization, 58 GEO. L.J. 863, 893 n.79 (1970). This common
sense definition tells us little about the possible forms and purposes of decentralization. Cf
Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 254-55 (1993) (questioning
the "liberal" conception of decentralization as modeling local power on a "centered sense of
the [local] self"). This definition also assumes that the "local unit" is easily defined and iden
tified, a view that this Article seeks to problematize.
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new policing has developed primarily in response to crime and the
breakdown of public order in urban neighborhoods and the concomi
tant failure of traditional policing methods to affect it. Led by cities
like New York and Chicago, localities have adopted law enforcement
measures aimed at the quality of life in the city in general and order in
public spaces more specifically. The ordinance at issue in Morales is
one of a genus of policing tools directed toward controlling low-level
misconduct in public spaces by enforcing norms of behavior and civil
ity rather than by attempting to police specific criminal acts. In an ef
fort to address what are often described as "quality of life" crimes,
many local governments have either passed or increased enforcement
of antiloitering ordinances, juvenile curfews, and ordinances prohibit
ing panhandling, unlicensed street vending, public drunkenness, urina
tion in public places, graffiti, and sleeping on public benches or in
parks.18 Cities have also sought judicial remedies against street gangs
as public nuisances, obtaining, in some cases, injunctive relief institut
ing adult curfews and forbidding conduct as varied as loitering in
abandoned buildings, carrying a baseball bat in a public place, climb
ing over fences, or standing on rooftops.19
These approaches to policing the urban "commons"20 reflect the
ascendancy of a new theory of crime control based in large part on
variations of the popular "broken windows" thesis.21 This thesis asserts
18. See NATIONAL LAW Cm. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, No HOMELESS
PEOPLE ALLOWED (1994) (describing measures); Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Miscon
duct, supra note 8, at 1 168, 1217-19 (same); Dirk Johnson, Chicago Council Tries Anew with
Anti-Gang Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A14 (reporting that Annapolis, Md., has
approved a measure that bars convicted drug dealers from loitering in designated areas, and
Grand Prairie, Tex., has adopted an ordinance that allows the police to scatter loiterers if
officers suspect drug dealing); Steve Miletich, Sidewalk Law is Posted, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, May 19, 1994, at Al (discussing Seattle camping and public urination ordi
nances); Michael Ybarra, Don't Ask, Don't Beg, Don't Sit, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, § 4, at
5 (reporting that cities throughout the country have put limits on where panhandlers can
beg). The Ohio Supreme Court recently struck down a Cincinnati ordinance that mandated
the "civil banishment" from "drug exclusion zones" of any person arrested or taken into cus
tody for any drug abuse-related activity. See Ohio v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 858-60 (Ohio
2001).
19. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nui
sance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 415 (1999);
see also Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony
in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2264 (1998); Stephanie Smith, Note,
Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (2000). In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), the
California Supreme Court held that the state's public nuisance law permits courts to enjoin
gang activities that constitute a "public nuisance."
20. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1 173.
21. See William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement
of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 448-50 (1995); James Q. Wilson & George A.
Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29, 31-32; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41
(1999) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] ("The 'Broken Windows' thesis is that crime is most
effectively combated when the police can address signs of visible disorder - including loi-
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that low-level public disorder left unchecked (such as an unrepaired
broken window) can disrupt a neighborhood's social fabric. The com
bined effects of minor misconduct contribute to the deterioration of
community norms generally and thus to increased criminal activity of
a more serious nature.22 A persistent theme sounded by proponents of
the broken windows thesis is that the preservation of accessible, open,
safe, and inviting public spaces is essential to the ongoing viability of
urban neighborhoods and the liberty and security of their residents.23
What is common to these types of quality of life ordinances is that
they seek to control the aggregate effects of small individual acts of
misbehavior in order to effect an overall change in the way certain ur
ban spaces are used and viewed. The individual panhandler is not, in
and of himself, a danger to the community. According to proponents
of quality of life measures, however, repeated aggressive panhandling
by a number of individuals can soon make the street unpleasant, and,
more important, create an image of disorder that is threatening to law
abiding people.24 The strategy is to project a sense of orderliness and
cleanliness on the street. Orderliness will invite law-abiding people to
use the street more often, which will make the street still safer by in
creasing the number of informal "eyes" on the street and the sense
that it can and should be used.25 More important, law-abiding people
will come to see the street as orderly and expect it to be so, contribut
ing to further enforcement of the informal norms of civil street be-

tering - that destabilize commumhes and stimulate the commission of more serious
crimes."). For a discussion of the "broken windows" thesis, see Livingston, supra note 8, at
578-91.
22. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 16, at 370-76; Wilson & Kelling, supra note
21, at 32.
23. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1 174 ("Rules of
proper street behavior are not an impediment to freedom, but a foundation of it."); Peti
tioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 14 ("[B]y moving gang members along, police officers can
restore order to the streetscape and stop crime before it occurs. . . . And by enabling the po
lice to demonstrate control over the streetscape and the most lawless elements in the com
munity, loitering laws make people feel safer, thereby invigorating neighborhoods."); see
also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76-167 (1997) (arguing that order
maintenance policing often protects minority residents who are disproportionately victims of
minority lawbreaking).
24. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF
DECA y IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 48 ( 1990) ("Visible physical and social disruption
is a signal that the mechanisms by which healthy neighborhoods maintain themselves have
broken down. If an area loses its capacity to solve even seemingly minor problems, its char
acter becomes suspect.").
25. Jane Jacobs's THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 24-34, 29-1 12
(1961) offers the original "eyes on the street" thesis. Her work is often cited by proponents
of order maintenance policing, see, e.g., Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra
note 8, at 1 171; Livingston, supra note 8, at 558-59, despite her professed wariness of man
aged public spaces, see JACOBS, supra, at 41.
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havior.26 As stated by the City of Chicago in its brief defending the
Gang Congregation Ordinance: " 'Norms of order are critical to
keeping social influence pointed away from, rather than toward crimi
nality; the spectacle of open gang activity, vandalism, aggressive pan
handling, and other forms of disorder transmits signals that cause both
lawbreakers and law-abiders to behave in ways conducive to crime.' "27
The individual panhandler is thus more dangerous than he might ini
tially seem because he represents the first in a cascade of broken win
dows.28
The second large-scale structural trend at work in Morales, though
less directly, is the increasing insistence on and institutionalization of
local control over local environments. Like the new policing, this lo
calism has been precipitated in part as a response to urban disorder
and the problems of urban governance generally. In addition, the last
decade saw a reinvigorated suspicion of centralized government, or at
least the political harnessing of a dissatisfaction with its workings, as
well as a renewed call for decentralizing power to increasingly local
institutions.29 These broader calls for decentralization have been ac26. Sociologists note that anxiety of disorder itself may lead to a breakdown of social
control mechanisms that can prevent crime regardless of whether the anxiety is realistic. "In
response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening [social] controls." Wilson & Kelling,
supra note 21, at 33.
27. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 15 (quoting Kahan, Social Influence, supra note
16, at 391); see Livingston, supra note 8, at 580 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note 21, at
32) ("[S]igns of disorder - abandoned property, accumulating litter, inebriates slumped on
the sidewalk, and teenagers loitering or fighting in front of the corner store - prompt fear
ful residents to use the street less often and avoid involvement in matters that occur there.
' . . . Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people
are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change
hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped.' " ) .
28. For critiques of what has variously been called "order maintenance policing," "norm
enforcing policing," "quality of life policing," and the "new discretion," see David Cole, Dis
cretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholar
ship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1083-87 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on Subject: A Cri
tique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and
Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Toni Massaro,
The Gang's Not Here, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 25 (1998); Dorothy Roberts, Foreword: Race,
Vagueness, and the Social Order of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 775, 790-99 (1999).
29. See, e.g., NEWf GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995) ( " 'Closer is better'
should be the rule of thumb for our decision making; less power in Washington and more
back home, our consistent theme."). The devolutionary impulse is not new. See Harry N.
Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism - An American Tradition: Modern
Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 239-40 (1996) (describing
the "federalism creed" of the late nineteenth century when "most American political leaders
regularly paid lip service to the idea that smaller government was better than larger" and
that power should reside in the states). Indeed, the ideology of localism is deeply embedded
in the intellectual, cultural, and constitutional history of the United States, though not al
ways politically emergent. Thomas Jefferson was the " 'first and also the foremost, advocate
of local self government.' " Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American
Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 10506 (quoting A. SYED, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 38
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companied by the proliferation of sublocal governmental or quasi
governmental institutions that replace or supplement the existing ar
ray of local governments.30 These institutions, which include residen
tial community associations (commonly known as homeowners asso
ciations), downtown business improvement districts, and special
districts, often provide those services that traditional local govern
ments either do not normally undertake or cannot undertake because
they are overwhelmed, incompetent, unresponsive, or all of these.31
The arguments on behalf of decentralized local governance are
various and overlapping, but some highlights can be noted here.32 Ad
vocates of decentralization to the neighborhood level argue that local
governments are more responsive to the specific needs of unique
communities and that local institutions can provide better and in
creased services. Neighborhood-level governments can tailor their
policies and allocate resources more efficiently than can larger gov
ernments.33 They also provide increased opportunities for political par(1966)). Jefferson advocated the division of counties into "wards," each of which would
function as a "little republic." Jefferson conceived of these wards as places in which the
yeoman farmer would play a personal part in the administration of public affairs. See id.
Alexis de Tocqueville similarly argued that small-scale municipal institutions allow citizens
to "practice the art of government in the small sphere within . . . (their) reach." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, 1 D EMOCRACY IN AMERICA, at 61, 68 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (1835).
The Jeffersonian legacy can be found in contemporary articulations of the civic republican
tradition. See, e.g. , MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S D ISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 202 (1996).
30. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
MINN. L. REV. 503, 521-33, 534 (1997) (discussing the development of sublocal structures
like business improvement districts, enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, and
special zoning districts, and noting that though these institutions may lead to improved mu
nicipal service provision, they may also exacerbate intralocal service inequalities).
31. See id. at 508-24; Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) (hereinafter Ellickson, Cities] (arguing that homeowners associa
tions can provide local public goods more efficiently than municipalities in many cases);
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 79-89 (1998)
[hereinafter Ellickson, New Institutions] (proposing that cities create new block improve
ment districts ( BLIDs") modeled on the homeowners association and the business im
provement district in order to provide block-level goods).
"

32. The strands of localism tend to cut across traditional political and scholarly lines. For
example, Richard Briffault observes that the arguments on behalf of local power are a
"striking harmonization of the otherwise divergent values of the free market, civic republi
canism and critical legal studies." Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part I - The Structure of
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). Despite this convergence, there are
serious disagreements among advocates of decentralization. For example, even those who
agree that participation in collective governance in small-scale settings is a positive good of
decentralization do not agree on the proper character of the institutions in which such gov
ernance should take place, who gets to participate, or the structure of that participation.
Compare Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31, at 1519-20, with Gerald Frug, Cities and Home
owners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982).
33. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31; Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 7989. The law and economics model of local government is primarily a legacy of Charles
Tiebout's A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), which devel
oped a marketplace theory of municipal competition in which "rivalry among local govern-
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ticipation and thus offer venues for individual engagement in collec
tive governance, which is a positive good for the individual and for the
wider political community.34 Indeed, neighborhoods may be our most
central and resilient sites for civic involvement, the best loci of com
munity and fellowship that we have in an increasingly fractured met
ropolitan area and an increasingly globalized society.35
The new policing and the reinvigorated localism end up in the
same place. Scholars and policy-makers have increasingly advocated
the proliferation of lawmaking authority down to the neighborhood
and block level. A. burgeoning literature calls for deference to local
decisions addressing the quality of life on streets and in particular
neighborhoods, and suggests that norms of street (and other) behavior
be set locally. Indeed, the strongest advocates of quality of life ordi
nances, including Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, argue that
to a significant degree " 'police activity on the street should be shaped,
in important ways, by the standards of the neighborhood rather than
by the rules of the state.' "36 This is a claim that communities - not at
the level of the state, region, municipality, or even town, but at the
level of the neighborhood - not only can but should effect basic
changes in the fundamental rules that govern relations between the
state and the individual, as well as among individuals.
Neighborhood governance is not new to urban planners and local
government scholars;37 however, advocacy of the power of neighborments (for residents] is analogous to rivalry among firms" in fostering efficiency in the provi
sion of public goods. VINCENT OSTROM, ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 206 (1988).
34. See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 84 & n.35 (arguing that block-level
institutions are "well scaled to strengthen individual members' involvement and skills in
collective governance"). The argument that localities are centrally important sites for collec
tive self-governance, and therefore should be structured in order to promote participatory
governance in small-scale settings, is most associated with Gerald E. Frug's influential arti
cle, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). His recent book, CITY
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT WALLS 11 (1999) (hereinafter FRUG, CITY
MAKING], expands on that project, developing an "ideal of city life" on which to base a lo
calism premised on creating forums for collective governance among strangers. David
Barron has recently joined those advocates of decentralized local government who argue
that "our towns and cities are . . . important political institutions that are directly responsible
for shaping the contours of 'ordinary civic life in a free society.' The Promise of Cooley's
City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) (quoting Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
"

35. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, at 57, 72-74 (March 1996). For a cogent summary of "the case for lo
calism," see Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (2000)
[hereinafter Briffault, Localism and Regionalism].
36. Livingston, supra note 8, at 560 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note 21, at 34).
37. See, e.g., HOWARD w. HALLMAN, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT IN A
METROPOLITAN SETTING 1 2 (1974) (advocating that "(n]eighborhood government should
be established in the larger cities of the United States [as it] would contribute to improved
urban governance"); DAVID MORRIS & KARL HESS, NEIGHBORHOOD POWER: THE NEW
LOCALISM 5, 99 (1975) (discussing neighborhood governance). In Los Angeles, for instance,
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hoods to generate fundamental (constitutional) norms is something
more recently devised.38 Proponents of this devolutionary approach
employ the language of community autonomy and democracy in de
fending policies that would normally be considered violative of consti
tutional guarantees. Proponents of community standards do not de
fend these policies using the traditional language of rights. Instead,
they mount a territory-based offensive grounded in a robust concep
tion of community self-determination: territorially defined communi
ties should be permitted to depart from background constitutional
norms under certain circumstances. Neighborhood constitutionalism
constitutes the devolution of norm creation down to the local and
sublocal level, a constitutional rights discourse with localism at its cen
ter.
B.

Three Accounts of Community

A number of scholars have taken up the call for community stan
dards, for the decentralization of norms down to the neighborhood
calls for neighborhood governance have been a constant refrain. See Donald G. Hagman,
Regionalized-Decentralism: A Mode for Rapprochement in Los Angeles, 58 GEO. L.J. 901,
927-931 (1970) (suggesting a two-tier structure that simultaneously decentralizes city gov
ernment to neighborhood-level "boroughs" while providing for a city-county revenue shar
ing metropolitan area government). Hagman noted when he was writing thirty years ago that
the "desire for a decentralized Los Angeles is not novel." Id. (describing history of decen
tralization movements in Los Angeles, and citing proposals for neighborhood governance).
Los Angeles's most recently enacted city charter institutionalizes neighborhood councils,
though they operate in an advisory capacity only. See Los Angeles City Charter § 900 (July
7, 2000). For a discussion of the debates concerning neighborhood governance in Los
Angeles, and one City Charter Commissioner's change of heart concerning the powers of
neighborhood councils, see Erwin Chemerinsky, On Being a Framer: The Los Angeles
Charter Reform Commission, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 131 , 142-44 (1999) (describing how Professor
Chemerinsky initially supported empowered neighborhood councils but changed his mind
and eventually opposed granting councils strong governing powers, particularly any powers
over land use).
38. The distinction between neighborhood involvement in local governance and neigh
borhood norm generation can be illustrated by the difference between community policing
and order maintenance or quality of life policing. The former is an organizational strategy
that seeks to improve the effectiveness of current law enforcement by decentralizing com
mand structures and increasing local input into police priorities and practices. See WESLEY
G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETI, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 5-9 (1997)
(identifying four principles of community policing: (1) organizational decentralization; (2) a
broadly focused, problem-oriented policing; (3) responsiveness to the public's setting of pri
orities; and (4) a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems through their
own local organizations). The latter refers to a policing based in a social norm theory of de
viance and to those substantive legal regimes designed to prevent deviance by enforcing
norms of civility and order. Though sometimes used interchangeably, community policing
can be employed to enforce existing norms and need not be accompanied by the adoption of
local order maintenance norms. Indeed, Chicago has instituted an extensive community po
licing regime that has been used as a model of decentralized, community-centered policing.
See id. at passim. Though the line between community norm generation and community in
put can be fine, it is important to recognize the distinction between arguments in favor of a
decentralized chain of command and arguments on behalf of neighborhood or local political
sovereignty.
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level. For example, Debra Livingston has argued that policing be tar
geted to the norms and requirements of specific streets.39 Professor
Livingston contends that courts should defer to community-set be
havioral standards that "make a community's public life possible."40
Robert Ellickson similarly suggests that cities use geographically spe
cific norms to police what he calls "chronic street nuisances" in public
places, like aggressive panhandling and bench squatting.41 He, too, ar
gues for establishing community standards as the basis for police ac
tion, defining a chronic street nuisance as persistent action in a public
space that violates "prevailing community standards."42 Mark Rosen
advocates an even broader decentralized constitutionalism, claiming
that courts should permit "geographical variations of constitutional
requirements in the aid of community."43 Professor Rosen argues that
rights should be context sensitive: neighborhoods, like the residents of
Chicago's public housing projects, should be able to adopt constitu
tional norms that differ substantially from background norms where
that adoption might be crucial to their survival.44
Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have provided the most
forceful argument in favor of constitutional nonuniformity. Indeed,
they were the principal authors of an amicus brief submitted on behalf
of a number of neighborhood organizations in support of Chicago's
Gang Congregation Ordinance.45 Amici did not principally argue that
the ordinance was constitutional as set against the Court's current doc
trinal standards. Instead, they argued that courts "should adjust the
level of constitutional scrutiny applied to a policing technique based
on the breadth of its impact on liberty within the community."46 The
amici claimed that the Court should defer to communal norms that
limit individual freedom where those norms are generated by the

39. Livingston, supra note 8, at 560-62.
40. Id. at 562.
41. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1 167-76.
42. Id. at 1 185.
43. Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Consti
tutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1 129, 1 130-39 (1999)
("[T]he Illinois Supreme Court overlooked geographical non-uniformity in City of Chicago
v. Morales, when it struck down a gang antiloitering law."). But cf Gerald L. Neuman, Ter
ritorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
264-65 (1987) (arguing that territorial discriminations should not be exempt from equal pro
tection analysis and that deference should be limited to "truly exceptional" cases).
44. See

Rosen, supra note 43, at 1193-94.

45. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief].
46. Id.

November 2001]

Limits of Localism

385

community and the "community itself is sharing in the burden that the
law imposes on individual freedom."47
Invoking this same shared burdens theory, Professors Kahan and
Meares have defended the Chicago Housing Authority's policy
authorizing warrantless searches of public housing apartments.48 After
waves of shootings at the Robert Taylor Homes and the Stateway
Gardens public housing projects, the Chicago Housing Authority
adopted a policy of authorizing police to search public housing apart
ments without first obtaining a warrant and in the absence of exigent
circumstances. A federal district court in Chicago struck down the
policy, despite the residents' apparent overwhelming support for the
measure.49 Kahan and Meares have argued that the court should have
considered the context of the policy, the purpose of its enactment, and
the direction of its burdens before overriding the residents' decision.
The building search policy, like the Gang Congregation Ordinance,
"was enacted not to oppress the City's minority residents; rather it
sprang from the grievances of those very citizens, who demanded ef
fective action to rid their neighborhoods of drive-by shootings, fight
ing, and open-air drug dealing."50 In both cases, "we think that the
residents of Chicago's high-crime, minority neighborhoods . . . are the
citizens entitled to determine whether the . . . law reasonably balances
liberty and order. "51
These scholars' call for community standards rests upon a powerful
argument for community self-determination premised upon a concep
tion of the individual as a normatively entitled person, a person whose
j udgment in "balanc[ing] liberty and order"52 is entitled to the wider
political community's moral respect. For advocates of this form of de
centralization, community autonomy is a normative imperative that
vindicates the individual's freedom of choice and thus "allows for the
fullest expression of self."53 But the idea that the neighborhood is a
47. Id.; see Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 9, at 209-10.
48. See Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at
1.
49. See Pratt v . Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F . Supp. 792 (N .D . Ill. 1994).
50. Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 5.
Erik Luna calls Kahan and Meares' shared burdens theory a "neo-political process theory of
criminal procedure," because it requires that courts assess whether a given law is an instru
ment for oppressing a traditionally insular minority or an instrument of political and social
empowerment adopted by that minority. See Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48
DUKE L.J. 787, 812 (1999). This characterization is accurate, though I argue that there is an
independent devolutionary impulse - an argument about the appropriate scale for decision
making - that underlies the shared burdens theory as well.
51. Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra note 9, at 258-59.
52. Id. at 258.
53. Georgette Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 607, 622 (1997).
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place that fosters individual freedom can be contrasted with a tradi
tion that views the neighborhood as a threat to individual liberty. For
James Madison writing in Federalist No. 10, the conventional wisdom
that republican government required a circumscribed territory con
taining a relatively small number of (like-thinking) citizens was mis
taken.54 Indeed, such a republic would be more susceptible to the
"mischiefs of faction" - the ready creation of oppressive majorities.
In contrast, if you
extend the sphere . . . you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who
feel it to discover their own strength and act in unison with each other.55

Madison's community of heterogeneous citizens ranging over a
wide territory contrasts with the neighborhood constitutionalists'
community of homogeneous neighbors living in close quarters. And
indeed, these two images map onto two compelling American political
visions. On the one hand, the Madisonian vision is concerned with fac
tions and tyranny, the political process gone awry. On the other hand,
the pluralist vision that animates neighborhood constitutionalism is
concerned with the moral worth that we as other actors in the political
system attach to individuals engaged in collective decisionmaking.
Thus, for Kahan and Meares, the "real questions" are: "Why can't we
trust residents of the inner city to decide for themselves . . . ?
Shouldn't these individuals be allowed to determine whether this is
the most sensible way to improve their lives?"56 The question "Why
don't we trust them?" is an implicit denunciation of perceived moral,
intellectual, and political superiority, a charge that we are not treating
"these" people and "their" community with equal concern and re
spect.
The question "Why don't we trust them?" also presumes a "them"
- a community of entitled decisionmakers. Yet, though rarely ad
dressed, how community is defined is a central and difficult issue. In
the following sections, I separate out three accounts of community
that are often invoked in parallel, taking advantage of political and le
gal theory to help construct my own particular and stylized models.
These models - I call them contractarian, deep, and dualist accounts
of community - each provide different and often competing bases for
identifying normatively entitled decisionmakers. I treat them in detail
here in order to make explicit the foundations for the moral claims
being asserted by advocates of decentralization on behalf of neighbor-

54. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 81-84 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1788).
55. Id. at 83.

56. Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 6
(emphasis in original).
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hood decisionmakers. Morales is a useful vehicle for this enterprise
because it nicely illustrates how the rhetoric of community hides a set
of overlapping (and oftentimes contradictory) understandings of what
a community is. Indeed, it is quite striking how the language of com
munity is deployed in legal rhetoric to take advantage of all three ac
counts, despite the fundamental differences in how each account un
derstands the nature of the individual and, in tum, the nature of
community.
These accounts of community are both descriptive and prescrip
tive, at once describing who belongs in the community and accounting
for the legitimacy of the community's lawmaking. This section illus
trates how the descriptive and prescriptive are linked (and often con
flated) when we talk about community, and particularly when we try
to translate membership into legal authority.
1.

Contractarian

The contractarian account of community derives collective auton
omy from individual autonomy. On this account, community is a
product of individual acts of voluntary association, an outcome of in
dividuals who have consented to join in a group. The contractarian ac
count of community represents a "liberal"57 theory of the group in that
the group's authority to act on behalf of its members is understood as
an extension of the individual's authority to act for herself by associ
ating with others. Group autonomy is an instrument of individual
autonomy.
The foundational premise of the contractarian account is consent.
At its simplest, we should defer to the Gang Congregation Ordinance
and other kinds of local norms if and when those norms are freely cho
sen by those who are affected by the norms' operation.58 When local
norms are the product of choice and not either a product or an instru
ment of oppression, they should be deemed legitimate. To consider
such norms otherwise is to coerce individuals who do not share our
values to abandon theirs.

57. See ALEXANDER M. BICKLE, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3-6 (1975). The contrac
tarianism of the liberal tradition begins with Locke and Rousseau, see generally SOCIAL
CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU (1962), and has been refined more
recently by John Rawls, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). This descriptive account does not suggest a norma
tive theory of the just society premised on the heuristic of a "primal contract," but has the
more modest goal of describing a model of association that is premised on individual auton
omy.
58. Of course, determining whether norms are "freely chosen" by "those affected" is no
easy task, which is why contractarianism often relies on constitutions to do the work of de
fining the relevant polity, determining how the polity will aggregate preferences, and de
scribing what kinds of decisions will be out of bounds. See Sheldon Wolin, Fugitive Democ
racy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 33-34 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
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A contractarian community may be narrowly drawn for instrumen
tal purposes (the chess club) or it may embrace more comprehensive
religious, political, and moral doctrines (the religious commune). The
depth or quality of communal attachments is not important as long as
the group is based in an uncoerced compact, which can take the form
of either an explicit agreement setting the terms of membership or a
tacit agreement to live by the membership's practices. The contrac
tarian account of community does not distinguish among groups on
the basis of substantive practices, beliefs, or purposes; it is, in the fa
miliar parlance of political philosophers, "neutral" towards competing
conceptions of the good life.59 Thus, the commune, the residential
community association, and the neighborhood are all "communities"
whose distinctive practices are deserving of respect when those prac
tices arise out of an uncoerced agreement.
The important distinction for contractarians is between associa
tions and aggregates - that is, between groups formed out of the pur
suit of a common goal or interest and individuals who happen to share
a common characteristic.60 The former type of group can exercise le
gitimate authority over its membership because it is grounded in con
sent, while the latter's authority would constitute a highly question
able exercise of coercion.
Indeed, the legal treatment of groups that are understood as asso
ciations of like minds differs substantially from the legal treatment of
groups that are understood as aggregates of strangers. Judicial defer
ence to the exercise of extra-property regulation by homeowners asso
ciations stems from the fact that individual residents have entered into
agreements to live there and be subject to the association's norms.61
59. Michael Sandel, Introduction, in LI BERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 3-4 (Michael Sandel
ed., 1984).
60. Iris Young discusses the difference between aggregates and associations in JUSTICE
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE ch.2 (1990).
61. Courts tend to review the actions of boards of directors of homeowners associations
(residential community associations) using a mixture of the business j udgment rule and a
reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Buckingham v. Weston Viii. Homeowners Ass'n, 571
N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1997) (holding that, in general, decisions by boards of directors will be
reviewed under the business j udgment rule to ensure that those decisions are made in good
faith and in furtherance of the legitimate interests of the condominium, and do not involve
fraud, self-dealing, unconscionability, or other misconduct; however, actions adversely af
fecting a minority of owners will be reviewed under a reasonableness standard whereby a
court must consider: (1) whether the decision or rule is arbitrary; (2) whether the decision or
rule is applied in an even-handed or discriminatory manner; and (3) whether the decision or
rule was made in good faith for the common welfare of the owners and occupants of the
condominium).
Increasingly, courts have favored the fairly open-ended reasonableness standard because
it protects "minorities from the tyranny of the majority." Id. at 844. For example, in
California, reasonableness review is a statutory requirement: "The covenants and restric
tions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and
shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development."
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1354 (West Supp. 1994). The reasonableness rule holds that, although the
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Some commentators claim that courts should be even more deferential
than they already are, arguing that homeowners associations accu
rately reflect the preferences of their residents and that courts should
allow for the most extensive exercise of private associational ordering
possible.62 Deference to acts of private "constitution-making" reflects
respect for individual autonomy.63
Some might object that the homeowners association is "private"
and thus entitled to enforce norms of behavior that "public" cities and
neighborhoods would not be permitted to enforce. But the pri
vate/public distinction fails to answer the question of what makes a
homeowners association different from a neighborhood. Both home
owners associations and neighborhoods contain spaces - streets,
parks, sidewalks - set aside for the common use of their mem
bers/citizens. Of course, in a homeowners association, the common
spaces may be "owned" and governed by a private government; title
of common areas may be in the collective or in a corporation governed
by a coop board. In a city, the common spaces are owned and gov
erned by a public government. But this definition is tautological: the
condominium's governing body has broad authority to regulate the internal affairs of the
development, this power is not unlimited, and any rule, regulation, or amendment to the
declaration or bylaws must be reasonable. Under the reasonableness test, a rule that is un
reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious is invalid. See Worthington Condominium Unit Owners'
Ass'n v. Brown 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); see also Ridgely Condominium
Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis, 681 A.2d 494, 498 (Md. 1996); Scudder v. Greenbrier C. Condomin
ium Ass'n, 663 So. 2d 1362, 1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Bluffs of Wildwood Homeown
ers' Ass'n v. Dinkel, 644 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); O'Buck v. Cottonwood
Viii. Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813, 817 (Alaska 1988); Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d
1313, 1317 (D.C. 1986).
Some courts have sought to distinguish between restrictions contained in the governing
documents of an association and subsequent board-passed regulations. For example, under
Florida law, the former are akin to covenants that run with the land and "will not be invali
dated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of
public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right." Hidden Har
bour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 1981). Such restrictions are "clothed
with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual
unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed." Id.
In contrast, board-passed rules are tested for reasonableness. See id. ; see also Pines of Boca
Harwood Condominium Ass'n v. Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (de
scribing the two standards of review and validating restriction on pets contained in associa
tion's governing declaration).
62. These scholars argue that "reasonableness review" is too broad a standard and en
ables courts to override association actions far too readily. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note
31, at 1519-30; see also Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
906, 926 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he system of private governance on balance works pretty
well," and that the doctrine of changed conditions should "not become the entering wedge
of a large-scale system of judicial control over private homeowners' associations"); cf
Gillette, supra note 13, 1441 (1994) (defending homeowners associations as a "mechanism
for sorting that is no more invidious than we allow through the creation of more formal ju
risdictions (municipal corporations) and that is more responsive than those institutions to
the desires of residents").
63. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 3 1 , at 1519-30; cf Epstein, supra note 62, at 907 (de
scribing the mutual covenants in homeowners associations as "mini-constitutions").
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most useful difference that can be gleaned from this distinction is that
private groups are governed by private governments and public groups
are governed by public governments.
Instead, in important ways, the private/public distinction on the
contractarian account turns on whether a particular group of people is,
in our view, an association of like minds or an aggregation of strang
ers. The publicness of the city is a function of the fact that cities are
"imperfectly voluntary" groups.64 A city's residents only partially
choose with whom they want to live. In contrast to the aggregate of
strangers, the homeowners association (or the religious commune) is
understood as a perfectly voluntary group.65 These groups consist of
residents/believers who contracted/covenanted to a certain way of life,
and who could leave if they came to disagree with the governance of
the community. The association's lawmaking - whether residential
community association's or religious commune's - is deserving of
deference because it is an expression of the individual's right to enter
into and break contracts to join or dissolve a community.
In other words, the whole (the community) is the sum of its parts
(the individuals). The now-familiar model of municipal competition
advanced by Charles Tiebout reflects this contractarian account of
community.66 According to Tiebout, under ideal conditions, multiple,
decentralized local government leads to competition between locali
ties that results in better local service provision at a cheaper cost for
all taxpayers and consumers of municipal services. Institutions with
the attributes of government (whether "private" like homeowners as
sociations or "public" like municipalities67) provide venues for the pur
suit of various (and competing) bundles of municipal services and
amenities. This competition allows individuals and firms to express
their preferences among service packages by continually selecting
where to locate. Consumer-voters register their preferences by "voting
with their feet" - by moving into or out of the locality. Indeed, locali
ties are best understood as mechanisms for distributing preferences in
a municipal services market that disciplines poorly performing, nonre
sponsive localities with the threat that unhappy residents or firms will
exit in favor of a more responsive neighboring jurisdiction. This mar
ket, absent barriers to entry and repaired for market flaws,68 results in

64. Frank Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977).
65. Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31, at 1522-23.
66. See Tiebout, supra note 33, at 416.
67. See Gillette, supra note 13, at 1388-402 (applying Tiebout's public goods model to
homeowners associations).
68. Tiebout assumed certain conditions, including perfect information, mobility, the ab
sence of externalities, and substantial choice among localities. See Tiebout, supra note 33.
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neighborhoods of voluntary association, freely chosen by those who
share a preference to live there.
The argument on behalf of local power is thus grounded in indi
vidual choice. Decentralized government allows for a wider array of
forms of association, thereby vindicating individual autonomy and the
efficiency and responsiveness of government in general. In order for
such a regime to function, localities must be able to dictate the terms
and conditions of membership in the community, to exclude those who
do not wish to abide by the community's terms, and to coerce rule
breakers to conform.
Thus, as one would expect, it was very important for advocates of
the Gang Congregation Ordinance to emphasize that the residents of
inner-city Chicago overwhelmingly favored the ordinance - that it
was not imposed upon them as an instrument of oppression, but was
instead a product of individual choice exercised through a legitimate,
recognized, and open political process.69 The important point for these
advocates is that the residents of high-crime Chicago neighborhoods
expressed a preference for a norm that constrained their own behav
ior. State intervention to override such local constitution-making is
dangerous because it threatens individual autonomy. This intervention
is particularly paternalistic when applied to minority and poor indi
viduals whose autonomy is regularly discounted by the state. State in
tervention is also inefficient because it effectively dismantles a power
ful sorting mechanism for individual preferences, a mechanism that
enhances overall social welfare by allowing residents to exercise their
preference for certain amenities or norms by choosing where and how
to live. On this account, the city of Chicago is losing the municipal
service competition to the suburbs because Chicago cannot provide
safe streets as part of its service package. By restricting Chicago's
ability to do so, the Court ensures that the city will never be able to
compete for residents, most of whom would prefer safe streets to vio
lent ones.
Of course, the contractarian does not ignore possible dissenters, in
this case, presumably the gang members themselves. They too have
preferences, which can be fulfilled in two ways. They can exercise their

69. Proponents argued that the fact that the minority representatives of the minority
residents of inner-city Chicago supported the measure differentiated it from measures that
the Court struck down thirty years before when minorities did not have meaningful access to
the political process. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5, 14-16 ("[T)he Ordinance is not a
tool of repression being used by white majorities to reinforce the exclusion of minorities
from the community's political and economic life. . . . Unlike the public order provisions
scrutinized by this Court in the 1960's, the Ordinance was not imposed on minorities by an
alien political establishment. . . . In short, any suggestion that the Ordinance was adopted as
a cover for harassing minority youths is completely misguided."); see also Meares & Kahan,
When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 8; Meares & Kahan, Black,
White and Gray, supra note 9, at 251 .
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option to exit7° the neighborhood (which is in part exactly what the
ordinance intended), or they can challenge the ordinance by invoking
a constitution to which the residents have previously bound them
selves and to which they (residents and gang members alike) have ar
guably also consented.71 Recourse to this latter option, however, needs
to be balanced against the strong presumption that associational pref
erences should be accommodated - if possible - through the former.
Thus, though the contractarian does not ignore conflicting prefer
ences, the usual solution to conflict inside a voluntary association is
separation - the exiting of the dissenting member from the group. If
you do not like the chess club's rules, you can leave and join another
club.
This is why describing Chicago's inner-city residents and their
neighborhoods as "communities" is a useful rhetorical move. Commu
nity implies an association of like minds collectively pursuing a com
mon end - a voluntary association. The normative intuition is to
lessen distrust of norms when those norms are characterized as the
outcome of collective, voluntary decisionmaking by like-minded indi
viduals. Associations of like minds are different from the Madisonian
majorities that create and enforce community norms against minori
ties. Associations govern through covenants that extend the individ
ual's autonomy, allowing the individual to order relations with others
of a similar persuasion in order to alter the terms of social life by
joining together in a group. Aggregates govern through a politics lim
ited by rights that protect individual autonomy from group encroach
ment. In the former, the group enables a particular pursuit of the good
life; in the latter, the group is a threat to a particular pursuit of the
good life. By denying the effect of the Gang Congregation Ordinance,
the Court essentially coerced residents of the inner city to live by
norms with which they do not agree and from which they cannot es
cape except by leaving the neighborhood.
In short, the more the neighborhood looks like a homeowners as
sociation or a commune (the more it looks like a product of choice),
the more its norms are worthy of deference (because overriding such
norms will increasingly look like coercion). Indeed, for some commen
tators, local governance is only legitimate where it is premised on the
contractarian foundation of consent. As Georgette Poindexter writes:
70. For a discussion of the concept of "exit," see ALBERT o. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE
& LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 22-25

(1970).
71. Such a constitution can take the form of a mythical contract, establishing the terms
of the social order and the conditions of j ustice behind Rawls' "veil of ignorance" where we
do not know if we are the gang members or the other residents of the neighborhood, see
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), or it can take the form of a set of rights codi
fied in a historically bound text, such as a city charter, a state constitution, or the Constitu
tion of the United States.
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"The Lockean requirement of voluntary association· for a legitimate
government when used as a premise for . . . neighborhoods, will insure
that . . . all parties have consented by joining the final product."72 For
Professor Poindexter, the standard for local government is whether it
"validate[s] consumers' individualism and revealed choice by dissolv
ing legal impediments to the full and free expression of their choice. "73
The neighborhood is a tool for the realization of individual autonomy.
Once legal structures that permit the "fullest expression of self"74 are
put into place, communities (whether communes, homeowners asso
ciations, neighborhoods, towns or cities) should be permitted to self
govern because such local governance maximizes the individual's
freedom of choice.
2.

Deep

According to the deep75 account of community, describing the
community as a voluntary association is too thin a characterization of
human experience and an insufficient basis for local constitution
making. The deep account of community reverses the direction of in
dividual and community. It rejects the idea that the individual can ex
ist or be sustained outside of, and prior to, his or her relationships with
others, prior to a community that infuses individual choices and expe
riences with meaning.76 Instead, the deep account of community con
ceives of the individual as always operating "within the discursive
forms of a community that engages its members in an integrated view
of their place in the cosmos, their history, their culture, and the
meaning of personal experiences."77 Human beings are never wholly
stripped of their communal identities, nor can they be. As Michael
Sandel writes: " [C]ommunity describes not just what they have as fel
low citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as
72. Poindexter, supra note 53, at 653.
73. Id. at 609.
74. Id. at 622.
75. The term "deep" is borrowed from Seymour Mandelbaum, Open Moral Communi
ties, in EXPLORATIONS IN PLANNING THEORY 86 (Mandelbaum et al. eds., 1 996) (discussing
the concept of "deep moral communities") [hereinafter Mandelbaum (1996)]. For an ex
tended version of Mandelbaum's article, see SEYMOUR MANDELBAUM, OPEN MORAL
COMMUNITIES chs. 3-5 (2000) [hereinafter MANDELBAUM (2000)].
76. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, supra note 59: For a summary of the legal and philosophi
cal literature that reflects the "constitutive conception of the self," see FRUG, CITY MAKING,
supra note 34, at ch.4.
77. Mandelbaum (1996), supra note 75, at 86. Others have used the term "affective
communities" to describe "the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture." ROBERT P.
WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 187-92 (1 968); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Pov
erty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty of Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 277, 312-14 (defining "affective communities" as culturally homogeneous commu
nities united by deep affective ties).
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in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not
merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity."78 Group auton
omy is thus required for the individual's realization of his or her own
psychological and moral place in the world.
The deep account of community asserts that, while some human
associations are intentional, many of the most important ones are not.
Family, church, neighborhood, and nation have aspects of intentional
ity, but are oftentimes imposed.79 Indeed, voluntary association is a
weak thread with which to stitch together community. Community in
volves shared experiences, deep attachments, mutual affection, and a
sense of belonging. While it may be created or maintained through
contract, community cannot be reduced to the mere coming together
for mutual advantage that the contractarian account implies. The con
tract between self-seeking individuals at the heart of the contractarian
account of community is at best an imperfect foundation on which to
base a robust community; at worst, it destroys it.
Foregoing the social contract, the deep account of community re
lies instead on concepts of mutuality and reciprocity - a sense of con
nection that inheres in social creatures. The amici who defended the
Chicago ordinance call this "linked fate."80 According to the amicus
brief submitted on behalf of area neighborhood organizations, sup
porters of the Chicago ordinance are "the mothers and fathers, the sis
ters and brothers, and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject
to the law."81 The inner-city residents, argued proponents of the ordi
nance, are linked by strong social and familial ties to the gang member
against whom the ordinance is enacted, are members of "communities
that individuals can create and maintain through social networks."82
The residents' deep social connections and shared experiences situate
them in a common narrative that gives their particularized constitu
tion-making its authoritativeness.83
78. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1982).
79. Group affiliation "has the character of what Martin Heidigger calls 'throwness': one
finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as always already having been."
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 43 (1990).
80. Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5, 16-17.
81. Id. at 2-3.
82. Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (1998).
Meares describes "linked fate" as "the empathy that people have with family and friends,"
though she argues that African Americans' experience with race in America also creates
"critical bonds" between even African Americans who are strangers to one another. Id. at
682-83.
83. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5 ("The residents of those communities . . . are
linked by strong social and familiar ties to the gang members against whom the Ordinance is
enforced. It is precisely because they care so deeply about the welfare of these persons that
residents favor the relatively mild gang-loitering law as an alternative . . . The pervasive
sense of "linked fate" between the majority of these communities' residents and the youths
affected by the Ordinance provides a compelling reasons to respect the community's deter-
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Unlike the contractarian account of community, the deep account
does not turn on what Michael Walzer calls "the right of rupture or
withdrawal."84 Community is not premised on the ability to exit, but
on the presence and quality of social attachments. Indeed, the fact that
the residents of Chicago's poor, minority, inner-city neighborhoods
may not have made a meaningful choice to live there in the first place
or may not easily exit lends their claims for autonomy additional force.
The residents' normative authority stems in part from the reality that
they - and not a federal judge - are faced with violence and crime
everyday that they cannot meaningfully avoid. Unlike the contrac
tarian account, in which the residents' authority to depart from consti
tutional norms is grounded in individual consent, on the deep account,
the residents' normative entitlement to balance liberty and order as
they see fit is a function of their deep social and familial ties to the
neighborhood and their personal experiences living there.85 The
"linked fate" of the residents of the inner-city neighborhood tran
scends the usual aggregate nature of a group of people who happen to
live next door to one another.86
The complex web of social and familial relations can make a
neighborhood into something approaching a communal order - a
constitutive community. Regardless of how the neighborhood initially
came to be created, a neighborhood of friends, relatives, and neigh
bors can adopt norms that are consistent with, or essential to, pre
serving a certain "way of life" that constitutes their collective and in
dividual identities. In contrast to the contractarian account, which sets
the private/public line at the point of contract, the deep account sets
the private/public line at the point of constitutiveness. We are wary of
norms that aggregates of strangers impose on other aggregates of
strangers. We are less wary of norms that "family" and "friends" im
pose on each other. The intuition is that the former kind of rule
making is "public" and needs to be tested against suspicions of bad
faith and self-interest, while the latter is "private," and thus is medi
ated by fellow-feeling.37 The description of supporters of the ordinance
as family and friends is no mere rhetorical flourish. The measure of a
mination that such measures enhance rather than detract from liberty in their communi
ties.").
84. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 21
(1990).
85. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5.
86. See id. at 16 ("Nor can it credibly be maintained that those citizens who supported
the Ordinance did so to oppress minorities within their own neighborhoods . . . . After all,
those who were subject to the Ordinance were not 'outsiders'; they were the sons and daugh
ters, brothers and sisters, and friends and neighbors of the community's own residents.").
87. See id. ("Individuals in these communities tend to evaluate whether a policy benefits
them individually by considering its impact not just on themselves but also on members of
the groups to which they belong.").
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neighborhood's autonomy is the thickness of its communal attach
ments.
The deep account of community sets the community in opposition
to the state. On the contractarian account, the state threatens the indi
vidual by its failure to recognize the individual's associational com
mitments and defer to the individual's choices. The deep account con
ceives of the state as a threat to community qua community. Deep
communities are at risk from the monopolizing and centralizing ten
dencies of the state apparatus and its universalizing norms. Wisconsin
v. Yoder,88 which affirmed the right of a member of the Old Order
Amish to refuse to send his fifteen-year-old daughter to school after
she completed the eighth grade, is an example. In Yoder, the Court
stated that the Amish way of life "is not merely a matter of personal
preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organ
ized group, and intimately related to daily living."89 Compulsory
school attendance laws therefore carry with them "a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community and religious practice."90 The
Court's opinion reflects a deep account of community, specifically an
account of the deep community as exceedingly fragile.
It is not a surprise that Yoder involved children and their socializa
tion into a particular way of life, a point of extreme vulnerability for a
deep community. The deep community often can survive only through
the intergenerational transmission of a specific normative and cultural
tradition.91 At risk in Yoder, advocates claimed, is the very survival of
88. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
89. 406 U.S. at 216.
90. Id. at 218.
91. This same claim of community and cultural self-defense was asserted (this time un
successfully) in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994), by a Hasidic religious community that sought to establish a separate school district
providing special education for Hasidic Jewish children. As in Yoder, the claim by the Kiryas
Joel petitioners that they had a right to teach their children in a separate and protected envi
ronment was asserted against the backdrop of a deep account of community. Robert Cover
calls "paideic" a teleological community that shares a common body of precept and narra
tive that is transmitted through a collective corpus. Cover, supra note 15, at 13-14. The risks
to such communities are particularly visible in disputes over educational issues, because the
public school curriculum invariably comes into conflict with the parents' transmission of
paideic norms. Cf Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state
should allow Amish children an opportunity to be heard before allowing their parents to
keep them out of school because being kept out of school "forever bar[s] [the child] from
entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today . . . . If he is harnessed
to the Amish way of life . . . his entire life may be stunted and deformed"). Another example
is Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in which
fundamentalist parents charged that teaching their children diverse viewpoints in a tolerant
and objective manner threatened the survival of their fundamentalist way of life. See id.
(holding that school board was not required by the Free Exercise Clause to permit children
of fundamentalist Christian parents to opt out selectively from reading certain texts or par
ticipating in a certain offending "secular humanist" curriculum); Stolzenberg, supra note 13,
at 627-28 (discussing Mozert and the tension between cultural pluralism and assimilation).
For an argument that advances an assimilationist reading of the Constitution, see
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a particular community. Amici in Morales invoked similar arguments,
asserting that the Gang Congregation Ordinance was intended to pro
tect the community against a continuing cultural, social, and literal de
cay (far worse, it could be argued, than the possibility of cultural ex
tinction that faced the Amish in Yoder): the criminalization of entire
ethnic neighborhoods, the incarceration or murder of generations of
young African-American and Latino men, and the deterioration of
inner-city, minority neighborhoods whose most robust members con
tinue to abandon their streets and their homes.92 An alternative to the
wholesale warehousing of young black men, argued amici, is a loiter
ing ordinance that stems the drug and gang trade before it results in
the death or long-term incarceration of its youngest members or in the
abandonment of formerly thriving neighborhoods by the majority of
its law-abiding residents.93
The argument for allowing local deviation from constitutional
norms is thus both an affirmative and a preservationist one. The con
tinued existence of deep communities is a good in itself, both because
our humanity is a function of our communal attachments and because
the multiplicity and diversity of particularized normative communities
is a distinct human and societal value.94 On the contractarian account,
the empowered voluntary association extends individual autonomy
and allows for individual preference formation. It thus reinforces the
self-interested and instrumental nature of human interactions as op
posed to emphasizing the human interconnectedness that true com
munity provides. The deep account of community looks for ways to
remove the impediments to connection and to provide groups spaces
in which to create their own moral worlds. Local government law vin
dicates the community (whether it be a commune, neighborhood,
town, or city) by treating it as its own "extensive moral entity"95 and
by requiring that political boundaries be drawn to ensure that the
community has sufficient powers to define and to protect itself.96

Christopher Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 87
(1996). Eisgruber believes that Kiryas Joel was rightly decided by a Court concerned with
cabining separatism. Abner Greene disagrees. See Abner Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two
Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. l, 43-51 (1996).
92. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 17-18.
93. See id. at 20-24.
94. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 31-34 (collecting arguments); see also Cover, supra
note 15, at 68; Greene, supra note 91, at 15-17.
95. Mandelbaum (1996), supra note 75, at 87.
96. Cf. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 188-90 (1989) (ar
guing that we should protect insular minority cultures by "redrawing the boundaries of po
litical units, and redistributing powers between levels of government, so as to ensure that a
minority culture controls a political unit which has sufficient powers to protect the commu
nity").
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Dualist

The deep account thus presents an organic notion of community
that is very different from the highly intentional account offered by
the contractarian. Yet, neither may be wholly sufficient to capture
human experience. The thinness of the contract and the thickness of
the constitutive community are two extremes; we sometimes do not
recognize either as reflecting our experience of community as both
chosen and unchosen. The third set of arguments that ground local
autonomy, which I label "dualist," partakes of both the contractarian
account's emphasis on the intentionality of group life and the deep ac
count's emphasis on the constitutive qualities of community.97 The du
alist account understands community formation as both highly inten
tional and highly immanent in human relationships. On the dualist
account, the self neither fully chooses community nor is it fully em
bedded in it; it is - in the words of political theorists - neither fully
atomistic nor fully situated. Community is instead always in the proc
ess of being negotiated and renegotiated against a background of a
"shifting and amorphous field"98 of social relations. Thus, the dualist
account emphasizes the individual's engagement in a process of collec
tive self-governance. The individual is constituted by his or her en
gagement in the dialogue that occurs during acts of collective deci
sionmaking. Group autonomy makes the exercise of deliberation that
is essential to human flourishing and freedom a meaningful one.
For dualists, " [g]enuine community requires dialogue, robust and
continuous. "99 The dualist account rejects the bland impersonality of
the contract and the fearful nomic insularity of the deep. Intentionality
is expressed through participation: self-government occurs in face-to
face settings. The ideal is a participatory practice whereby individuals
arrive at shared values by engaging in dialogue with each other. The
ongoing negotiation between and within groups for social space occurs
in a consciously public sphere.100 This public sphere is understood as a
97. Cf Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of
Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1217-18 (1994) (offering an account of the self based on
social roles in an effort "to avoid both an individualistic and a collectivist reductionism" by
treating "individuals and collectivities as equally primary and irreducible entities").
98. Mandelbaum (1996), supra note 75, at 89.
99. Alexander, supra note 13, at 61. For that reason, some would call this community
"dialogic." See WOLFF, supra note 77, at 192-93; see also JURGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY
OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 275-330 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
100. The Habermasian concept of the . "bourgeois public sphere" as an institutional
space between state and economy that emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen
turies is more disciplined than my more general use of the term here. See JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY
INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1993)
(1 962). My use of the term is closer to Seyla Benhabib's. Selya Benhabib, Toward a Delib
erative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58,
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place for conversation, in which individuals can engage in negotiation
about the quality and reach of collective norms and, by extension, the
individual's own commitments to his or her multiple, overlapping
identities. Thus, the dualist account mediates the contractarian and
deep accounts of community through a process of deliberation.101
A central debate waged by those on either side of Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance concerned the quality of the political process
that resulted in its passage.102 On one level, this debate was about
whether the winners and the losers were fairly represented, that is,
whether the system for picking winners and losers in a world where
the majority wins actually worked. That question goes to the efficacy

67-87 (discussing the idea of a "public sphere of deliberation about matters of mutual con
cern" and a "public sphere of opinion-formation, debate, deliberation, and contestation
among citizens, groups, movements, and organizations in a polity"). For a guide to Haber
mas's concept of the public sphere, see CRAIG CALHOUN, Introduction, in HABERMAS AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 1 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1999) (noting that "bourgeois society produced a
certain form of public sphere" separate from the state and from the private realm); William
E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide and Critique, 23 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 969, 981 (1998) (noting the emergence of "institutions of sociability" as a "social
space in which the Enlightenment and liberal constitutionalism were forged").
101. Cf IRIS YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 4-10 (2000) (contrasting delibera
tive democracy from aggregative democracy). According to Young, on the deliberative
model, democracy is a form of practical reason:
Democratic process is primarily a discussion of problems, conflicts, claims of need or inter
est. Through dialogue others test and challenge these proposals and arguments. Because
they have not stood up to dialogic examination, the deliberating public rejects or refines
some proposals. Participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have
greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are
supported by the best reasons.

Id. at 10.
Joshua Cohen, another theorists who writes in this tradition, describes the enterprise in
these terms:
Not simply a form of politics, democracy, on the deliberative view, is a framework of social
and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among equal citizens - by pro
viding favorable conditions for participation, association, and expression - and ties the
authorization to exercise public power (and the exercise itself) to such discussion - by es
tablishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political power too
it through regular competitive elections, conditions of publicity, legislative oversight, and so
on.

Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 99.
The literature that arguably fits under the umbrella of deliberative democracy is varied
and has been given a number of names, such as proceduralist-deliberative democracy, par
ticipatory democracy, communicative democracy, and civic republicanism. A sampling in
cludes: BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984); JAMES BOHMAN,
DELIBERATION AND DEMOCRACY (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
D EMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William
Rehg trans., 1996); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R:
'
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
1 02. Compare Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 9, with
Alschuler & Shulhofer, supra note 9, and Meares & Kahan, Black, White, and Gray, supra
note 9.
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of the democratic process as a mechanism for expressing individual
preferences; it thus reflects a contractarian concern. The debate also
reflects, however, a dualist concern about whether the residents of
Chicago's inner-city, minority neighborhoods had an opportunity to
engage in deliberation regardless of who won or lost. At stake is not
only who engaged in the conversation but its quality - not merely
whether the channels for political participation were open, but
whether the participation that resulted was robust. On the dualist ac
count, a norm is not legitimate merely because it is the outcome of a
full and fair vote; that vote has to be accompanied by a true conversa
tion among decisionmakers (ideally face-to-face) in a small enough
setting to enable each stakeholder to be heard. A norm's bindingness
is a function of its being the outcome of a deliberative process, the
public formation of shared values.
The argument for local governance in Morales can therefore be
understood in dualist terms as an argument about the appropriate
scale for the face-to-face interactions necessary for true political com
munity. Proponents of the ordinance declared that the relevant deci
sionmakers were the residents of the neighborhoods and specific
blocks in which gang activity occurs every day. Opponents countered
that the state (speaking through its courts) was the appropriate deci
sionmaking unit or, alternatively, that the appropriate decisionmaker
was "We, the People,'' speaking through constitutional guarantees.
Implicit in the proponent's argument was the dualist notion that the
kind of dialogue that occurs between neighbors is superior to the kind
of dialogue that occurs between representatives at the state or federal
level. This dialogue is superior because it allows individuals to "inter
act with each other as concrete, not abstract, personalities,"103 and be
cause it invigorates a wider democratic politics. Indeed, by respecting
the norms of smaller scale decisionmakers - the neighbors across the
fence - the wider polity fosters the kind of civic engagement that is
both central to human flourishing and crucial for revitalizing civic life
in the larger polity as well.104
The dualist account of community emphasizes the individual's
public role as citizen: community involves participation in the deci
sions of the day. Amici in favor of the Gang Congregation Ordinance
invoked this image of the public-regarding citizen, portraying the resi
dents of Chicago's inner-city neighborhoods as taking the reins of
government after the police, the city, and the larger political commu
nity had failed to repair - or had been unwilling to address - the

103. Alexander, supra note 13, at 48.
104. De Tocqueville is often invoked as the standard-bearer for this view. "A nation
may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit
of liberty." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 68; see SANDEL, supra note 29, at 202.
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problems of inner-city gang violence.1 05 Residents would literally "take
back" their streets. In this way, the dualist account provides not only a
general justification for local self-government but a justification for
the Gang Congregation Ordinance in particular. By freeing the public
streets from the terrorizing effects of gang violence, the ordinance
would foster the face-to-face interaction required for true collective
decisionmaking. The ordinance would make the community's "public
life possible" 1 06 by securing the forums in which the interpersonal con
nections necessary for public life transpire - namely the streets,
parks, and corners where people meet, interact, and participate in
public life.107
On the dualist account, community does not just happen; it has to
be fostered by appropriate policies in particular public environments.
Unlike the contractarian and the deep accounts, which set the state in
opposition to the individual and community respectively, the dualist
account views the state as uniquely positioned to encourage civic at
tachments in local settings through appropriate legal regimes. State in
tervention can help to create the arenas and spaces in which collective
action will more likely arise.108 The dualist account thus allows the
government a more aggressive role in engaging in citizen-making ac
tivities, activities that may sometimes clash with other kinds of com
munity norms.109
This sense that the government has to take active steps to define
and defend a robust public life is implicit in the arguments made by
advocates of the Gang Congregation Ordinance. The residents of
inner-city Chicago wanted to govern themselves and to have the space
in which to govern themselves into the future, to make their public life
105. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 17-18.
106. Livingston, supra note 8, at 562.
107. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 25-26.
1 08. See Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 1 13 (advocating the creation of new "de
liberative arenas" that can serve as "schools of deliberative democracy").
109. For example, the state may have an interest in promoting a public school curricu
lum that emphasizes democratic values, such as tolerance, deliberation, and dialogue. This is
the tenor of Judge Cornelia Kennedy's concurring opinion in Mozert v. Hawkins County
Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in which she rejected fundamentalist
Christian claims for an opt-out from the public school curriculum on the basis that critical
thinking is essential for "citizenship in a Republic," because it prepares students for "self
government" and helps "avoid[ ] religious divisiveness." But cf W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that classroom-imposed, compulsory flag salute vio
lated First Amendment rights of children of Jehovah's Witnesses). Both Cover and
Stolzenberg have noted the fine line between a mandated curriculum and a mandated flag
salute. See Cover, supra note 15, at 60-62; Stolzenberg, supra note 13, at 605-10, 642-43. The
paradox of liberal education - illustrated by Justice Douglas's dissent in Yoder - is that it
must champion tolerance, diversity, and accommodation, but its substantive program may
put some (insular or intolerant) groups outside the bounds of tolerance, diversity, and ac
commodation.
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possible.1 10 The ordinance constitutes an example of the former and a
means of ensuring the latter. Localism, on this account, rests on the
thesis that civic engagement can only meaningfully take place within
the contours of some form of a circumscribed jurisdiction, in forums
where citizens can meet face-to-face. Local government law vindicates
the community by providing venues for participation in small-scale
democratic governance and by defending the spaces in which public
reasoning can take place.
The dualist account can therefore be characterized as a more
"positive" account of state-group relations ("help us self-govern by
making our streets safe") in contrast to the "defensive" stance taken
by the deep account ("allow us to defend ourselves against cultural
genocide") and the more "neutral" stance taken by the contractarian
("leave us alone to make our own choices"). These respective postures
correspond to different visions of group vulnerability. On the contrac
tarian account, groups are only vulnerable to the extent that the indi
vidual is vulnerable. The state's role is limited to creating a back
ground regime in which individual choices can be honored and not
suppressed, either by the government or by other groups. Once volun
tariness is guaranteed, the state does not have any further role in de
termining the substance of group life. In contrast, on the deep account,
groups are always vulnerable to the force of state orthodoxy. The state
must be mindful of its destructive capacities, which may require it to
accommodate (or even sponsor) deep communities' alternative law
making or risk their elimination. The state thus has a negative role (as
representing the omnipresent threat of a norm that will hurt or destroy
the group) in structuring group life. Finally, on the dualist account, the
state can foster community by creating fora for self-government.
Group life is vulnerable to an enforced individualism which the state
can counteract by affirmatively supporting collective engagement. The
creation of small-scale governments is thus a positive act that the state
can perform: encouraging decentralization should be an affirmative
state policy.
On all three accounts, community is threatened by, on the one
side, an enforced atomism and, on the other, an enforced statism. The
wider polity should defer to those norms that are genuinely
community-directed, that is, those norms chosen by individuals whose
weighing of liberty and order are entitled to moral respect. The deci
sions made by the shareholder of the residential association are enti
tled to moral respect because she has entered into a contract by
110. Livingston, supra note 8, at 667 (describing the void for vagueness doctrine as ap
plied to local order maintenance policing as "democracy foreclosing" if used "in such a way
as to prevent communities from regulating in a given sphere" and arguing that "[w]hen . . .
public order laws do not appear aimed at the exclusion of some from full participation in a
community's public life, but rather at the articulation of behavioral standards that may facili
tate the common use of public spaces . . . courts should not invalidate them for vagueness").
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choosing to live there. The decisions made by the neighbor living in
the neighborhood of linked fate are entitled to moral respect because
she is "one of us." And the decisions by the citizen living in the neigh
borhood as little republic are entitled to moral respect because they
are a result of a reasoned deliberative dialogue. All three accounts
thus contribute to a defense of local autonomy in the name of com
munity. In the first, the community standard is self-imposed by legal
operation. In the second, the community standard is self-imposed by
sociological fact. In the third, the community standard is self-imposed
because it is the outcome of a participatory process.
II.

INTERROGATING COMMUNITY

Though the three accounts of community offer widely divergent ra
tionales for deferring to local constitution-making - individual
choice, community preservation, civic engagement - each shifts the
burden of justifying encroachment on local norms to the encroacher.
The rhetoric of community is an effective tool in this debate. No one
can be against community. To the contrary, we seek to preserve it,
build it, foster it. Indeed, the debate over local constitution-making is
structured as a choice between community and coercion; all efforts are
directed toward mediating the effects of higher-level or universalized
norms on lower-level or particularized communities. From this van
tage, our choice is either respect for a local norm or the force of a su
perior authority.
This Part argues that the choice between respect and force is a
false one. I show that community itself is a result of forceful acts of lit
eral and figurative boundary creation, the drawing of lines between
insiders and outsiders. Robert Cover's description of how law consti
tutes an "integrated world of obligation and reality"11 1 from which the
rest of the world is perceived, is useful here.
At that point of radical transformation of perspective, the boundary rule
- whether it be contract, free exercise of religion, property or corpora
tion law - becomes more than a rule: it becomes constitutive of a
world . . . . A world is turned inside out; a wall begins to form, and its
shape differs depending upon which side of the wall our narrative places
1
us on.1 2

Cover associated this (metaphorical) process with the law-generating
activities of (mainly) insular religious groups, but I want to use his de
scription of the process of boundary creation to understand how local
autonomy is constructed by norms operating in geographical space.
This account shares with legal geographers the view that space itself is

1 1 1 . Cover, supra note 15, at 31.
1 1 2. Id.
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a social production, and that law is as constitutive of social geogra
phies as it is of social institutions.113 The geography of the metropoli
tan region is as much a product of legal rules as are the social relations
of husband, citizen, and debtor the outcome of the legally constituted
forms of family, state, and market.114
This Part cautions that localism claims - claims that certain
groups should be permitted to make law for themselves - must be
understood as acts of legal and spatial construction. 11 5 Community de
scribes an act of demarcation, involving the complex social, legal, po
litical, and psychological activities of joining, leaving, belonging, exil
ing, excommunicating, embracing, defining - the whole range of
social practices of inclusion and exclusion. The shape of localism is
contingent on how the walls between neighborhoods are built and
conceived. Shifting our lens to the origins of communities in space re
veals the crucial horizontal relationship between competing concep
tions of the local.
The walls that form between neighborhoods are both legal and lit
eral. This Part demonstrates how important conceptions of demar
cated space - in the form of the zoned spaces of the metropolitan re
gion - are to the creation and maintenance of the concept of
community. I begin by describing the Gang Congregation Ordinance
as a zoning device, and proceed to describe the function of boundary
creating norms in delineating social spaces in the built environments
of the city. The concept of zoned space then informs a critique of the
contractarian, deep, and dualist accounts of community. This critique
employs three very different cases, involving standing, the Establish
ment Clause, and voting rights, respectively. Each case concerns a cen
tral preoccupation of this Article: how the legal rules for incorporating

1 13. The intersection of law and geography has been the focus of a group of scholars
who have sought to look at the "spatiality of human life" through the lens of the law. See
Edward Soja, Afterward, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (1996) (describing the general "spatial
turn" in critical thinking and the ways in which legal scholars have begun to engage in this
critical spatial perspective). Legal geographers ask how geography shapes law and, more im
portant, how law shapes geographies, both real and virtual. See id. at 1426-27; NICHOLAS K.
BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER xi-xiv (1994). The recently
published LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 14, collects some representative
works.
1 14. See David Delaney et al., Where is Law?, Preface to THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER, supra note 14, at xv.
1 1 5. Cf BLOMLEY, supra note 1 13, at 43 (quoting Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the
Politics ofSpace, ANTIPODE May 1976, at 31) ("Space is not a scientific object removed from
ideology or politics; it has always been political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality
and indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be purely formal, the epitome
of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has already been occupied and used, and has
already been the focus of past processes. . . . Space has been shaped and moulded from his
torical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and
ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies.").
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or excluding others generate a community's identity and the commu
nity's claims to self-govern.
The Gang Congregation Ordinance at issue in Morales can be un
derstood as a mechanism for defining the space in which community
takes place. The introduction of literal and legally demarcated space
undermines any straightforward notion of local autonomy; indeed, it
calls into question the idea of the "local" altogether and the rhetoric
of community that is often used to describe and prescribe it.
A.

Zoning Deviance: Land Use and Social Control

I begin with two claims - one descriptive, the other definitional.
The descriptive claim is that the Gang Congregation Ordinance is a
zoning regime. The definitional claim is that zoning regimes are
boundary-creating norms, norms that demarcate physical and social
space. Zoned space is the geographically describable reality of local
government. For the local government scholar, community is not an
abstraction but is instead the outcome of political and legal actions
embedded in a particular geography, tied to a particular place. 116
Zoning laws define and differentiate the built environment, sepa
rating favored uses of land from disfavored uses. This differentiation
of the built environment has profound effects on the way we live, but
this power is often taken for granted, thought of as background rules
relevant to builders and real estate agents and of little importance to
our day-to-day experience. Yet zoning is one of the primary powers of
local governments in this country; indeed, as Richard Briffault points
out, towns have incorporated simply to gain the power to zone.117 This
zoning power is a central mechanism for controlling entrance into a
community, establishing norms of order there, and transmitting those
norms to its residents. Though land use lawyers tend not to think of
zoning as an instrument of policing and criminal law scholars often fail
to make the explicit link between land use and deviance,1 18 it should
1 16. Lea Vandervelde observes:
One of the noteworthy characteristics about zoning law is that the social construction of lo
cal governance is coupled with the physical construction of bricks and mortar. A city's physi
cal structure provides graphic evidence of the effect, or lack of effect, of legal constraints.
What a city or neighborhood is, or what it will become, depends to a significant degree on its
physical structure.

Lea S. Vandervelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1057, 1063 (1990) (emphasis added).
1 17. See Briffault, supra note 32, at 39.
1 18. James Lorenz, Planning for the City's Deviants, 1 PORTIA L.J. 143 (1965), is an ex
ception. It asks how land use planning can or cannot serve as an "adjunct to the criminal
law." Id. at 145. Neal Katya! has also drawn a direct link between the built environment and
crime control in his recent article. See Neal Kumar Katya!, Architecture as Crime Control
(draft 2001, on file with author).
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come as no surprise that land use regimes are important mechanisms
for controlling and ordering social life through the spatial differentia
tion of behaviors and persons. Land use regimes are powerful instru
ments of social control.
Consider Robert Ellickson's hypothetical proposal for public space
urban zoning, which makes the link between social control and spatial
differentiation explicit. 1 19 Professor Ellickson asks his readers to con
sider a city that sincerely desires to create a welcoming environment
for all its citizens but which is beset by marauding teenagers, aggres
sive panhandlers, and other public disorders that make life on the
street unpleasant and even untenable. The city decides to institute
rules of conduct for different urban spaces divided into three color
coded zones - Green, Yellow, and Red - in an effort to control and
cabin these antisocial activities.120 These zones indicate the level of of
ficial tolerance of various types of behavior on the public street and in
public places. In Green Zones, the city strictly enforces anti
panhandling ordinances, congregation ordinances, and other quality of
life ordinances regulating a whole range of disruptive conduct. The
Green Zone is a place of "refuge for the unusually sensitive," like
children and the elderly.121 In Yellow Zones, the city strikes a balance
to create a "lively mixing bowl. " 1 22 In Yellow Zones, the police regu
late aggressive panhandling and some forms of loitering and congrega
tion, but perhaps not occasional panhandling, limited loitering, and
other kinds of congregation. The idea would be to "curb street misbe
havior enough to make the great majority of citizens willing to enter
these spaces without hesitation."123 Finally, in Red Zones (consistent
with the concept of Red Light Districts), the city tolerates more noise
and rowdiness and does not regulate panhandling, loitering, or other
deviant behaviors at all. Red Zones would be "safe harbors for people
prone to engage in disorderly conduct."124
Ellickson offers this hypothetical "public-space zoning" scheme to
control what he calls "chronic misconduct in public spaces," which is
defined with reference to "prevailing community standards of behav
ior. "125 His proposal specifically addresses "chronic street nuisances,"
1 19. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1219-22.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 1221.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1 185. Professor Ellickson's zoning proposal is meant to bring attention to
what I think is his first priority: permitting police the discretion to force panhandlers and
vagrants to "move along" specifically and allowing law-enforcement authorities in cities a
great deal of leeway in controlling deviance in public spaces generally. See id. at 1185-89.
Ellickson is decidedly opposed to what he sees as the Warren Court's unnecessary and im-
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like aggressive panhandling and bench squatting, but it could easily
apply to the conduct outlawed in the Chicago ordinance, loitering as
defined as "remaining in one place with no apparent purpose. " In
deed, Ellickson would make all sorts of conduct that is currently legal
- such as dog walking or playing a radio - illegal in Green Zones. 1 26
Like the Gang Congregation Ordinance and other public order
laws, Ellickson's proposal is thoroughly grounded in the new policing
that emphasizes quality of life issues: the concern for the vitality of the
street, the emphasis on the responsibilities of those who use the public
ways, the sense that small disorders will aggregate into larger ones,
and the belief that informal norms of civility enable urban life to
flourish.127 His approach targets specific uses of public space in an ef
fort to increase ones we like (walking/strolling) and to decrease ones
we do not like (panhandling/loitering). Less delicately, the purpose of
urban zoning is to force undesirable uses to go somewhere else (into
Red Zones). Ellickson argues for the return to the days of Skid Rows,
when the Bowery was an informal Red Zone for the "down" and
"out" in New York City. 1 28 His goal is to recreate such neighborhoods
in our central cities. 1 29 Like ordinances that ban shopping carts from
the streets, camping in public parks, sitting on the sidewalk, lingering
on a highway median, or rummaging through trash, public space zon
ing is intended to force the loiterer and the panhandler to " 'find
someplace else to go' " on the theory that " 'if there's no good fishing
in the lake, you find another lake. ' " 130
proper constitutionalization of street law. His proposal thus embodies a federalism concern
as well. See id.
126. See id. at 1222.
127. See id. at 1 177-78.
128. See id. 1167, 1171-72.
129. See id. De facto zones are already at work in certain cities. See MIKE DA VIS, CITY
OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 232-33 (1990) (describing how
Los Angeles "promotes the 'containment' (official term) of the homeless in Skid Row along
Fifth Street east of the Broadway," a strategy that "by condensing the mass of the desperate
and helpless together in such a small space, and denying adequate housing" has "trans
formed Skid Row into probably the most dangerous ten square blocks in the world").
130. Evelyn Nieves, Growing Number of Homeless Defy Cities' Drives to Move Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al (quoting Mark Siemens, Marysville, Md., City Administra
tor). In Santa Ana, California, it is illegal to sit in the civic center with belongings that oc
cupy more than three cubic feet. See id. At the extreme, it has been reported that town offi
cials in Sacramento give homeless people one-way tickets out of town. See id. Other tactics
to rid downtowns of the homeless and panhandlers include designing street furniture such as
the barrel-shaped bus bench and installing outdoor sprinklers and spikes on flat concrete
surfaces to discourage sleeping on and around the street, and placing fences around garbage
or locking up trash receptacles to prevent the homeless from accessing them. See DA VIS, su
pra note 129, at 233-34. For a collection of urban policies designed to control public space,
including laws against sleeping in public, sitting on sidewalks, and laws requiring the licens
ing of panhandlers, see Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Im
plications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER, supra note 14, at 6, 8-9. Jeremy Waldron has argued that such controls effectively
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In this way, public-space zoning, like all zoning regimes, operates
by discouraging and excluding undesirable uses of land and encour
aging and attracting desirable uses. When combined with a criminol
ogy emphasizing the effect of low-level disorder in promoting more
serious criminal behavior, a land use approach to crime control
emerges. This approach views deviance through the lens of space and
place: land use regimes, broadly conceived, deter crime by deterring or
isolating disorderly uses of public and private space.
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance is a good example. As
advocates argued, the ordinance's purpose was to prevent gang mem
bers from gathering on sidewalks, corners, and parks before they en
gaged in serious crimes, to create norms of order on the street in order
to deter further criminal activity. The Chicago police did not patrol
the entire city looking for loitering gang members. Instead, the police
specifically targeted certain blocks and corners of the city and, essen
tially, zoned them as no-gang loitering areas.131 The fact that the
Chicago police implemented the ordinance in this manner was one of
the city's defenses of its constitutionality.132 Echoing constitutional de
fenses to the zoning of adult theaters and bookstores and other unde
sirable venues, the city argued that the ordinance was a permissible
regulation of the streets because the regulations implementing the or
dinance provided adequate alternative areas in which gang members
could gather "with no apparent purpose."133 Ellickson defends his ur
ban zoning against constitutional attack on the same grounds, arguing
that public-space zoning does not make particular behaviors illegal but
only makes them the equivalent of "nonconforming uses" in certain
deny homeless persons the only legal space in which they can exercise certain basic human
freedoms, such as sleeping or washing. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of
Freedom, 39 UCLA L REV. 296, 315 (1991)
131. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 27-28 ("Under General Order 92-4, the
gang loitering ordinance is not enforced throughout Chicago, but only in those limited areas
designated by police district commanders as 'areas in which the presence of gang members
has a demonstrable effect on the activities of law abiding persons in the surrounding com
munity.' ").
Similarly, Cincinnati's recently invalidated "drug exclusion zone" ordinance required
that persons who had been arrested or taken into custody within any designated drug exclu
sion zone for drug abuse or any drug abuse-related activities could not be present in the zone
for ninety days following their arrest. See Ohio v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 858-60 (Ohio
2001). Excluded persons were permitted to file for a variance from the chief of police for
reasons related to their health, welfare, or well-being, or for drug abuse-related counseling
services, if they were bona fide residents of the drug exclusion zones, or if they were bona
fide owners or employees of places of lawful employment within the zones. Id. Transient
occupants of hotels or motels were not bona fide residents under the ordinance. Id.
132. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 28.

133. See id. ("[T]here remain many - indeed innumerable - opportunities available to
gang members to express their ideas and associate with others."). Of course, for obvious rea
sons, the areas selected for enforcement of the ordinance were only known to members of
the police department's Gang Crime Section and other designated personnel and were not
made known to the general public. See id. at 5-6.
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areas of the city. 1 34 In a Chicago with a functioning anti-gang loitering
ordinance, congregating with gang members on certain specified
blocks or corners is simply a nonconforming use subject first to a
warning and then, if not corrected, to arrest.
Though rarely applied so directly to specific types of disorder, this
land use model of crime prevention is not a new one. The theory that
the physical conditions in which people live can contribute to crimi
nality was present at the inception of the discipline of urban plan
ning.135 Indeed, in 1926, at the time the Supreme Court first addressed
the constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning regime, it was ac
cepted wisdom that "crime and vice increase in the blighted districts
where general conditions are more promotive of sickness and delin
quency."136 Thus, the Court in Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co 131
could validate zoning as a means of protecting the "health, safety, and
morals of the community; "138 Advocates of zoning, with its attendant
building codes, tenement restrictions, sanitary regulations, and mixed
use limitations, could refer to the "well documented facts that slum
clearance and the provision of sanitary low-rent housing decrease
danger of epidemics, raise general public health, reduce crime, cut ju
venile delinquency, reduce immorality . . . and prevent the cancerous
spread of the slums to uninfected areas. "139 As the President's Com
mittee on Natural Resources stated in 1937: "[I]nadequate housing
conditions are causally connected with . . . [a] high incidence of delin
quency. Likewise, there is a close coincidence between poor housing
conditions and social disorganization."140
Zoning was initially justified both as a means of rehabilitating and,
in the case of the Village of Euclid, of preventing the formation of en.

134. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1232-39. For an
extended critique of this defense and of Ellickson's proposal in general, see Steven R.
Munzer, Ellickson on Chronic Misconduct in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squat
ters, and Day Laborers, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, passim (1997).
135. See generally James G. Coke, A ntecedents of Local Planning, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 7 (William Goodman & Eric c. Freund eds., 4th ed. 1968).
New York City enacted legislation regulating tenements in 1867. Larger cities followed with
sanitation and building codes for new construction. In 1916, New York City adopted its first
comprehensive zoning ordinance that addressed the type, location, and use of buildings. See
James C. Nicolas, State and Regional Land Use Planning: The Evolving Role of the State, 73
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1999).
136. See Brief for Appellant at 66, Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (No. 31).
137. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
138. Id. at 395.
139. Myers S. McDougal & Addison A. Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An
Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42, 47-48 (1942).
140. NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, OUR CITIES: THEIR ROLE IN THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY 67 (1937).
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vironments that would foster delinquency and deviance.141 Land use
regimes quickly took on the broader defensive role of preventing
overcrowding, noise, pollution, and traffic: the harbingers of the fear
ful urban blight characteristic of the decaying city.142 Justice
Sutherland, writing for the Euclid Court, held that zoning "increase[s]
the safety and security of home life; greatly tend[s] to prevent traffic
accidents, especially to children . . . decrease[s] noise and other condi
tions which produce or intensify nervous disorders; [and] preserve[s] a
more favorable environment in which to rear children."143 As suburbia
came to dominate America's social and cultural life, zoning took root
as a mechanism protective of home and family, reinforcing the con
trast between the "dangerous city" and the "bucolic suburb."144
141. See Lorenz, supra note 1 1 8, at 169. It also had implicit racial overtones. See
CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA 193-209 (1977) (describing how fear of immigrants are "in the fiber of zoning");
Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 603-14
(2001) (describing how the "polite" public health rhetoric of Euclid was a code for "ugly"
racial imagery).
142. See Peter L. Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM 122, 1 27-29 (Charles M. Harr & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
143. 272 U.S. at 394.
144. A host of factors are at play in the construction of this dichotomy. Professors Jerry
Frug and Keith Aoki note the origin of suburbia in a sentimental pastoralism. See FRUG,
CITY MAKING, supra note 34, at 143-44. The anti-urban, Arcadian aesthetic of urban plan
ners and architects of the nineteenth century and the utilitarian strand of urban planning
that developed in the early to mid-twentieth century combined to produce a distribution of
space "strictly segregated along economic, social cultural, and racial lines." Keith Aoki,
Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism,
Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 700-01 (1993).
Others have examined the role of the "cult of domesticity" in constructing suburban
space. See NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: 'WOMAN'S SPHERE' IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780 - 1 835, 199-203 (1977); DOLORES HAYDEN, THE GRAND DOMESTIC
REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF FEMINIST DESIGNS FOR AMERICAN HOMES,
NEIGHBORHOODS, AND CITIES 28-29 ( 1981). A primary role of zoning is the spatial separa
tion of home and work. The cordoning-off of a social space for the family emerged in part
from the separate spheres ideology of the 1800s. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 26-36 (1980);
Cott, supra, at 5.
Professor Cott argues that the "contradistinction of home to world had its roots in relig
ious motives and rhetoric." Cott, supra, at 64. By creating a separate sphere protected from
the contagion of money and the amorality of work, women's "self-renunciation remedied
men's self-alienation." Id. at 64. Thus, the division of work from family arose from a con
scious need to "save" virtue in an increasingly unmediated, stained public world. See id. This
separation of male and female spheres was also reflected in the spatial design of the isolated
family home, with whole rooms set aside for entertainment, living, sleeping, and eating.
Dolores Hayden argues that some early feminists sought to define urban space to reflect not
the isolation of the family, but its interdependence. See HAYDEN, supra, at 6, 33. Coming out
of the material feminist tradition, these early utopians envisioned a collective urban residen
tial space in which women could share housework, and collaborate on domestic chores. By
the 1970s, however, Hayden argues, "both anti-feminists and feminists accepted the spatial
design of the isolated home." Id. at 290.
Racism also played a significant role. It is well-documented that suburban development
was explicitly racialized not only by private actors but also by the federal government. See id.
at 198-99; Abeles, supra note 142, at 132, 137; see also KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS
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This is still the case. As Richard Briffault points out, local govern
ment's power over land use is the central tool in an arsenal of local
powers intended "to protect the home and family - enabling resi
dents to raise their children in 'decent' surroundings, servicing home
and family needs and insulating home and family from undesirable
changes in the surrounding area."145 Almost fifty years after Euclid,
Justice Douglas, writing in Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,146 affirmed
that a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehi
cles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed
to family needs."147
The contemporary version of the land use model of controlling de
viance shares elements of the "dangerous city" ideology, though it has
shifted slightly from an emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the
city neighborhood (e.g., overcrowding) and its sociological implica
tions for crime to a more direct emphasis on and recognition of the so
ciological infrastructure of the city neighborhood itself. Instead of fo
cusing primarily on the physical characteristics of dwellings and public
spaces,148 the new criminal justice scholarship focuses on the quality of
"community-level structures"149 that keep norms of order pointing
away from criminality. Advocates argue that high-crime, urban neigh
borhoods often lack the social networks and informal monitoring
structures that can support the private norm enforcement necessary to
deter crime by preventing the low-level disorders that can lead to
crime.150 The lack of community-level structure - akin to the lack of
sanitary facilities or the problems of overcrowding in the era of slum
clearance - results in dangerous neighborhoods.
From this vantage, public order norms can be understood as the
next generation of land use planning targeted at specific behaviors.
Zoning is employed to create and maintain the proper "environment"
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (discussing how federal

mortgage-backing agencies redlined black neighborhoods). For example, predominantly
black Camden did not have a single FHA-backed mortgage in the 1950s and '60s, while sub
urban, white Mount Laurel had hundreds. See DA YID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE,
HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 1-8, 16 (1995). In the suburban-shaping years between
1930 and 1960, fewer than one percent of all mortgages in the nation were issued to African
Americans. See id. at 7.
145. Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part II __:..._ _Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346, 382 (1 990); see ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF SUBURBIA 3-4 (1987).
146. 41 6 U.S. 1 (1974).
147. Id. at 9.
1 48. I emphasize "primarily" because the "broken windows" thesis is also concerned
with the physical characteristics of neighborhoods.
149. See Meares, supra note 82, at 669-70 ("[T]he structure of the community in which
an individual lives interacts in important ways to either facilitate or retard an individual's
criminal or delinquent behavior.").
·

150. See id. at 669-77.
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and "structures" for discouraging rather than encouraging law break
ing, to shore up "weakly organized communities" and "structurally
weak communities."151 The thread running through slum clearance,
comprehensive zoning plans, the Gang Congregation Ordinance, and
other forms of public-space zoning is the idea that deviance occurs at
the intersection of norms and place: the built environment is both a
source of norms and norm-enforcing.
Thus, the direct connection drawn by the early advocates of zoning
between physical disorder and social disorder has been further refined
and specified. The zoning of particular property uses is employed as
an instrument for policing particular behaviors. In turn, policing par
ticular behaviors has consequences on the types of persons who will
use the space.152 This sorting is couched in the language of Tieboutian
preferences, but this rhetoric masks and reinforces existing spatially
maintained barriers throughout the metropolitan region.
Indeed, Ellickson's hypothetical public-space zoning is a micro
cosm of the entire metropolitan region, with its informal but easily
recognizable Green, Yellow, and Red Zones. Suburban "Green
Zones" have limited meaningful public space and limited accessibility
to public transportation. Suburban developments (increasingly struc
tured as homeowners associations) are designed with cul-de-sacs and
single entryways (accessible only by cars) that create an air and a real
ity of exclusivity. Suburban zoning regimes ban or discourage mixed
used developments, isolating residences from commercial and business
districts. Isolating residential uses on large lots tends to limit the ven
ues for denser foot traffic - for the spaces in which anyone, especially
teenagers, might congregate. 153 The low density and differentiation of
commercial and residential space forces residents to find other venues
aside from the suburban street to congregate, such as the local shop
ping mall. The traditional public spaces of the neighborhood are re151. Id. at 677-84, 693. Meares argues for a "roadmap" to "construct . . . 'norm high
ways' " necessary for "social organization improvement." Id. at 695. It is not a surprise that
the metaphors are infrastructure oriented.
152. See J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761,
763.
153. Suburban design not only restricts the movement of children and tee nagers, it iso
lates the elderly and women as well. See FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 34, at 155-61;
Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space,
144 U. PA. L. R EV . 705, 715-24 (1995).
The "New Urbanists" - a group of planners, theorists, and architects who favor in
creased density and the development of towns that reduce the reliance on the automobile have been vocal in criticizing the spatial separation of residence and work, and are the lead
ing proponents of a new residential architecture promoting mixed uses. See ANDRES DUANY
ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM 187-92 (2000). The goal of creating the car-less city faces an uphill climb. See Alan
Ehrenhalt, Suburbs with a Healthy Dose of Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at 15 (dis

cussing America's car culture and the New Urbanists' attempts to create new mixed-use
walking developments in the face of regional infrastructures that still depend on the car) .
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placed by private commercial spaces, regulated by developers and po
liced by private security guards.
Homeowners associations assert even greater control over their in
ternal environments. An association can ban children and establish
proper uses of commonly held space, including limiting the number of
persons permitted to congregate in one place.154 The association may
enforce an "orderly" aesthetic by preventing residents from repairing
automobiles in driveways, parking trucks on the street, putting signs
on their lawns, or painting their houses or mailboxes an unapproved
color.155
These design elements are accompanied by more direct barriers to
entry or access. For example, suburban neighborhoods often zone out
affordable housing through minimum lot size regulations, square
footage requirements, prohibitions on multifamily housing, bedroom
restrictions, or prohibitions on mobile homes and the like. 156 These
regulations bar high-density housing, in effect preventing poorer peo
ple or large families from moving into the area, as well as the unem
ployed or the transient. Not incidentally, these favorable uses are also
protective of property values. A chief reason for exclusionary zoning
in the suburbs is to maintain or increase property values, by excluding
high-density residential uses that contribute to lower property values
and higher costs of municipal services. Not surprisingly, the city of
Chicago repeatedly cited the protection of property values as one of
the chief purposes of the Gang Congregation Ordinance.157
154. See, e.g. , White Egret Condominiums, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979)
(affirming validity of restrictive covenant prohibiting children under age of twelve from liv
ing in condominium complex but holding that the covenant was unenforceable because the
association had failed to enforce it in a uniform manner against all residents); Hidden Har
bour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. App. 1975) (upholding validity of
an association rule that prohibited the consumption of alcoholic beverages in common areas,
and stating that "[i)t appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the principle
that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners
since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner
must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in sepa
rate, privately owned property," and that "[c)ondominium unit owners comprise a little
democratic sub society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium
property than may be existent outside the condominium organization").
155. See Gillette, supra note 13, 1384-85 (collecting cases). Regulations generally in
clude rules regarding use of common areas, ownership and care of pets, posting of signs, dis
posal of garbage, and parking of automobiles. See CURTIS C. SPROUL & KATHERINE N.
ROSENBERRY, ADVISING CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS

609 (app. C) (1991). One student note has reported even more specific restrictive covenants.
See Carl Kress, Note, Beyond Nahrstedt· Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Prop
erty Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837, 883 n.12 (1998) (citing a restriction that
"[n)o Barry Manilow records, tapes or CDs may be owned or played on the premises," a re
striction banning pornography in owners' bedrooms, and a prohibition against carnivorous
plants).
156. See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 35, at 18-20 (discussing barriers
to entry that prevent mobility between localities).
157. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 10, 14, 27, 44.
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The metropolitan region also has its Yellow and Red Zones. A
yellow zone may be a shopping district - but not just any shopping
district. The wealthy mall up the highway is a Green Zone; the poorer
one downtown is a Yellow or Red Zone. Red Zones tend to be those
inner-city neighborhoods and poor suburbs that people avoid. The
shadings of class and race are remarkably refined. "Everyone knows
which parts of the metropolitan area are nice and which are danger
ous. Everyone knows where they don't belong." 1 58
Most significantly, the segregation of the built environment has
been successful in segregating crime. Crime is not equally distributed
throughout the city or the metropolitan region, but instead is concen
trated in what one commentator has called "deviancy areas":159 neigh
borhoods with high concentrations of poverty, unemployment, and so
cial breakdown. As those "deviancy areas" threaten "normal areas,"
neighborhoods seek out more creative ways to wall them off and pre
vent their spread.160 Neighborhoods create speed bumps and close off
through-streets to prevent access.161 Homeowners associations put up
literal walls. Others hire private security forces.162
In this way, the Gang Congregation Ordinance and other forms of
public-space zoning borrow a central tool of a successful crime
prevention strategy from the suburban playbook: boundary-creating
158. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1996).
159. Lorenz, supra note 1 18, at 146. These deviancy areas are also called "hot spots" by
criminologists. See Philip B. Heyman, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 423-24
(2000); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and
the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1989); cf Meares, supra note 82, at 695
("[W]e must adopt a place-centered vision of law enforcement . . . (that] keep(s] racial distri
bution of law enforcement effects in mind . . . within a spatial context.").
160. Amy Mandelker notes that "[t]he very idea of city planning is axiologically con
flicted: the utopian intentions of a rationally structured city are deconstructed in the un
planned, dystopian shanty towns, mean streets, and back alleys . . . . (W]hile the city is viable,
it is characterized by the displacement of undesirable social elements to the periphery or to
regions that Michel Foucault termed heterotopoi: the madhouse, the prison, the "red light"
districts, the bowery." Amy Mandelker, Writing Urban Spaces: Street Graphics and the Law
as Postmodern Design and Ordinance, 3 WASH. U. J. LAW AND POLICY 403, 407-08 (2000).
161. See, e.g., Derek Ali & Jim Bebbington, Five Oaks May Hire Security - Neighbors
at Odds over Need for Guards, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, April 22, 1999, at 1 (reporting debate
over hiring of private security guards to patrol exclusive neighborhood that had already in
stalled gates across its streets); Miles Corwin, Guns for Hire: A Growing Crop of Private
Cops Is the First Line of Defense for Our Homes and Shops - But at a Price, L.A. TIMES
M AG ., Nov. 28, 1993, at 24 (describing explosion of private security services in public and
private developments); Matt Schwartz, HUD Labels Dian Street Gate Discriminatory, Asks
Removal, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 15, 1998, at 25 (reporting five-year battle over gate placed
in street that linked the predominantly white, middle-class Timbergrove Manor area of the
city with the surrounding poor and minority neighborhood of Clark Pines).
162. See generally DAVIS, supra note 129, at 221-64 (describing Los Angeles security
apparatus); Trevor Boddy, Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous City, in
VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC
SPACE 125-28 (Michael Sorkin ed., 1 992) (describing how infrastructure improvements in

cities are often designed for security purposes).
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legal regimes that serve to limit access to, and the types of behaviors
in, particular geographically defined spaces.163 Ellickson's hypothetical
zones illustrate the dominant land use model of crime control that is
already at work on a large scale throughout the metropolitan region.
That defensive strategy - to separate out zones of deviance and zones
of normalcy and then create legal and physical walls to prevent them
from intermingling - continues to be the instrument of choice for in
creasing numbers of metropolitan-area residents fearful of crime.164
B.

Community in Zoned Space

Ellickson's Red-Yellow-Green Zones make explicit the fact that
communities operate in zoned space. Boundary-creating norms place
us in social, legal, and physical space. The spatial quality of local
norms helps reveal a tautology: If community standards are under
stood as mechanisms for spatial differentiation (as a means for defin
ing community in the first place), rather than as outcomes of commu
nity self-determination (as a product of some existent entity known as
community), then localism claims quickly become circular. Boundary
creating norms are justified as exercises of local autonomy while cre
ating the community that asserts autonomy in its name.165
By drawing out the implications of a localism that is invariably de
pendent on the erection of walls between "us" and "them," this sec-

163. Anti-panhandling and loitering laws are often specifically targeted at certain
populations (gang members, teenagers, the homeless). Urban spaces may also bar entry and
Cordone off undesirables through the design of the streetscape. See DA VIS, supra note 129, at
ch.4 (describing how in "Fortress L.A." public space has been privatized or designed in such
a way as to discourage its use by panhandlers and the homeless); see also Boddy, supra note
162, at 125-53 (arguing that the development and construction of extensive networks of
raised pedestrian bridges, people movers, and tunnels in major cities like Dallas, Montreal,
Minneapolis, and Charlotte has closed off large portions of the city to lower socioeconomic
classes); Maria Foscarinis et al., Out of Sight - Out of Mind? The Continuing Trend Toward
the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 145, 162-64 (1999)
(discussing the criminalization of homelessness and order maintenance ordinances).
164. See FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 34, at 196, 201 ("In America, the predomi
nant strategy individuals employ to deal with crime is to isolate themselves from it," a strat
egy that "in an important sense . . . has worked."). The same was observed over forty years
ago: "Today, the suburbs remain tight little islands, protected against the city. Unsuccessful
and irrelevant at times to the problems of deviancy, zoning has been very relevant in one
respect: it has kept poverty and crime exactly where it was situated fifty years ago, in the
heart of the city." Lorenz, Planning, supra note 141, at 170. Of course, this strategy is already
failing as suburbs begin to experience the same problems of deviance and crime as the cities
and the amount of available land for further expansion and isolation decreases. See, e.g. ,
MYRON 0RFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 124-25 (1997) (proposing a regional alliance between the inner city and the older
inner-ring suburbs, many of which will - or are - facing the same social and economic
problems that beset the urban core).
165. Richard Ford makes a similar argument about the "tautology of community self
definition." Richard Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1860 (1994).
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tion critiques the contractarian, deep, and dualist accounts of commu
nity. This localism is premised on some initial or ongoing act of exclu
sion: the displacement of nonconforming uses to some other place, the
excommunication of those who will not abide by the norms of the
community, or the exiling and disenfranchisement of those who are
politically disfavored. In each case, the possibility of an alternative lo
calism is masked by the invocation of community standards. These
standards do all the work necessary to define insiders and outsiders those individuals who are and who are not normatively entitled to
make decisions on behalf of a community that now exists by function
of the disputed norm.
1.

The Critique of the Contractarian Account: Warth v. Seldin
and the Geographically Exclusive Conception
of Local Government

a.

The Problem of Exclusion

Recall that the contractarian account understands community as
the outcome of individual acts of voluntary association. Localism is an
instrument for efficient individual preference allocation; local auton
omy vindicates individual associational choice. Community is a prod
uct of voluntary association, which can take the form of either an ex
plicit agreement setting the terms of membership or a tacit agreement
to live by a community's practices. The immediate difficulty with this
account is that it assumes that individuals are sufficiently mobile that they can readily join or leave neighborhoods if they so choose when the reality may be just the opposite. One might want to live in
Beverly Hills (or, more important, one may desperately want not to
live in Compton), but one may literally have no choice.
That is not to say that individuals do not make choices about
where to live - they do. Purchasing housing on the housing market,
however, is quite different from joining a voluntary association. Thus,
the term "community" as used to describe the residents of Chicago's
poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods stumbles over an initial descriptive
problem. Community implies an association of like minds, but the fact
is that a residential neighborhood is generally an aggregate of strang
ers who happen to live next door to one another. Though clearly some
neighbors are friends and family, in general, neighborhood residents
simply share a common geography, which they may not have chosen
had they the means to go elsewhere. The voluntarist justification for
deferring to local norms like the Gang Congregation Ordinance is cer
tainly less powerful where residents' ability to exit the community
(and enter a safer one) is restricted by life circumstances, in particular
one's ability to afford housing elsewhere. We should be wary of as-
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suming that community norms are somehow a result of collective
choice where individual residents have limited power over entry and
exit, as might be the case in poor urban neighborhoods. As at least one
commentator has asked: Can the desperate acts of crime-ridden
neighborhoods to reduce constitutional rights really be considered a
voluntary "choice" to balance liberty and order?166
Questioning the voluntariness of a poor neighborhood's local
norms, however, runs up against an uncomfortable paternalism: Does
this mean that only the wealthy, who can choose to live in privatized
enclaves or the suburban equivalent, are empowered to adjust consti
tutional norms as they see fit? This seems objectionable. The fact of
residential exclusion/segregation should not prevent the poor from
contracting into a chosen form of governance by consenting to norms
in the neighborhoods in which they happen to live. To deny local con
trol to those with less means because they have been excluded from
other neighborhoods only adds insult to injury.
But how do we avoid the appearance, if not the reality, of coercion
brought on by desperate circumstances? The answer, for those com
mitted to a contractarian account, is to save localism by eliminating
barriers to entry between communities. Efforts are directed to in
creasing mobility by enforcing antidiscrirnination laws or other indi
vidually targeted residential consumer legislation (such as prohibiting
redlining), or by redistributing wealth to allow individuals a wider
choice of where to live.167 The solution is to increase individual choice
166. See Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights, in URGENT T IMES, supra note 9, at
49. A useful analogy is the plea bargain. Courts look to the state of mind of the defendant
when he or she makes the choice to waive constitutional rights to ensure that such a waiver
is "intelligent and voluntary." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Critics of plea
bargaining argue that this inquiry is far too narrow and fails to take into account that deci
sions to waive constitutional rights are "the product of a seriously flawed bargaining struc
ture." Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1910 (1992). For critics of plea bargaining, consent is not enough to j ustify waiver of funda
mental rights; a separate inquiry is necessary to ensure that the process itself is structured to
protect the "dignity" and "autonomy" of the citizen. Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell:
Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain,
84 YALE L.J. 683, 700 (1975). Cf Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role
of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 384, 424-28 (1985) (challenging the idea that consent is sufficient to establish the
morality of a legal regime or of the choices offered to individuals within that regime).
167. I understand this to be the tact taken by Georgette Poindexter, who argues for a
federative tier of government that would be responsible for region-wide wealth redistribu
tion while promoting the autonomy of local neighborhoods as mechanisms for the realiza
tion of individual choice. See Poindexter, supra note 53, at 658-64. The goal of "opening up"
the suburbs by attacking suburban exclusionary zoning by forcing localities to take their
"fair share" of lower income residents also represents this kind of approach. See, e.g. , John
Charles Boger, Mount Laurel at 21 Years: Reflections on the Power of Courts and Legisla
tures to Shape Social Change, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1450 (1997) (discussing New Jersey's
attempt to institute a "fair share" regime after the seminal New Jersey Supreme Court's
Mount Laurel decisions). Fair share regimes, however, have had limited success in creating
low-income choices in the suburbs. See Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact
of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants,
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for everyone, ensuring that every neighborhood is based on a volun
tarist model. This is both a moral imperative and a requirement for ef
ficient preference formation.168
These solutions to the problem of exclusion, however, do not solve
the central conceptual defect with the voluntarist account of localism.
No matter how robust the individual's mobility, an account of local
autonomy based in voluntary association is conceptually flawed be
cause it requires that neighborhoods be allowed to enforce boundary
creating norms that themselves undermine the outsider's ability to
contract in. On the contractarian account, exclusion is not simply a
byproduct of local autonomy (that we can solve), but a condition of
local autonomy. What may look like consent-based, voluntarist local
governance is actually the result of legal and political choices favoring
one kind of resident over another.
The Supreme Court's decision in Warth v. Seldin169 amply illus
trates this point. In Warth, low and moderate income residents of the
city of Rochester (along with nonprofit organizations, developers, and
Rochester taxpayers) sought to challenge the neighboring suburb of
Penfield's exclusionary zoning laws.170 The Court assumed (for pur
poses of the appeal) that the ordinance had the purpose and effect of
excluding persons of low and moderate income (many of whom hap
pened to be minorities) from residing in the town in violation of their
constitutional and statutory rights.171 The Court noted that the zoning
ordinance allocated 98% of Penfield's vacant land to single-family de
tached housing on large lots and only 0.3 % of Penfield's vacant land
for multifamily structures, and that these limits, combined with set
back restrictions and floor area and habitable space requirements, in
creased the cost of single-family housing beyond the means of the peti
tioners.172 The Court held, however, that the petitioners did not have
standing to challenge Penfield's zoning regime because they did not
assert a present interest in "any Penfield property": " [N]one is himself
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 268, 1304-06 (1997) (concluding that, while Mount Laurel did re
sult in increasing the amount of low-income housing in urban areas, it failed to provide
housing opportunities in the suburbs or to ameliorate racial and ethnic residential segrega
tion) . Indeed, many conclude that New Jersey's efforts at opening up the suburbs have
failed. See, e.g. , Florence Wagman Roisman, The Role of the State, the Necessity of Race
Conscious Remedies, and Other Lessons From the Mount Laurel Study, 27 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1386, 1387-89 (1997). This is not surprising. As I argue below, efforts to expand indi
vidual "choice" do not challenge the spatial biases of local government law and therefore
will only be minimally effective in fostering racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic integration.
See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
168. See Poindexter, supra note 53, at 658-64.
1 69. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
170. See id. at 493.
171. See id. at 502.
172. See id. at 495.
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subject to the ordinance's strictures; and none has ever been denied a
variance or permit by respondent officials."173
The Court treated the boundary between Penfield and Rochester
as immutable. Because petitioners did not live in Penfield or have a
current interest in property in Penfield, they did not have the standing
to challenge the zoning ordinance regardless of its effect on their abil
ity to become future residents of Penfield. As Justice Brennan's dis
sent pointed out, the Rochester petitioners found themselves in a
Catch-22: if they could afford to become residents of Penfield, they
would have standing to sue but no grievance; conversely, because they
could not afford to become residents of Penfield - the gravamen of
their complaint - they did not have standing to sue.174
The Court did not recognize the impossibility of the situation of its
own making. Instead, the majority appeared to reject the petitioners'
entire theory of the case out-of-hand (despite formally accepting the
petitioners' allegations as true), stating that "petitioners' descriptions
of their individual financial situations and housing needs suggest . . .
that their inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the eco
nomics of the area housing market, rather than of respondents' assert
edly illegal acts. "175 In effect, the Court presumed that the residents of
Penfield and Rochester lived in their respective towns because they
had made the choice to do so. The Rochester petitioners were ex
pressing nothing more than a "preference" to live in Penfield, which,
like all preferences (to own a Ferrari, to live in a big house), was sub
ject to the limitations of petitioners' finances and not cognizable under
Article III. 176
In so doing, however, the Warth majority privileged the Penfield
residents' preferences for large lots and single-family housing over the
Rochester residents' preferences for living in Penfield, with its argua
bly better schools and lower tax rates. The result was the exclusion of
the Rochester petitioners, a result that the Penfield respondents would
surely argue was necessary to maintain their particular pastoral way of
life, their property values, and the health and welfare of their resi
dents.
The important point is not that the Court made a choice among
competing preferences or that it did so without identifying the values

173. Id. at 504. The Court denied standing to the nonprofit organizations and the devel
opers on essentially the same grounds. See id. at 512 (nonprofits), 516 (developers). The
Court also denied standing to the class of Rochester tax-paying plaintiffs whose claim was
not that they were denied access to Penfield, but that Penfield's exclusionary zoning laws
injured them as taxpayers because those laws had the effect of raising property tax rates in
Rochester. See id. at 509-1 1 ; infra text accompany notes 181-187.
174. See id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
175. ld. at 506.

1 76. See id. at 505.
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underlying that choice - though both are true. What is important is
that the contractarian account is unable to tell us which preference the Rochester petitioners' preference to be let in or the Penfield resi
dents' preference to keep out - should receive priority. Both are as
sertions of individual choice: the former, a choice to live in a particular
town; the latter, a choice to live in a particular way.
In other words, the mobility that is so central to the contractarian
account is continuously undermined by the necessity for entrance con
trols that maintain the character and nature of the community in the
first instance. Because the Court had to choose one or the other pref
erence, it could not possibly honor the contractarian requirement that
neighborhoods be based on voluntary association for both: the indi
vidual autonomy of either the Penfield residents or the Rochester
residents had to be sacrificed. But instead of facing this stark alterna
tive, the Court pretended that it was honoring everyone's "choices"
(within the limits of their means), while granting no one's "prefer
ences."
b. The Geographically Exclusive Conception of Local
Government
Of course, the fact that the Warth Court privileged the preferences
of Penfield's current residents over those of its potential residents
(currently living in Rochester) was not surprising, given that local gov
ernment law is structured to favor current residents over potential
residents. Indeed, the residence-based franchise is the primary feature
of a local government law regime that is structured in numerous ways
to prefer residents over nonresidents. This strong identification of in
terests with residence is taken for granted: we have come to accept
that existing residents of a particular geographically defined area have
a stronger claim to govern within a particular territory than do non
residents.177
177. Warth is one of a series of Burger Court decisions that had the effect of constitu
tionalizing current residents' preferences on the basis of local autonomy. See Williams, supra
note 29, at 83-84, 105-15. Land use-related cases include Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (establishing rigorous standard in order for
a plaintiff with standing to prove discriminatory intent in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment from locality's adoption of exclusionary zoning ordinance); City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (holding that provision in city charter pro
viding that land use changes must be approved by majority vote in a referendum does not
violate Due Process Clause); Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding
zoning ordinance excluding student households); and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
(upholding referendum requirement that permitted majority of residents to veto low-rent
housing projects regardless of zoning requirements unless racial discrimination could be
shown). Two school cases also reified the jurisdictional line between neighboring localities,
enforcing in language and in deed that local amenities such as schools are for the use and
enjoyment of local residents. Thus, in San Antonio v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Court rejected a challenge to Texas's school financing system that was based on the local
property tax and that resulted in significant inter-local inequalities in per-pupil expenditure.
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Yet, this geographically exclusive conception of local governance
has not gone unchallenged. Some local government scholars have
charged that the privileging of residence in distributing voice - link
ing residence and local governance - is flawed, both descriptively and
conceptually.178 As a descriptive matter, residence-based local govern
ance fails to recognize the complicated reality of life in metropolitan
regions. People no longer live and work in one locality with which they
identify entirely. Instead, people move multiple times over the course
of their adult lives and conduct their lives across various political and
social communities everyday, working in one, playing in another, go
ing to school in another, sleeping in another, and voting in another.
The geographically exclusive conception of local government assumes
that individuals are more concerned, competent, and aware of issues
that relate to their homes. Yet, a Stamford, Connecticut, resident
without children who commutes to New York everyday may have a
stronger interest in decisions made by the city of New York than in the
decisions made by the Stamford school board.
As a conceptual matter, then, this residence-based account of local
governance is overdetermined. Why should a person's residence and
not her interests decide her community? The linking of residence and
franchise results in the identification of political issues in terms of
where people buy or rent a home. Local governance is thus premised
on a narrow sort of neighborhood identification, limited by territorial
designations that mean little to contemporary persons living in metro
politan areas with numerous overlapping jurisdictions.179
More important, the geographically exclusive conception of local
government effectively reinforces an exclusionary idea of community.
In allowing prior-in-time residents to adopt norms that restrict access
to "their" neighborhood, as Penfield's residents did, th� Court simul
taneously affirmed Penfield residents' individual autonomy while
denigrating the Rochester petitioners'. It thus adhered to a construc
tion of localism that privileged insiders without ever questioning how
those insiders got to be there. This only increases the irony of the
Court's suggestion that the Rochester petitioners look to the "normal
democratic process"180 in seeking to alter Penfield's exclusionary zon
ing laws. The Court failed to recognize that in order even to partici
pate in the making of Penfield's local zoning ordinances, the
Rochester petitioners would have to become residents there. But then
the match would be over: the outsiders would have become insiders, at
And in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court reversed a district court order
that required busing of inner-city children to suburban schools as part of a Detroit-area de
segregation remedy.
178. See Frug, supra note 17, at 320-35; Ford, supra note 165, at 1909-10.
179. See Frug, supra note 17, at 316-17.
180. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
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which point the game is already won (for Rochester residents) or lost
(for Penfield residents).
The key here is that the geographically exclusive conception of lo
cal government obscures the effects of local decisions on "outsiders"
primarily by defining them as such. Once the border between Penfield
and Rochester is assumed, the Rochester residents' lack of standing
appears obvious, and any spillover effects can be easily discounted as
"incidental," as the Warth majority claimed.181 B ut these spillover ef
fects are not incidental, they are structural. The zoning regime serves
as an entrance control; it is inherent in the concept of a jurisdictional
border between Penfield and Rochester. Without such an entrance
control, the border would itself be incidental. Indeed, if Penfield could
not keep out the residents of Rochester, there would be no border, no
Penfield and no Rochester.
The relevant externality is exclusion, which is embedded in the
structure of local government. Exclusionary zoning not only alters (or
preserves) the environment for Penfield, it also causes the displace
ment and concentration of less desirable (from a municipal finance
perspective) persons into more limited localities. These limited locali
ties, like Rochester, are beset by the combination of increasing costs of
municipal services and an ever-shrinking tax base, while wealthy lo
calities, like Penfield, use entrance controls to defend their tax base.
"As a result, a locality with a more ample per capita tax base can pro
vide better services at a lower tax rate without having to support serv
ices in other localities, while poorer localities have to tax themselves at
higher rates but generate revenues sufficient only to fund relatively in
ferior local services."182 The poor get poorer: exclusionary zoning re
gimes lead to the concentration of poor people in specific localities
where they are afflicted by higher tax rates and receive inferior serv
ices. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in waging its twenty
five year battle to open the New Jersey suburbs, fiscal zoning "pre
vent[s] various categories of persons from living in the township be
cause of the limited extent of their income and resources. "183 "Almost
every [municipality] acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest
and in effect builds a wall around itself to keep out those people or en
tities not adding favorably to the tax base."184
181. Id. at 509.
182. Briffault, supra note 12, at 1 136.
183. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 717
(1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]; see also S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 510 A.2d 621 (1986); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). For an historical account of the Mount Laurel litigation, see
KIRP ET AL., supra note 144.
184. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723. This includes competition for low-cost commer
cial ratables. See Sheryll Cashin, Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 758 (2001).

November 2001]

Limits of Localism

423

These concentration effects may be exacerbated by the perceived
identification of costly municipal service users with race. As Richard
Ford has pointed out, the existence of racially identified spaces in the
metropolitan region is a product of the frequent correlation of race
and income.185 Even absent the existence of discriminatory motivation,
claims Ford, wealthier (usually white) residents have strong incentives
to avoid and exclude poorer and often black residents as a matter of
local finance. Racially identified spaces become self-perpetuating as
whites come to view blacks as placing increasing burdens on municipal
finances. Whether blacks actually impose higher burdens becomes ir
relevant as spaces become increasingly racially identified, with whites
fleeing what they perceive to be costly blacks in an effort to maintain
property values. This flight may itself lead to the depression of prop
erty values regardless of the incomes of the blacks moving in. Ford de
scribes the local government finance system based on boundaries as a
" 'tax' on integration"186 - one that perpetuates a segregated metro
politan geography even in the absence of overt discriminatory actions
by municipalities. 187
The Warth Court may have been more sympathetic to these spatial
spillover effects if it had understood them temporally. Once we begin
to think of the Rochester petitioners as potential or future residents of
Penfield instead of as residents of a neighboring municipality, our
sense of which interests are entitled to normative respect shifts (be
cause our sense of the relevant "community" shifts). Future residents
of a locality are affected by any number of policies pursued by current
residents, including those policies made in the recent and not-so
recent past by residents who may no longer live in the jurisdiction but
that have adversely affected newer entrants. This widespread temporal
disjuncture is built into the ideology of American mobility and the
close identification between where one lives and one's place in the so
cial order. For millions of Americans, "making it" has meant moving
("All localities in the fragmented American metropolis are in a vigorous horizontal competi
tion with each other for a limited commercial tax base.") Cashin observes that white subur
ban communities tend to out-compete not only predominantly black urban areas, but also
suburbs with majority black populations. See id.
185. Ford, supra note 165, at 1849-57.
186. See id. at 1853-54.
187. See id. at 1856-57. The segregation and concentration of African Americans in the
inner city not only harms African Americans as a matter of municipal finance, but it also has
a measurable impact on individual access to employment and overall social mobility. See
generally Bruce Wienberg, Black Residential Centralization and the Spatial Mismatch Hy
pothesis, 48 J. URBAN ECON. 1 10-34 (2000); David Cutler & Edward Glaeser, Are Ghettos
Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. OF ECON. 827 (August 1997). Concentration effects are significant
factors in exacerbating black poverty. See generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993);
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY D ISADVANTAGED (1987); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996).
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up and out. Current residents buy "up" (and move up the social lad
der) by moving out of the city to the suburbs and out of the inner sub
urbs to more distant suburbs as the older suburbs become less desir
able, leaving those who cannot move up to grapple with the results of
past local decisions.188 Many current residents of a locality may not
have to live with the consequences of local government decisions be
cause of the ready availability of new localities in which to reconstruct
the American dream after they have cashed in or gotten out.
These temporal spillover effects of local decisionmaking are often
overlooked. What does local autonomy mean in a mobile society
where changes in the make-up of local populations occur over the
span of years as opposed to decades or longer?189 Who exactly is the
accountable local decisionmaker? Potential residents, like the
Rochester petitioners, bear the economic and social brunt of exclu
sionary land use policies that contribute to increased property values
for all Penfield residents, including current residents whose properties
were less valuable before the exclusionary regime was put into place.
Being in the mobility market, the potential resident will feel the im
pact of certain local policies, particularly those that affect the cost of
housing, more strongly than nonresidents or even current residents.
Indeed, it is arguable that the one group of plaintiffs that was most af
fected by Penfield's exclusionary zoning regime was the Rochester
home-seeking petitioners. When thought of as an injury across time,
the class of potential residents incurs the most devastating harm.
c.

Internalizing Displacement

The contractarian account of community can attempt to take these
extra-territorial and extra-temporal effects into account by adopting a
limiting principle that demands that localities internalize the spillover
effects of their acts of self-government, particularly acts of exclusion.
In fact, numerous local government law scholars have argued over the
years that the only way to internalize the extraterritorial effects of lo
cal government policies is by extending the locality's boundaries to in
clude all affected persons.190 Local government scholars and policy188. The realization that this process is becoming untenable has resulted in the recent
unprecedented popular concern with the problems of sprawl, though this concern has gener
ated few effective antisprawl measures. See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism,
and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. R EV. 57, 136 (1999) (conclud
ing that "key sprawl decisions are likely to continue to be made by largely unaccountable
local, state, and federal officials" and therefore "sustained and effective anti-sprawl meas
ures . . . have been and are likely to remain a rarity").
189. The average American moves every six years. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 153,
at 44 (citing U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 Report on Geographical Mobility).
190. See, e.g. , VICTOR JONES, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT (1942) (urging creation
of general purpose local governments at the metropolitan level); Briffault, supra note 12, at
1 164-71 (advocating metropolitan-wide regional government with significant powers over
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makers have offered various formulations of regional ·government, ne
cessitated by the parochial actions of neighboring localities.191 In ma
nipulating j urisdictional boundaries by expanding them outward, ad
vocates of these proposals have given up on local governance in i:nany
instances altogether, basically acknowledging that any limiting princi
ple on local autonomy eventually swallows local government alto
gether.192
land use, revenue collection, and regional infrastructure); Robert L. Lineberry, Reforming
Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality?, 58 GEO. L.J. 675, 697-71 1 (1970) (discussing
problem of externalities and advocating various forms of metropolitan-area government).
191. For the more recent literature on this subject, see ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW
VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1994); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); NEAL R. PIERCE,
CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993);
DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); and DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME,
OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA (1999). See also
Briffault, supra note 12, at 1 164-71; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyr
anny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985,
2046-47 (2000) (advocating a regionalist system of local governance); Lineberry, supra note
190, at 697-711; Poindexter, supra note 53, at 660-63 (advocating a redistributive tier at the
regional level to effect region-wide wealth redistribution).
In the 1960s, some metropolitan areas experimented with a "federative" structure (such
as Miami-Dade County) or with city-county consolidation (such as Indianapolis-Marion
County, Nashville-Davidson County, and Jackson-Duvall County). See Lineberry, supra
note 190, at 698-706. More recent moves towards regionalism have been spurred by the
problems of suburban sprawl and the traffic congestion, air pollution, and loss of open space
that accompanies it. For example, in Atlanta, a new metropolitan authority, the Georgia Re
gional Transportation Authority, has the power to build or veto roads and transit systems
and to control growth by denying permits to tie into the road system. The purpose is to con
trol the massive sprawl in the Atlanta region that has resulted in average commuting times
of eighty minutes. See David Firestone, Suburban Comforts Thwart Atlanta's Plans to Limit
Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at 22. For a discussion of the institutional politics of
sprawl, see Buzbee, supra note 188, at 136.
192. See, e.g. , Briffault, supra note 12, at 1164-71; John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and
the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1685, 1711 (1998) (advocating that states "reclaim the
delegated zoning power from the gaggle of fragmented, parochial municipalities and either
exercise the power itself, redelegate it to new state or regional planning agencies, or redele
gate it to municipalities subject to tighter standards"). But see Clayton P. Gillette, Regionali
zation and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190,190-97 (2001) (advocating decentral
ized governments and suggesting inter-local bargaining as an alternative to regionalism);
Edward A. Zelinksy, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665
(1998) (reviewing DA YID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); NEAL R. PEIRCE,
CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993); &
DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995))
(rejecting calls for regional or metropolitan-wide government as unworkable and unlikely to
alter the current racial, economic, and spatial distribution of metropolitan areas).
Another possible mechanism for forcing localities to internalize the costs of their deci
sionmaking is to allow the affected local government legal standing to challenge the deci
sions of a neighboring or adjacent local government unit. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. City
of Shaker Heights, 507 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio 1987) (holding that Cleveland had standing to
challenge neighboring Shaker Heights' decision to close and barricade certain streets which
diverted traffic and inconvenienced residents of the city but sustaining Shaker Heights' deci
sion); cf Robert C. Ellickson, Public Property Rights: A Government's Rights and Duties
When Its Landowners Come into Conflict with Outsiders, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1627-30
(1979) (advocating creation of public intergovernmental rights and duties to internalize
spillovers of local and state governmental decisions).
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Efforts to prevent spillovers without expanding boundaries are dif
ficult, however. Any proposed limiting principle on local power must
differentiate between local decisions to exclude and local choices to
instantiate a way of life, which are often one and the same. The ques
tion "Why don't we trust them to decide for themselves?" can be
asked of the resident of Park Avenue who is tired of aggressive pan
handlers, the resident of Penfield who wants to protect her pastoral
lifestyle by banning low-income housing, and the business owner who
has joined other business owners to create a business improvement
district downtown that enforces a curfew for teenagers. Any proposed
anti-exclusionary limiting principle becomes untenable in the face of
the powerful thrust of local autonomy based on the consent of the
residents of an already territorially defined locality.
Indeed, like Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, zoning re
gimes are almost always portrayed as defensive measures intended to
protect existing residents, who, it is again assumed, have a particular
normative entitlement to that protection. Residents use terms like
"community character" and "way of life" to defend mechanisms that
exclude or discourage undesirable uses in their neighborhood. The
rhetoric of community is thus employed to defend norms that con
struct the community in their image as they are simultaneously j usti
fied as emanating from that community.
Consider again Ellickson's proposal for Red-Yellow-Green Zones.
Ellickson begins with public order norms, deployed to create definable
and defensible perimeters between neighborhoods, newly conceived
of as "zones" for certain specified behavior. The Green, Yellow, and
Red Zones do not exist prior to defining the uses of land that are ap
propriate in each. Indeed, the whole purpose of Ellickson's regime is
to create standards of behavior and impose them on a grid of the city,
allocating certain percentages of land to the various norm zones with
an eye toward a proper distribution of functions to create an overall
attractive city. Thus, Ellickson suggests that Green Zones would con
stitute approximately 5 % of the city's public space, while Yellow
Zones would constitute 90% , and Red Zones the remaining 5 % .193
Yet, at the same time, Ellickson defends his newly constructed
public space zones by invoking "prevailing standards of community
behavior," as if such prevailing standards exist prior to the construc
tion of the Red, Yellow, and Green Zones - prior to the imposition
of nonconforming uses. Thus, he argues that a zoning regime that
permits adoption of neighborhood-specific street norms allows the
various neighborhoods within the city to decide what kind of street life
they wish to have.194 Mirroring claims made by proponents of the
193. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1221-22.
194. See id. at 1220.
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Gang Congregation Ordinance, Ellickson argues that communities
should be permitted to experiment with norms that may be important
to preserving a way of life or a particular community character. In
other words, zoning public space "adds to the richness and diversity of
urban life"195 by increasing the variety of options available to the city
dweller, who can pick and choose among those options by voting with
his or her feet. Under Ellickson's proposal, panhandling, bench squat
ting, and other forms of "chronic street nuisance" are activities one
can choose. If I want to panhandle or bench squat, I can choose the
particular zone where that activity is permitted by "voting" with my
feet. In the same way, I can also choose whether I want to associate
with people who engage in these activities.
Of course, this is the same kind of "choice" that the Warth Court
asserted was being exercised by the Rochester residents - indeed, no
real choice at all. And yet, as in Warth, the community looks like a
product of choice because it is spatially defined. First, the norms serve
as entrance controls that encourage desirable uses and outlaw unde
sirable ones, thereby defining the perimeters of the relevant commu
nity. The particular behaviors and persons targeted by quality of life
or exclusionary zoning ordinances will not disappear; they will just go
somewhere else, to increasingly marginalized, coerced, and isolated
spaces. In the case of public order norms, panhandling and other
"chronic street nuisances" are almost universally considered undesir
able uses except by panhandlers or bench squatters themselves. The
result, of course, is that all the undesirable uses are displaced into the
Bowery. These undesirable uses are excluded from a community that
now exists by function of that act of exclusion.
Second, the formal boundaries of regimented zoned space - the
Green, Yellow, and Red Zones - disappear from the picture, be
coming invisible as the norms take hold in the space, enforced through
informal means of monitoring, and, most important, because violators
of the norms are weeded out. "Space does the initial work of defining
the community or association and imbues the latter with an air of ob
jectivity, and indeed, of primordiality."196
Displacement is thus the central birth act of community. How does
a community "internalize" the initial and ongoing displacement of in
dividuals to other communities? How does one recognize the differ
ence between facially exclusionary policies and polices intended to en
able a particular neighborhood to flourish when these policies are
invoked by everyone?197 Rather than asking how much mobility par195. Id.
196. Ford, supra note 165, at 1860.
197. Consider again the arguments for devolving constitutional norms to the neighbor
hood level. Advocates recognize that not all neighborhood norms are valid; an anti
exclusionary limiting principle or "hypernorm" is required. See Poindexter, supra note 53, at
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ticular individuals need in order to create truly consenting neighbor
hoods across all our cities and suburbs, we might ask how much exclu
sion we will countenance in order to have truly consenting neighbor
hoods anywhere. The real question is not whether the inner-city
neighborhoods of Chicago are voluntary associations, but whether any
of our neighborhoods are really voluntary associations.
It bears repeating - returning again to Warth - that Penfield
does not exist unless it can exclude the residents of Rochester. Indeed,
Penfield's ability to exclude the residents of Rochester is its defining
feature. Our intuition that Penfield should be entitled to govern itself
is less plausible when this displacement role of entrance controls is
made explicit - when we realize that entrance controls in Green
Zones also coerce others (by default or purposefully) into particular
Red Zones. When combined with the residence-based franchise,
which restricts formal political governance to individuals who reside in
the jurisdiction, these boundary-creating norms are constitutive of
neighborhoods that assert self-government in their defense, defended
as associations of like minds, allegedly made up of individuals "freely
choosing" where - or, if not where, how - to live.198
636-38. Professor Livingston, for example, notes that that courts should invalidate public or
der laws if they are "facially aimed at rendering some people, like racial minorities, tran
sients, and the poor, outsiders to the community." Livingston, supra note 8, at 594. Echoing
Livingston's call for a limiting principle, Professors Meares and Kahan claim that a public
order law is not likely to constitute an attempt at excluding certain groups from public life
(and the political process) if the community as a whole has "internalized" the "coercive inci
dence of a particular policy." Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note
9, at 209; see also Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra note 9, at 251, 254-55. By
shouldering the burdens of the policy, crime-ridden minority neighborhoods could be said to
have sufficiently taken responsibility for their acts of self-government.
Livingston, like Kahan and Meares, acknowledges that application of her version of the
anti-exclusion principle is context-specific - that it depends in part on how the average citi
zen is affected by the law and whether that citizen's support of the law is entitled to moral
respect. See Livingston, supra note 8, at 667-71 ; Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray,
supra note 9, at 258-59. Even taking context into consideration, however, it is not at all clear
what a public order law "facially aimed at rendering some people . . . outsiders to the com
munity" looks like. An ordinance banning gang members from collecting on the street looks
like a facial ban on gang members participating in community life. Nor is it clear what the
community has to do to internalize a particular coercive policy. Simply being subject to the
same standard as a gang member - or, in the case of a zoning regulation, all the other resi
dents of a town - does not mean the members of the community have internalized the coer
cive impact of the law. The Gang Congregation Ordinance is particularly asymmetrical in
that it does not even require non-gang members to meet the same standards of conduct:
there are no constraints on non-gang member loitering. Presumably, the anti-exclusion limi
tation prevents the community from passing laws explicitly motivated by racial discrimina
tion, or by the desire to rid the community of particular types of persons (panhandlers or
gang members), though, in truth, the limitation cannot prevent localities from using proxies
for that purpose.
198. This rhetoric of choice is deeply resonant despite its conceptual flaws because it
clothes itself in the vocabulary of individual freedom and community identification. Thus,
for example, the Nixon administration's opposition to busing (a position that helped Nixon
win a second term and that was vindicated by the Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974)) was premised on a voluntarist argument that emphasized individual mobility and the
benefits of pluralism. Nixon argued:
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But minority residents of high crime neighborhoods do not benefit
from a localism based in the language of consent. As an initial matter,
the power to zone enables the neighborhood to displace further an
unwanted group (gang members) to a neighboring community, a
probably limited and short-lived success.199 More important, by rein
forcing the notion of community as a voluntary association, the con
tractarian account j ustifies the policies that led to the creation of ra
cially identified Red Zones in the first place. The result is to reinforce
the isolation of inner-city, minority neighborhoods in their particular
geography - a geography of diluted rights and racially identified
space200 - and to mask the reality that those spaces are the product of
an existing regime of community self-definition. The outcome is some
thing that we may already recognize: a metropolitan region of spatially
differentiated individuals, segregated into racial and socioeconomic
enclaves that are j ustified as th,e product of individual choice and
community self-determination. Indeed, proponents of localism struc
ture their arguments as a quest for community autonomy in the pur
suit of individual conceptions of the good life. According to this argu
ment, such autonomy, though often stymied by federal judges, may be
required by liberalism. By implying that inner-city neighborhoods are
associations of like minds, the language of community transforms a
less-than-ideal housing option into a conscious commitment to a
neighborhood and an unconstitutional standard into a choice of a
"way of life."
"We cannot be free and at the same time be required to fit our lives into prescribed places
on a racial grid - whether . . . by some mathematical formula or by automatic assign
ment. . . . An open society does not have to be homogeneous, or even fully integrated. There
is room within it for communities. . . . [I]t is natural and right that members of those commu
nities feel a sense of group identity and group pride. In terms of an open society, what mat
ters is mobility: the right and the ability of each person to decide for himself where and how
he wants to live, whether as part of the ethnic enclave or as part of the larger society - or, as
many do, share the life of both."
THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON

(quoting a 1970 Nixon state paper).

334-35 (1975)

·

199. Often the result of targeted policing efforts is to displace crime from one neighbor
hood to another. See Geoffrey Barnes, Defining and Optimizing Displacement, in CRIME
AND PLACE 95 (David Weisburd ed., 1995). Robert Helsley and William Strange have con
structed an economic model that supports their argument that gated communities always
divert crime to other communities, and may actually increase overall crime rates under cer
tain circumstances. Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Gated Communities and the
Economic Geography of Crime, 46 J. URBAN ECON. 80 (1999).
200. These neighborhoods would be true "anomalous zones," Gerald Neuman's term
for "a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying fun
damental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended." Gerald L. Neuman,
Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 197, 1201 (1996). Neuman offers an additional argu
ment against permitting local deviations from background constitutional norms. He argues
that such deviations threaten a "broader subversion of fundamental norms" because they
can easily jump barriers, or leak into the broader legal and political culture and increase the
acceptability of more significant exceptions to those norms. Id. Neuman thus highlights a
different kind of spillover effect that cannot be easily internalized by neighborhoods that
depart downward from existing constitutional standards.
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The Critique of the Deep Account: The Cartography of Normative
Entitlement and Smith v. Community Board No. 14

a.

Essentializing the Neighborhood

The voluntarist premise of the contractarian account can never be
fully realized; the spillover effect of exclusion cannot be internalized
without undermining localism altogether. Yet, it may be that we are
willing to tolerate the spillover effects of local decisions if those deci
sions are made on behalf of communities that we value highly or that
are highly valued by their members because they are intrinsic to indi
vidual identity. The deep account of community is not based in volun
tary association and therefore does not fail because some affected in
dividuals cannot consent or because they fall outside the ambit of
consent. Instead, community is defined by a web of reciprocal and re
inforcing social, familial, and cultural ties. Communities are constitu
tive of the individual; in the case of the Gang Congregation Ordi
nance, proponents argue that the poor, minority neighborhoods of
Chicago's inner city are bound by "linked fate," the ties of sociability
that make their lawmaking particularly w�rthy of deference by those
who do not share those ties.201 This lawmaking is more than a mere
choice to live a certain lifestyle; it is essential to the identity and sur
vival of a unique community.
The descriptive difficulty with the deep account is determining the
contours of such a community. The debates surrounding the extent of
the inner city's political support of the antigang ordinance illustrate
the difficulty of determining the relevant membership of a community
of linked fate formed out of a neighborhood.202 Amici in favor of the
ordinance were described as twenty "civic, religious, and other com
munity associations from throughout Chicago . . . [who] played a criti
cal role in the design of the gang-loitering ordinance. "203 These amici,
asserted their brief, are the "mothers and fathers, the sisters and
brothers, and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject to the
law."204 Amici opposing the ordinance were self-described as "grass
roots membership groups, and other Chicago and national organiza201. See text accompanying notes 75-96, supra.
202. On one side were those who argued that Chicago's African-American community

and its representatives widely supported the ordinance. On the other side were those who
argued that the ordinance was railroaded through the Chicago City Council despite African
American opposition. Compare Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra
note 9, and Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra note 9, with Alschuler &
Shulhofer, supra note 9, and Roberts, supra note 28.

203. Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 1 .
204. Id. a t 2.
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tions dedicated to serving the needs of inner-city residents."205 These
amid, asserted their brief, consist of the "representatives from [all of]
Chicago's major neighborhood-safety organizations"206 except one.
The perception of these two groups of the same ordinance could
not have been more different. Amici in favor argued that the ordi
nance protected their community as a "form of policing that secures
order without destroying the lives of community youth who find them
selves enmeshed in the complex social and economic forces that fuel
gang criminality."207 Amici on the other side disputed this characteri
zation. Asserting that twelve of the eighteen African-American al
derman on the city counsel opposed the ordinance, these amid argued
that the ordinance would be "divisive of communities along racial and
generational lines."208 The opponents of the ordinance quoted one
African-American alderman opposed to the ordinance who alleged
that the law was " 'drafted to protect the downtown area and the white
community' at the expense of innocent blacks."209 Moreover, both sets
of amid disagreed about who they were representing. At times, they
seemed to be speaking on behalf of the neighborhoods or the city. Still
at other times, the amid invoked the entire African-American com
munity as the relevant "we" entitled to a say in the ordinance's opera
tion.
The fact of disagreement among the residents of Chicago's inner
city African-American communities is not surprising. The "black
community's" ambivalence toward black criminal behavior and the
dominant ("white") j ustice system has been well documented. As
Regina Austin writes:
[T] here

is typically no unanimity within 'the community' on these issues.

For example, some blacks contend that in general the criminal j ustice

system is working too well ( putting too many folks in prison ) , while oth

ers maintain that it is not working well enough ( leaving too many dan
0
gerous folks out on the street ).21

This ambivalence is reflected in recent polls showing that many
African Americans are highly skeptical of police and concerned about
police brutality yet would welcome more effective police action to
combat crime in their neighborhoods. "It is like straddling a fence,"
205. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al.,
at 1, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Opposition] .
206. Id. at 1 n.4.
207. Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 2.
208. Amicus Brief in Opposition, supra note 205, at 1 .
209. Id. a t 4-5.
210. Regina Austin, The "Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and the Politics of Iden
tification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992) (citation omitted ) . Randall Kennedy is one
respected scholar who believes that the police are not doing enough to protect black com
munities. See KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 29-76.
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said one Bronx resident in a recent interview. "I am worried about the
police on one side and the criminals on the other. "21 1
This is not to say that disagreement among members alone is suffi
cient to undermine a "deep" community's claim to be permitted to
self-govern. Recall that on the deep account, the neighborhood is enti
tled to deference for internal decisions however they are made. The
proper inquiry is the nature of the community and the moral authority
of its membership, not the process by which the community comes to a
decision. A neighborhood of family and friends, linked by bonds of
mutual affection or shared experience, is something more than a po
litical community defined by jurisdictional lines. A community of
linked fate deserves deference not because individual members are
politically entitled to a say in a particular jurisdiction, but because they
are (collectively) normatively entitled to make decisions for each
other. Such a neighborhood does not engage in lawmaking exclusively
(or at all) through the standard majoritarian political processes, but
also, in part or in whole, through the transmission of communal, non
positivistic, and often nondemocratic norms.212 For amici, the neigh
borhood is an extension of the family, and the gang loitering ordi
nance is a form of tough love dispensed by parents and neighbors; it is
therefore on the private side of the private/public line.213
Mapping the normative concept of "community" onto the descrip
tive and territorial concept of neighborhood, however, exposes one to
the perils of essentialism that come with any invocation of the "black
community," the "inner-city community," the "minority, high-crime
community," or, for that matter, the "white, suburban community."214
211. Blaine Harden, On Edge but Optimistic, Blacks Offer Complex Views in Poll, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2000, at Bl (reporting that 89.3% of New York City blacks polled reported
that police brutality is a serious problem and that 45% rate the police as excellent or good in
being helpful and friendly). Richard Brooks has analyzed survey data concerning minority
perceptions of policing and criminal j ustice. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in
the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1219 (2000). He found that the majority of African Americans believe that the
American legal system treats blacks unfairly, but that, compared to their wealthier counter
parts, poor blacks are more likely to view the American legal system as fair. See id. at 122324. He concludes, however, that the data "do not suggest that poor urban blacks are pre
pared to waive constitutional rights in order to reduce crime." Id. at 1227
212. For example, civility and respect may be enforced through shaming penalties, not
through formal sanctions. See Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Pri
vate Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860-71 (1999).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. In other words, mere disagreement
among "family" is not enough to justify state intervention.
214. Of course, like residents of any neighborhood, residents of minority, high-crime
neighborhoods may share a particular set of overlapping interests and concerns. In our met
ropolitan regions, race, residence, and crime tend to overlap. These interests, as well as con
venience of administrability, may j ustify identifying residents of these neighborhoods as an
appropriate unit of political decisionmaking in a hierarchy of units. Indeed, this might justify
obscuring the fact that residents of minority, high-crime neighborhoods (or any neighbor
hood) are individuals with overlapping but oftentimes competing interests. Though linking
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As with all essentializing terms, "community" is both over- and un
derinclusive. This is certainly so where - in place of a person-by
person assessment of the decisionmaker's normative authority - one
uses proxies for membership in the community. In the case of the
Gang Congregation Ordinance, this proxy is residence and, by exten
sion, race and socioeconomic status.
Membership in the community is, in turn, a proxy for individual
moral worth. The assertion that certain neighborhoods have a norma
tive entitlement to govern requires a determination of the relevant
membership of the community, which in turn requires an assessment
of individual claims of belonging. Those claims of belonging involve
determining who does not belong. This is the notion that some who
may live among us do not count, and that those who do not live among
us are not part of "our" community.
Recall that linked fate turns on a normative judgment concerning
whether an individual is sufficiently connected to the community so as
to be able to speak on its behalf. The implication is that the white
business owner who is losing business because minority youth are con
gregating outside her store and intimidating shoppers does not have a
respectable normative claim for redress. Even though she may live
with the consequences of gang activity everyday, she cannot properly
balance liberty and order because she does not (it is assumed) happen
to be a neighbor or a friend of any gang members. She is therefore not
entitled to speak on their behalf. The African-American resident of
the wealthy suburb who wants to defend his neighborhood from rov
ing gangs also cannot properly balance liberty and order because he
does not share in the connection that comes with living in a poor,
inner-city neighborhood and is not a neighbor of those for whom he

government and race/residence may erase important differences in individual opinion, it may
still be in each individual's interest to be defined for political purposes with reference to a
larger community. This is a reason for creating minority-majority electoral districts. It is also
the argument that animates movements by predominantly African-American neighborhoods
to incorporate as separate, self-reliant municipalities. See Ankur J. Goel et al., Black Neigh
borhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowerment, Local Control and the Implications
of Being Darker Than Brown, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 417-18 (1998) (arguing that
African Americans should pursue incorporation of predominantly African-American neigh
borhoods as a means of empowering minority neighborhoods); Russel M. Lazega & Charles
R. Fletcher, The Politics of Municipal Incorporation in South Florida, 12 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 215, 227-29 (1997) (discussing strategy of incorporation used by the predomi
nantly African-American community of Destiny in Dade County in response to dissatisfac
tion with inequitable municipal service provision).
The deep account of community, however, turns on a stronger argument than represen
tation. The argument is not that it is a good idea for residents of high-crime, minority neigh
borhoods (or any neighborhood) to be defined as a political entity because residents share
similar interests, understandings, or competencies, and those interests are not addressed by
the larger community because of a lack of interest or a lack of political clout. Instead, the
argument is that residents of high-crime, minority neighborhoods (or any neighborhood)
have a right to self-govern if (normatively) they constitute communities, a group of individu
als with overlapping moral authority to speak for each other.
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arguably speaks. And the resident of a predominantly white, lower
class neighborhood who wants to stop loitering drug dealers (of what
ever race) in her neighborhood has no right to adopt constitutionally
suspect norms in her community, because she does not have the requi
site standing. She, too, does not share a particular proxy that makes
her "part of the community," linked by the social ties that would make
her lawmaking worthy of deference.
How do we recognize the difference between neighborhoods that
are deeply constitutive of their residents and thus entitled to deference
for norms that contribute to their survival and neighborhoods that
simply provide amenities for a particular lifestyle and whose norms
are masks for convenience or exclusion? How do we distinguish be
tween exclusionary zoning employed to defend a suburban community
and the gang loitering ordinance employed to defend an inner-city
community?
It is not that arguments cannot be made to distinguish these kinds
of norms; indeed, it would be difficult to contend that the values un
derlying fiscal zoning in the suburbs are no different than the values
underlying gang zoning in the inner city. The problem is determining
in advance which communities are "deserving"215 of deference and
which are not, and why. The deep account of community requires
making sociological determinations about the depth of communal at
tachments to a particular territorially defined space.216 These accounts
tend to devolve into competing and unverifiable claims about the
benefits to residents of living in particular neighborhoods among par
ticular neighbors.211 Indeed, there is little to constrain localism - if it

215. MANDELBAUM (2000), supra note 75, 18-19.
216. Indeed, the deep account of community counsels against limiting the normative
entitlement to balance liberty and order to those within a territorially-defined neighborhood
or region, unless that community has isolated itself to such a degree and with such concen
tration that its territorial definition and social definition are coterminous, as may be the case
with the Amish of Yoder or the Satmars of Kiryas Joel. Regina Austin argues persuasively
that the "black community" as a whole should engage in the ongoing conversation about
black lawlessness, and that the community as a whole has a stake in a politics of identifica
tion that rejects a strict lawless/law-abiding dichotomy when it comes to the black law
breaker. See Austin, supra note 210, at 1815-17. The concept of linked fate, at least as de
scribed by Tracey Meares, also indicates that African Americans outside of Chicago's inner
city communities should have a say in the norms that that community adopts because they
also share a linked fate with those residents. See Meares, supra note 82, at 682-83.
217. For example, the question of whether homeowners associations should enjoy ample
autonomy to govern often seems to turn on whether we believe that such associations are
"thick" communal enterprises, that is, whether they represent a valuable form of "deep" as
sociation to those on the inside or just a particular amenity package. See Gillette, supra note
13, at 1379-81 (observing that often liberals and communitarians are less tolerant of home
owners associations, which tend to provide particular amenities, than they are of "highly dis
tinct subcultures" like the Amish or Orthodox Jews, when the assertions of self-government
by both can be understood as crucial to their respective pursuits of a particular version of the
good life).
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is to have any force at all - if the test of the legitimacy of a norm is
its contribution to a unique community's preservation.
b.

Reinforcing the Cartography of Normative Entitlement

The kinds of distinctions drawn between entitled and nonentitled
persons are a result of conflating the normative concept of community
with the descriptive concept of neighborhood. The melding of the
normative and descriptive has far-reaching implications. First, such a
conception serves to reinforce the walls of separation between neigh
borhoods. When membership in the deep community is determined
primarily by residence, where one lives takes on a transformative sig
nificance. Simply by moving into a neighborhood (or choosing to re
main there) a resident becomes a person entitled to balance order and
liberty and becomes subject to norms that other equally entitled per
sons may invoke on behalf of the community. The stakes if the neigh
borhood (conceived of as a deep community) becomes too permeable
are always very high. At risk (from the members' perspective) are the
very connections between its members essential to the survival of its
way of life.
When the stakes are that high, the walls between neighborhoods
must be even higher. Consider the vehemence of suburban defenses of
exclusionary zoning regimes.218 The tenacity of such regimes cannot
merely be attributed to the fact that suburban residents are defending
a preference. The contractarian account of community would predict
that some residents would sell out if the price was right and find other
a.cceptable forms of association, and that others who were indifferent
would stay instead of fleeing in the face of lower-income arrivals. A
better explanation is that the walls that suburbs build constitute a de
fense of a perceived holistic order - a perception of itself as a deep
community - that is itself premised on spatial differentiation.219
This brings us to the second consequence of conceiving of neigh
borhoods as deep communities and justifying deference to local norms
on that basis: attaching normative weight to where one resides rein
forces a social order that already marks the inner-city neighborhood as
normatively suspect. The moral mapping of the metropolitan region
reinforces rather than subverts a social order that is spatially main
tained. This is a social order that places a high cultural value on single-

218. The narrative account of the Mount Laurel litigation aptly recounts the intensity of
an entire state's opposition to low-income housing. See, KIRP ET AL., supra note 144, at 1-10.
This vehemence extended not just to lower-income arrivals, but to residents who had lived in
Mount Laurel all their lives. As Bill Haines, the former mayor of Mount Laurel, once told a
church full of poor, African-American residents of the town, "If you people . . . can't afford to
live in our town, then you'll just have to leave." Id. at 2.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 223-229.
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family-detached homeownership, on suburban as opposed to urban
life.220 As the Court's defense of suburban zoning reveals,221 these
spaces have moral valences even before they are inhabited. The sub
urb signals stability, family, privacy, children, and community; the city
signals transience, work, publicity, danger, strangeness, and foreign
ness.222 The city/suburb dichotomy is a function of a localism invested
in rigorous boundary maintenance between the safe and the danger
ous, the familiar and the foreign, the family and the outside world.223
Thus, the metropolitan region already represents a cartography of
normative entitlement that divides suburbs and cities, white space
from black space, rich space from poor space. Ellickson's Red-Yellow
Green Zones make explicit what sociologists and anthropologists have
long understood: that social order is maintained spatially. The zones of
the metropolitan region are crucially important cultural signs used to
evaluate one's wealth, progress, intelligence, morals, children and
educational attainments. We talk about "good," "bad," and "transi
tional" neighborhoods and understand exactly what that neighbor
hood says about the person who lives there. As Constance Perin writes
in her anthropological account of American land use law, Everything
in its Place: Social Order and Land Use in America, land use regimes
reflect and reinforce cultural conceptions of "transition, citizenship,
honor, marginality, success, and self-esteem."224
The technicalities of defining zoning districts in terms of their permitted
and forbidden buildings and activities, classifying parts of cities and sub-

220. See PERIN, supra note 141.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 135-147.
222. These moral valences have been amply mined by sociologists and other theorists.
See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 145, at 3-17 (arguing that suburban residents' conception of
themselves rests in large part on their perception of cities as violent, anarchic, and corrupt
and of the suburbs as a haven from the city's corruption); JOHN R. STILGOE, BORDERLAND:
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUBURB, 1820-1939 (1988) (discussing the cultural distinction
between the "sinful" urban life and the "virtuous" rural life that underlies the development
of the suburbs); ROBERT C. WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICS (1958)
(arguing that the suburbs were constructed on an ideal of small town life and on a rejection
of "turmoil" and the corrupt politics of the city, and noting that privacy and fraternity are
two of suburbia's animating values); see a/so M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF
A SUBURB 30-36 (1 988) (noting that social conflict in the suburbs is muted, externalized and
medicalized); HERBERT J. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS: WAYS OF LIFE AND POLITICS IN A
NEW SUBURBAN COMMUNITY 33, 39 (1967) (observing that the foremost concern of buyers
of Levittown was "more space," "comfort and roominess," and "privacy and in owned
home"); JOHN R. SEELEY ET AL., CRESTWOOD HEIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE CULTURE OF
SUBURBAN LIFE (1956) (observing that suburban communities are built around schools and
children).
223. See PERIN, supra note 141, at 108-28. Whether these typologies reflect the reality of
suburban life, which is increasingly beset by the ills of overcrowding, congestion, sprawl,
drugs, and crime, home ownership in a suburban setting remains the dominant cultural ex
pression of American mobility. The distinction between city and suburb remains a primary
cultural artifact despite the fudging of those borders in real space.
224. PERIN, supra note 141, at ix.
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urbs by housing types and levels of population density, arranging the lay
outs of subdivisions: these also express our taken-for-granted under
standings of what f,•)cial order is and how it is best obtained. Whatever
governs relationships among land uses I take to be as well organizing
principles for relationships among land users.225

Perin observes how our placement in social space reflects our at
tainments in social time and how those social categories result in
marking us normatively by where we happen to live. One of Perin's
central insights is that the "correct chronology of life is one major or
ganizing principle in the system of land use."226 A deeply ingrained cul
tural assumption is that as individuals move into adulthood they will
progress towards maturity, stability, and financial security. A leading
indicator of this progress is the move from renting to homeownership,
a singularly important event in American cultural consciousness. For
many Americans, being a renter is a transitional state, a step on the
way to adulthood and homeownership. The transitional figure is a
threat to social order: "What matters is that transitional social catego
ries are defined, and then they are subject to a subsidiary axiom: that
all transitional categories should be collected together, for spreading
such anomalies in space (and in social time) will be disturbing to social
safety. "227
Land use regimes thus demarcate the boundaries between the
transitional and the stable both in time and in space. Many suburbs'
resistance to mixed use developments, to apartments, and to low
income housing can be explained in part by the central role of spatial
differentiation in cultural conceptions of the self. Not only are the
people who will live in such developments often of a different race228
than "we" are (which creates fear and anxiety in and of itself), they
are - if permitted to move into the neighborhood - now members of
the community ("one of us") - requiring a radical redefinition of who
"we" are, as progressing or transitioning, as marginal or successful
persons along the "ladder of life."229

225. Id.
226. Id. at 109.
227. Id. at 114.
228. The lack of multifamily housing impacts African Americans disproportionately be
cause blacks are more likely to be renters than whites. The 1999 American Housing Survey
for the United States shows that approximately 26% of white (non-Hispanic) households are
renters, compared to nearly 54% of blacks. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF
Haus. AND URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES (1999),
at 42.
229. Perin, supra note 141 at 32-80.
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The Problem of Insularity

This is the danger of an account of local autonomy that turns on
claims of normative entitlement based on "belonging." In such a
world, where the cost to the community of not being able to protect
itself by adopting norms for its defense is so high (as proponents of the
Gang Congregation Ordinance assert), battles over demarcated space
are battles over social meaning. Thresholds become crucially impor
tant markers of normative entitlement. Jurisdictional lines are more
than neutral mechanisms for distributing local preferences; they be
come normatively electrified fences between "us" and "them" that are
often impossible to cross.230 The vocabulary of threshold is meant to
invoke the idea of an entrance control with normative power, a mark
that defines insiders and outsiders, and to conjure up the threats, risks,
and rewards of crossing.
Take for example, Smith v. Community Board No. 14.23 1 In Smith,
neighborhood residents challenged local officials' granting of a permit
to Orthodox Jews to construct an eruv in the neighborhood.232 An eruv
is a defined space, the boundaries of which are demarcated by existing
man-made or natural barriers (such as fences or hedgerows) or by
stringing a barely visible wire normally across existing telephone or
other poles to create an enclosed area, sometimes a few blocks wide,
other times town-wide.233 Under Jewish law, the eruv serves as a sym
bolic and physical extension of the "private domain" and thus enables
religiously observant Jews to do acts that would normally be only
permitted inside such a domain, like carrying or pushing, without vio
lating the proscription against doing work on the Sabbath.234 By cre
ating "the fiction of a communal 'private' domain,"235 the eruv draws a
new public/private line that has religious legal significance: carrying is
forbidden in the public domain, but is not forbidden in the private
230. Belonging is expressed in spatial terms. Consider what happens when one enters
(usually accidentally) the "wrong" neighborhood, moving across an invisible threshold from
a place where one belongs to a place where one emphatically does not belong. See David M.
Engel, Law in the Domains of Everyday Life: The Construction of Community and Differ
ence, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 123 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). Not
knowing where those spatial boundaries are can be life threatening. At the extreme are lit
eral fences manned by guns and guards. See Renato Rosaldo, Foreword, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1037, 1037-39 (1996) (discussing, in Foreword to symposium entitled Surveying Law and
Borders, the U.S.-Mexico border and the social construction of the identities of those on ei
ther side).
231 . 491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1985); see also ACLU v. City of Long Branch, 670 F.Supp. 1293
(1987).
232. See Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85.
233. See id. ; see also Eyal Weisman & Manuel Herz, Between City and Desert, AA Files
#34 (Autumn 1997) (on file with author) (defining and describing eruvs).
234. See Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85.
235. Id.
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domain. The eruv primarily makes it possible to carry books or push
baby carriages between home and synagogue or between homes, and
thereby enables observant Jews more easily to visit one another and
attend synagogue on Friday nights and Saturdays.236
In Smith, non-Orthodox residents challenged the construction of
the eruv on First Amendment grounds, charging that, even though the
eruv was almost invisible (consisting as it did of existing fences and
virtually invisible alterations to existing structures), it had a "meta
physical impact on the area" that violated the claimants' First
Amendment rights.237 The court rejected this claim, holding that the
eruv was not a violation of the First Amendment.238
Consider the competing claims to community made in Smith by the
two sets of residents living in the same town. It is easy to question the
depth of the non-Orthodox residents' "metaphysical" objections to the
eruv, especially in light of the fact that the town was not asked to
spend any money for its construction. The Jewish community paid for
the eruv, mostly by repairing existing structures. The claim of commu
nity on behalf of the Orthodox seems particularly strong here; relig
iously based groups are presumed to have a certain linked fate. In con
trast, the claim of community on behalf of the non-Orthodox residents
looks fairly shallow. The eruv did nothing to alter how non-Orthodox
residents used the public spaces in the town, nor did it demonstrably
alter how observant Jews used the public spaces. (The eruv did not
create an explicitly religious space, just a space in which to do nor
mally mundane activities like walking and carrying bags, activities that
all residents of the town undertook every day of the week.) The oppo
sition to the eruv can easily be seen as an excuse for exclusion, the as
serted metaphysical injury as a way for non-Orthodox residents to ex
press a fear that the town was becoming "too Jewish" or would,
because of the eruv, "attract more Jews" to the area.239
But as Glen Robinson points out, the residents' complaint can also
be couched in more sympathetic, less exclusionary, and more deeply
constitutive terms: "The undeniable effect of creating the eruv was not
simply to make it more convenient for Orthodox Jews to observe the
Sabbath; it was also to give the neighborhood an identity as a Jewish
community."240 The demarcation - even figuratively - of the neigh236. See id.
237. Id. at 585.
238. See id. at 585-88.
239. The fear of a neighborhood becoming "too Jewish" is the subject of an article by
Samuel G. Freedman aptly entitled The Jewish Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 13,
2000, at 42-47. Opponents often worry that an eruv will attract additional Orthodox resi
dents who will change the nature of the community in other ways. For example, in neighbor
hoods dominated by Orthodox Jews, stores are often closed on Friday evenings and
Saturdays during the Jewish Sabbath.

240. Robinson, supra note 13, at 298.
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borhood's public spaces as Jewish communal space could lead non
Orthodox residents (taking their metaphysical claim at face value) to
"the perception that they could no longer enjoy a collective identifica
tion with the neighborhood because it has been 'taken over' by an ex
clusive group, a 'community' to which they cannot belong."241 Whether
or not this is a cognizable injury in First Amendment terms (the court
found it was not), we should not underestimate the social meaning of
the eruv's marked boundaries. The eruv is a literal boundary regime
that requires (on the deep account) the redefinition of the commu
nity's insiders and outsiders, a redefinition of who the residents of the
town "are."242 The space within the eruv takes on social meaning: it
becomes religiously identified, normatively "restricted" space.243
Smith highlights the conflicting impulses of belonging and exclu
sion inherent in community and the difficulty of sorting out competing
claims of deep community. In an America in which residence is so
powerful a cultural signal, controlling one's border is a central mecha
nism for controlling one's identity and the identity of others. Indeed,
Smith is a literal example of how the meaning of community happens
at borders between communities, not solely (or even primarily) inside
them. The eruv literally attaches normative weight to jurisdictional
lines; it represents the rare situation in which the normative commu
nity is coextensive with the descriptive neighborhood (as defined by
the limits of the eruv). The boundaries of the normative community
are physical. Thus, an act of pushing or carrying something outside the
eruv's demarcated lines (by a member of the Orthodox community) in
241. Id. at 298-99.
242. One opponent to the building of an eruv in a North London neighborhood report
edly argued that "(a] ghetto atmosphere would be imposed where integration of different
cultures would no longer occur." Another claimed that "(t]he proposal would implant on all
people in the area pronouncements going back some three to four thousand years." A third
argued that "[a] varied harmonious community would break down into selfish, embittered,
fragmented portions with strong suspicion, bitterness and hatred." Weisman & Herz, supra
note 233. For additional discussion of the North London eruv and an argument about how its
construction threatened the underlying territorial monopoly of the nation-state, see Davina
Cooper, Out of Place: Symbolic Domains, Religious Rights, and the Cultural Contract, in THE
LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 14, at 42-51 .
The turf battles that erupt over eruvs are similar t o those that erupt over other signs that
a particular religious group is "taking over." In the case of eruvs and other religious institu
tions, these battles sometimes pitch secular Jews against Orthodox Jews. See, e.g. , SAMUEL
G. FREEDMAN, J EW VS. JEW: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN JEWRY (2000)
(describing the opposition to construction of an elaborate Orthodox religious campus in a
Cleveland suburb whose residents were eight-three percent Jewish, and relating how all six
members of the town's Planning and Zoning Commission - all of whom were Jewish voted against the project).
243. Indeed, that is the eruv's primary purpose. For Orthodox Jews the eruv is a "port
able, dynamic, private space." Weisman & Herz, supra note 233. "The city . . . is transformed
by the eruv on the Sabbath into a representation of the Temple and thus from the public into
the private domain." Thus, "entering the eruv becomes a holy act." Id. "By redefining the
space, the eruv redefines the behavior which is permissible within it, earning it the nickname
of the 'magic schlepping circle.' Id.
"

November 2001]

Limits of Localism

441

violation of the proscription against working on the . Sabbath has the
effect of putting the transgressor "outside" the limits of the commu
nity in two senses: the transgression that puts her figuratively outside
the community (because she is a lawbreaker) also puts her literally be
yond the zone of community protection.
Smith illustrates how boundaries serve as easy means of defining
insiders and outsiders and, by extension, law-abiders and lawbreakers.
Zoning gang members is, on the deep account of community, a neces
sary exiling or excommunication, because gang members are literally
and figuratively not "who we (the inner-city neighborhoods of
Chicago) are" because they have transgressed the rules of the com
munity. This serves a definitional purpose, linking obedience to the
norms of the community with membership in it. The Gang Congrega
tion Ordinance, like the eruv, is a literal threshold; crossing the
boundary is crossing into a different normative zone.
Indeed, an implicit argument made by proponents of the Gang
Congregation Ordinance was essentially an argument about who con
trols the definition of the black lawbreaker.244 The argument asserts
that the dominant (white) society has defined these (mostly) black
young men as ultraviolent and unredeemable arch-criminals through a
culture of fear reinforced by draconian criminal penalties imposed on
primarily black lawbreakers. To the "black community," these "arch
criminals" are nothing of the sort; they are instead the community's
sons and brothers and neighbors. The benefit of the Gang Congrega
tion Ordinance is that it gives the black lawbreaker an opportunity to
be saved. An arrest and conviction for loitering does not result in long
term incarceration for the young black offender, but may get him off
the street before he is injured in a gang-related incident or before he
commits a more serious offense that will result in extensive jail time.245
The ordinance also gives the "black community" and the legal system
a middle way to define gang members as deviant without accepting the
portrait of the criminal black male imposed by society - a choice
somewhere between arch-criminal and law-abiding citizen.246 This
middle way provides an escape from the law-abiding/lawbreaking di
chotomy that forces minority communities to choose either solidarity
with their youth against an often oppressive legal regime or agreement
244. See Austin, supra note 210, at 1774-75 (discussing different versions of the black
Jawbreaker and how the "black community" identifies or ostracizes him or her).
245. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 2 (arguing that the "mothers and fathers, the
sisters and brothers, and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject to the Jaw . . . sup
port the Ordinance because it is a form of policing that secures order without destroying the
lives of community youth who find themselves enmeshed in the complex social and eco
nomic forces that fuel gang criminality").
246. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 16 ("Indeed, residents who supported the Or
dinance did so precisely because they saw it as an acceptably moderate way to steer their
children and their neighbors' children away from the gang life.").
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with their youths' outright criminalization by that regime.247 This al
lows the "black community" to indicate the limits of community pro
tection, but to be able to choose something less than excommunication
for every transgression, to allow for the possibility of the black law
breaker's redemption.248
Of course, many commentators and community members dispute
this characterization of the Gang Congregation Ordinance as a "mid
dle way," seeing it as more of the same white oppressiveness and as
reinforcing the same old black criminal portraits.249 Perhaps a better
understanding is that the ordinance (assuming it is supported by an
identifiable "black community") serves both as a mechanism for com
munity self-definition and as a further instrument of oppression.
Consider how a localism premised on the deep account of commu
nity derives its force from what Cover calls "a narrative of insular
ity,"250 a story about how the community is uniquely situated in rela
tion to the wider world. Linked fate is such a story. This assertion of
difference also contains the obvious seeds of isolation; it both empow
ers those on the inside and isolates them from those on the outside.251
As Smith illustrates, difference can be a means of estrangement from
one's neighbors. This is the separatist, anti-integrationist, parochialist
edge of a localism premised on a deep account of community, a local
ism that rests upon a concept of normatively restricted space. As
Cover writes: "communities whose members believe themselves to
have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their com
mon lives [must] maintain their coherence . . . by expulsion and ex
ile. "252 The community of linked fate cannot simply regulate its mem-

247. Cf Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide,
26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877, 886 (discussing the "difference/deviance divide," which puts
black women into the position of distinguishing themselves by participating in "the broader
societal put down of other black women").
248. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 18 ("In sum, the residents of poor, minority
communities favor 'middle ground' solutions to crime - ones that furnish a reasonable
prospect of relief from crime without severely disrupting their communities."). The vocabu
lary of redemption itself implies a deep community. Compare Austin, supra note 210, at
1815-17 (advocating a politics of identification that increases the black lawbreakers chances
for redemption), with Cover, supra note 15, at 34-35 (describing a "redemptive constitution
alism" as connoting the "saving or freeing of persons").
249. See, e.g. , Roberts, supra note 28, at 779-81, 834-35.
250. Cover, supra note 15, at 34-35.
251. Cf Ford, supra note 14, at 909, 926 (arguing that "often the subordinate group un
wittingly conspires in its own continued subordination and participates in its own quaran
tine" and warning against the "compulsory provincialism" that accompanies an "empow
ered" minority whose territorial autonomy is both "a haven and a prison for its residents").
252. Cover, supra note 15, at 15-16; see id. at 16 n.41 (citing the expulsion of Roger
Williams and Anne Hutchinson from the Massachusetts Bay Colony as an example). "The
other side of membership is, of course, exclusion and difference. A community that does not
distinguish between members and strangers cannot construct or sustain a moral order and
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bers' conduct; it must, at a certain point, turn its face away from mem
bers who disobey.
Thus, in considering the public housing apartment search policy
invalidated by the district court in Pratt v. Chicago Housing Author
ity,253 we can accept both that the court's allowance of such a policy
would have affirmed the residents' power to define the reach of the
Fourth Amendment and that it would further estrange those residents
from the wider political community by demarcating public housing as
someplace where "other" people live and where baseline constitu
tional rules do not apply. Like Smith, Pratt entailed an attempt by
residents to redefine public and private space. In Pratt, the public
housing residents invited the police into their homes by adopting a
regulation that allowed police to enter apartments without warrants
and absent exigent circumstances.254 In essence, residents sought to de
fine their normally private space as public for Fourth Amendment
purposes. In Smith, the Orthodox Jewish residents did the opposite,
literally demarcating a public space that would, for purposes of Jewish
law, essentially be treated as an extension of the private, religious do
main. Both manipulations of the private/public line created boundary
regimes that defined the internal membership of the community, but
also estranged that newly defined community from its neighbors.
This brings us back to the moral mapping of the metropolitan re
gion. The estrangement of the inner city is already demarcated in the
social space of the inner city, in what outsiders perceive as the "no-go"
(Red) zones of the metropolitan region. Deviance from constitut.ional
norms reinforces the public housing residents' normative and social
isolation in the context of a metropolitan region that deems them to
be normatively suspect anyway. This suspicion is itself a product of
envisioning residential neighborhoods as deeply constitutive of the self
and of grounding the autonomy of the neighborhood in such a concep
tion. The deep account of community used to justify the exercise of
will on the part of inner-city residents reinforces the normative zones
of entitlement that are already spatially, temporally, and culturally dic
tated. In attempting to assert control over its own meanings by waiv
ing constitutional rights, the inner-city neighborhood invariably reaf
firms its place in the social order.

loses its identity. Its borders are dissolved, its discipline ended." MANDELBAUM (2000), su
at 10.

pra note 75,

253. 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
254. See id.
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The Critique of the Dualist Account:

Kessler v. Grand Central Management Association, Inc.,
and the Construction of the Public

a.

Problematizing Participation

The deep account of community reinforces the moral mapping of
the metropolitan region, with its corresponding suspicion and spatial
isolation of inner-city residents. The goal of the dualist account is to
decrease estrangement. On the dualist account, community is the
name we give to a process of civic engagement. On this account, com
munity occurs in appropriately scaled settings for face-to-face partici
patory governance. These settings can be entirely artificial - unat
tached to any claims of communal experience, history, or identity.
Indeed, small-scale democratic participation is intended to transcend
parochial communal (sectarian) attachments; a goal of participatory
democracy is to create a political community of citizens out of indi
viduals who would otherwise be strangers.
The neighborhood, it is argued, is the ideal scale for the face-to
face interactions necessary for true democratic dialogue. These inter
actions constitute a genuine form of democratic governance, one
missing from the highly centralized and impersonal forms of govern
ment most living in metropolitan regions currently experience. By
characterizing the Gang Congregation Ordinance as a neighborhood
initiative, proponents lay claim to a powerful image of local decision
making. The neighborhood is infused with democratic possibilities that
the state should allow to develop. These arguments can apply to a
whole range of emerging sublocal institutions that may hold out the
promise of a renewed civic empowerment.255 These small-scale repub
lics are touted as forms of government that energize the citizen both in
his or her immediate neighborhood and in the larger expanses of
American society.
Yet, the participatory defense of localism presents two difficulties.
First, the spillover effects of neighborhood decisions (for example, the
forcing of gang members into other - perhaps less politically power
ful - neighborhoods) undermine the premise of the participatory ac
count: that individuals will have a voice in the decisions that affect
them. The difficulty is getting all the stakeholders (neighbors and ad
jacent neighborhoods) together in one place without losing the scale
that is necessary for true dialogue. The spillover effects of local deci
sions undermine localism not because those outsiders who are affected

255. See, e.g., Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 84 (discussing advantage of
proposed block improvement districts (BLIDs) in fostering skills of collective governance).
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have not contracted into the norms (as on the contractarian account),
but because those outsiders who are affected have not been included
in the democratic process that preceded adoption of those norms.256
Second, decisions about who should be counted as a decisionmaker
are often based on arguments about who has the most to lose. These
kinds of arguments rarely favor the disenfranchised or the marginal;
indeed, the disenfranchised and marginal are almost never considered
members of any community. They are, by definition, "nonvoters" often literally so because they are transient or have no home or are
not of voting age. The already marginal are also often considered in
eligible to vote because they are not imagined as stakeholders in the
political community. Creating smaller sites for participatory democ
racy will do little to alter the contours of the current moral mapping of
the metropolitan region unless that site creation crosses more tradi
tional neighborhood, socioeconomic, and racial lines. An emphasis on
participation may in fact reinforce the current link between residence
and political power, further entrenching the deep suspicion of outsid
ers borne of protecting one's turf.
Thus, the notion that little republics at the sublocal level can pro
vide new arenas for public life is theoretically attractive but politically
unstable. Indeed, enforcing a public, democratic form of sublocal gov
ernance requires forceful intervention on the part of the state. Other
wise, sublocal institutions can easily become instruments for the pri
vate management of civic life, captured by powerful interest groups
who enforce a particular conception of public life to the exclusion of
other competing conceptions.
Consider, for example, Kessler v. Grand Central District Manage
ment Association, Inc. 257 In Kessler, the Second Circuit considered an
equal protection challenge by tenant-shareholders residing within the
territorial limits of the Grand Central Business Improvement District
("BID"), a semi-autonomous sublocal government encompassing 337
properties over seventy-five blocks in midtown Manhattan.258 The
Grand Central BID is one of over forty business improvement districts
established in New York City pursuant to New York State's business
improvement district act.259 BIDs increase the level of services pro
vided in particular city areas in an effort to promote and spur in256. Carol Gould writes: " 'Who has a right to participate not only in deliberation but in
the decisionmaking itself?' The answer 'everyone affected by the decision' will not work for
any practical or real-world context." Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing
Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 177.
257. 158 F.3d 92 (1998).
258. See id. at 95.
259. See Richard Briffault, A Government For Our Time? Business Improvement Dis
tricts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366-67 & n.l (1999) (hereinafter
Briffault, Government]. Briffault notes that estimates of the number of BIDs operating in
the United States range from between 1000 and 2000. Id. at 336 n.l.
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creased commercial and economic development, and are typically
funded through an assessment on real property within the BID that
goes towards improving the public property within the district.
The tenants charged that the composition of the Grand Central
BID's governing board violated the "one-person, one-vote" require
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.260 Of
the fifty-two members of the challenged governing board, at the time
of the lawsuit, thirty-one were elected by the 242 owners of real prop
erty in the district, sixteen were elected by commercial tenants, and
one each was appointed by the mayor, the city comptroller, the Man
hattan Borough president, and the city council member of the relevant
council district. Only one representative was elected by the approxi
mately 930 residential tenants of the BID.261
The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the district court's de
termination that the equal protection requirement of one-person, one
vote did not apply to the Grand Central BID. Analogizing the BID to
the water districts that the Supreme Court held in Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Districf62 and Ball v. James263 did not
have to comply with one-person, one-vote, the Second Circuit found
that the Grand Central BID's limited purposes and powers made it a
"special purpose district" that disproportionately affected property
owners.264 The majority held that the BID had a limited purpose (de
voted to promoting business and commercial activity in the district),
that its role and responsibilities in providing sanitation, security, and
social services were secondary to the City's (and over which the City
had significant control), and that the BID could not impose income or
sales taxes or enforce laws "governing the conduct of persons present
in the district," and thus lacked the kinds of sovereign powers a mu
nicipal corporation might exercise.265
The court also held that, because the mandatory assessment was
paid by property owners "and only property owners,"266 the weighted
voting system favoring property owners bore a reasonable relationship
to the purposes of the BID:

260. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 93-94; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-67
(1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968).
261. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 1 16-17 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
262. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
263. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
264. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104-07. The court applied the two-prong test of Salyer and
Ball for determining whether a local government is exempt from the one-person, one-vote
requirement: Does the government serve a "special limited purpose," and does it "dispro
portionately affect" those who are enfranchised? See id.
265. See id. at 104.
266. Id. at 107.
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Projects such as the improvements to land in the district, the sweeping of
streets, and the provision of additional security personnel are projects
that redound to the benefit of many property owners; but for that very
reason, these are projects that no owner would likely undertake indi
vidually. The [)BID allows property owners to pool their resources to ac
complish mutually beneficial projects to increase the attractiveness of
district property for commercial purposes.267

Of course, each of the projects mentioned by the court are classi
cally governmental. Indeed, government is often justified and de
scribed in these very terms as a mechanism for undertaking projects
that individuals would not otherwise undertake on their own, that is,
as an institution for solving collective action problems. Moreover, the
court's description of the BID as nongovernmental - as j ust another,
in the words of the appellee's brief, "private, non-profit entity"268 rings hollow in light of the BID's authority. For example, the BID was
authorized to construct capital improvements that "included the reno
vation of sidewalks and crosswalks, the planting of trees, the installa
tion of new lighting, street signs, bus shelters, news kiosks, and trash
receptacles," and the renovation of Grand Central terminal.269 The
BID also had the power to "include any services required for the en
joyment and protection of the public and the promotion and en
hancement of the District" including security, sanitation, tourist in
formation, social services for homeless persons, special maintenance
and repair, public events, and retail improvements.270 In fiscal year
1994-95, the Grand Central BID expended twelve million dollars
raised from assessments on real property owners. As of 1995, it em
ployed more than sixty security guards and three dozen sanitation
workers, and it financed capital improvements by issuing over thirty
two million dollars of bonds.271
In short, as Judge Weinstein's dissent pointed out, the Grand Cen
tral BID engages in a full range of " 'municipal' services" funded by a
special "municipal 'tax' " collected by the city of New York for that
purpose.272 In both actions and description, the Grand Central BID
constitutes a government.273

267. Id. at 108.
268. Id. at 127 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
269. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 95.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1 13-14 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
272. See id.
273. See also Briffault, Government, supra note 259, at 437 ("BIDs engage in . . . the
classic activities of urban government.").
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Thus, Ke�sler shows how the line between private (special district)
and public (municipality) can be easily manipulated.274 More signifi
cantly, Kessler shows how that line is manipulated in the service of a
propertied conception of citizenship. As in Smith, Kessler involved
adjudicating competing conceptions of community. And, as in Warth,
the Kessler court rejected appellants' claims for inclusion in favor of
appellee's assertions of autonomy. The. court j ustified favoring the in
terests of property owners (who constituted less than one-third of the
number of residential tenants) over tenants because only landowners
were required to contribute the mandatory assessment for the upkeep
of the BID. This rigorous application of the inverse taxation
representation principle (no representation without taxation) dis
counted the fact that tenants would pay the price of increased assess
ments in their rents.275 Yet, like the increase in the cost of the housing
for nonresidents that the Supreme Court discounted in considering
Penfield's exclusionary zoning laws in Warth, the Second Circuit
treated the increased rental cost passed onto the tenant as an inciden
tal burden, more tied to "factors such as rental market conditions, the
terms of individual leases, or City and State rent control and rent sta
bilization regulations" than to the assessment.276
Even if the tenants' rents were not affected by BID assessments,
their lives surely were. Certainly the BID's construction of sidewalks
and other public accommodations and its provision of private security
forces, social outreach services, and sanitation services altered the
daily lives of the people who lived there, arguably more so than the
daily lives of the often-absentee property owners. The court's privi
leging of the property owners' investments over the quality of life of
the residents, who may live, work, and sleep within BID limits, can
only be justified if we accept that BID activities actually had a de
minimis impact on residents compared to overall city service provi
sion.
This may also explain why the court did not even consider the pos
sibility that residents of New York City who lived or owned property
outside the BID's territorial lines should have a say in BID govern
ance, even though, as the dissent pointed out, BID polices could have
274. See id. at 437 ("[T]he very attempt to classify governments along a publidprivate
continuum according to the nature of the services they provide lacks analytical rigor and
leads to arbitrary results.").
275. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc., 158 .F.3d 92, 123 (1998) (Wein
stein, J., dissenting); cf Blaine Harden, Summer Owner Wants a Vote in Both Houses, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2001, at Bl (describing Hampton voting rights lawsuit by summer resident of
East); Blaine Harden, Summer Residents Want Year-Round Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2000, at Al (describing how property tax-paying, nonresident property owners of seasonal
vacation homes are agitating for the right to vote on local matters, arguing that because
"they foot the bills" they should have a say in how the money is used).
276. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 107.
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a demonstrable effect on the provision of municipal services elsewhere
in the city. Nor did the court consider that those disenfranchised users
of the streets, such as the homeless, street vendors, and panhandlers
- the very target of BID policies - should be entitled to representa
tion.
In fact, one direct result of BID activities that affected both con
stituencies was the displacement of panhandling and other undesirable
uses to neighboring areas of the city through aggressive private secu
rity enforcement - the creation of a BID-enforced "Green Zone."
The Grand Central BID engaged in aggressive "outreach" to panhan
dlers and the homeless within BID limits, which housing advocates
charged was simply a means to force the homeless to go somewhere
else.277
More troubling to the dissent was the possibility that the prolifera
tion of BIDs, particularly on the scale of the Grand Central BID,
would make the provision of city services dependent on where one
lived, with BID residents receiving increased city services because of
their political clout and ability to pay.278 This would not only have the
consequence of increasing city services for those with means, but
would lead to a decrease in city services for those without means.
BIDs may increase the pressure on the city to reduce city-wide tax
rates and to delegate service provisions to private "special purpose"
governments. The idea of a city-wide government in which tax reve
nues are redistributed throughout a large territory comes under strain
as BID members demand that their tax assessments stay in the BID's
particular geographical area and that those assessments go to pay for
services that benefit them.279
277. See Briffault, Government, supra note 259, at 402 (noting that BID programs deal
ing with the homeless grow out of a desire to maintain public order "rather than a desire to
provide social services per se," and that BIDs "aim to prevent panhandling and the sense of
'social disturbance' attributable to the presence of the homeless"). Critics charged that the
Grand Central BID employed "goon squads" that assaulted the homeless in order to force
them out of BID-controlled areas. An investigation did not find "credible evidence" of this
claim but did find that the BID's homeless outreach was "flawed in its design." Id. at 402-03;
see also Foscarinis et al., supra note 163, at 162-64 (suggesting alternative strategies BIDs
can undertake that will address the economic conditions of homelessness as opposed to re
stricting access to public space by "sweeping" the homeless with targeted removal strate
gies); Nieves, supra note 130, at Al (quoting head of the Downtown Sacramento Partner
ship, which represents 550 businesses and employs twenty "guides" to patrol sixty-five city
blocks, as saying: "we need to continue to make clear that downtown is not going to be a
place where panhandling and other negative activity is tolerated").
278. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 131-32 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
279. See id.; see also David J. Kennedy, Note, Restraining the Power of Business Im
provement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
283, 324-25 (1996) (discussing the concern that BIDs exacerbate existing social divisions and
encourage the flight of the successful into enclaves of privilege protected territorially). In
response to this assertion, Clayton Gillette acknowledges that "[l]egal doctrine may exacer
bate the problem by giving those with the capacity to opt for higher levels of service incen
tives to constrain governmentally provided services at artificially low levels," though he ar
gues that there "exist countervailing incentives that might deter both officials and those who
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The Kessler majority did not address these internal or city-wide ef
fects. The court instead redescribed the BID's powers as essentially
aesthetic; in short, it justified the limited franchise by imagining the
BID as an organization that picks up the trash, paints a few store
fronts, and cleans-up graffiti. Drained of any substantive norm gener
ating powers280 and with a scope of activities "quantitatively dwarfed
by those [performed by] the City,"281 the BID was rendered - like wa
ter districts - harmless by the court.282 By rendering the BID harmless
at least in theory, however, the Second Circuit missed an opportunity
to imagine the Grand Central BID as a forum for more substantive lo
cal governance and to develop an account of local democracy to go
along with it.
b.

Reinforcing Propertied Power

Although the Second Circuit evaded the question about represen
tation by portraying the BID's activities as virtually insignificant in the
lives of New Yorkers, it adopted a default norm of a property-based
franchise that has a long pedigree. The presumption that property
owners are more invested in a community than are non-property own
ers is ongoing theme in the American political order.283 The New York

could opt out from artificially limiting the scope of public services." Clayton P. Gillette,
Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 1 185, 1209-10 (1996). Among these
incentives are the interests of budget-maximizing bureaucrats and residents' desires to avoid
reductions in property values. See id. at 1 210-11. Gillette also argues that allowing some to
opt-out of public provision could reduce costs for those who remain by limiting congestion
and overcrowding. See id.
280. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104-05 (stating that the BID "performs no inspections in
matters of health and safety . . . [has no] power to issue citations for violations of City build
ing or zoning codes . . . in short, [it] cannot meaningfully alter the conduct of persons present
in the district"). The court's finding that the BID "cannot meaningfully alter the conduct of
persons" is belied by the fact that the BID clearly does "discourage" (and even polices) pan
handling and other street conduct, such as street vending. See also infra text accompanying
notes 291 -302.
281. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 105.

·

282. The dissent pointed out that even water districts are not so harmless, noting that
the disproportionate voting scheme upheld in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973), allowed "[o]ne corporation [to] cast a majority of the
votes as a result of its huge landholdings," which allowed it to "disadvantage . . . . smaller
landholders and residents by preventing flood control measures that might interfere with its
activities outside the water district." Kessler, 158 F.3d at 126 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
283. For example, though acknowledging that arguments in favor of property and poll
tax qualifications for voting "ring hollow on most contemporary ears," and "are not in ac
cord with current egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy should be organized,"
Justice Harlan nevertheless dissented in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), which struck down Virginia's poll tax as unconstitutional. Harlan contended that
states should be permitted to establish qualifications for the franchise, including property
qualifications and poll taxes, arguing that they "have been a traditional part of our political
structure":
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statute requiring property owners to select a majority of the BID
board is consistent with most state homeowner association statutes,
which normally do not allow voting rights to be allocated on the basis
of residence but only on the basis of property share.284 Recall the posi
tive moral valence exerted by property ownership and the spatial dif
ferentiation in our metropolitan regions between (stable) homeowners
and (transient) renters. Indeed, civic republicanism draws on a tradi
tion that holds that property ownership is a prerequisite for citizen
ship, providing the needed independence and stability for the pursuit
of civic virtue.285 An assumption of classical republican thought was
that non-property owners would either be irresponsible with the af
fairs of the state or would be easily corrupted or both.286 These as
sumptions are implicit in the majority's holding, which appears to ac
cept the appellee's premise that tenants will be irresponsible with
other people's money. The assumption is that the kinds of physical
improvements to a neighborhood that BIDs often undertake (such as
repairing sidewalks, painting over graffiti, removing junked cars, and
Most of the early Colonies had them; many of the States have had them during much of their
histories; and, whether one agrees or not, arguments have been and still can be made in fa
vor of them. For example, it is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal
poll tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about pub
lic affairs to pay $1.50 or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise. It is also argu
able, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of
Americans through most of our history, that people with some property have a deeper stake
in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more knowl
edgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the community
and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.
Id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
284. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31, at 1543 (discussing this limitation on possible
voting regimes and arguing that associations should be able to select among voting regimes
(including the residence-based franchise) and that cities also should be able to select among
voting regimes (including the property-based franchise)).
285. See, e.g., James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 170 (J. Pocock ed. 1977) (advocating the wide distribution
of property in order to increase opportunities for citizenship). For a current proposal based
in this tradition, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY
12 (1999) (proposing that Americans receive an $80,000.00 "stake" when they reach adult
hood, and stating that "[t]his is the time to make economic citizenship a central part of the
American agenda . . . to enable all Americans to enjoy the promise of economic freedom
that our existing property system now offers to an increasingly concentrated elite").
286. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790s 1-20 (1984). There were some at the Constitutional Convention who
favored a freehold qualification for federal elections. The proposed amendment was de
feated, however, in part because it was thought voting qualifications were best left to the
states. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 201-10 (Farrand ed.,
1911). Madison's views are described at follows:

Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend
much on the probable reception such change would meet with in States where the right was
now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the
qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would
be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.
Id. at 203.
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planting flowers) will not be supported by non-property owning ten
ants, who will instead redirect BID funds to lowering their rents or
throwing block parties.287 Only landowners, who will pay for and reap
the long-term benefits of higher property values, will have the correct
incentives to spend BID monies on truly "community-directed" proj
ects.
I have my doubts that a nonresident property owner's ownership
interest in his or her "fungible" (in Professor Radin's terms) real es
tate investment creates better incentives to improve upon it than does
a resident's nonownership interest in his or her "personal" home.288
Nor is it obvious that the franchise should turn on such a test. Re
gardless of where the incentives lie, however, the lesson here is that
there is a strong chance that sublocal institutions will disenfranchise
the unpopular or less politically powerful. Thus, the dualist account
requires a higher-level authority that can aggressively umpire internal
decisionmakers to ensure a baseline of equal rights of participation.
Dualism therefore points away from the kind of local autonomy that
287. See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 93-95 (defending property-based
franchise for BLIDs on grounds that tenants will tend to favor short-term (and wasteful)
projects that do not add value to property in the BLID). But cf Los Angeles City Charter
§ 906 (July 7, 2000) (requiring that neighborhood council membership be open to all
"stakeholders" - everyone that "lives, works, or owns property in the area"). For an at
tempt to explicate a link between homeownership and citizenship values empirically, see
Denise DiPasquale & Edward Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Bet
ter Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON . 354-84 (1999) (finding that the relationship between home
ownership and investment in social capital "may be causal," but that there is evidence that
any connection may be attributable to lower mobility rates for homeowners as opposed to
homeownership per se).
288. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 988-89,
991-96 (1982) (proposing a property rights regime that links the degree of property rights
protection to the relationship of the object to the person on a continuum from "fungible" to
"personal," and arguing that the residential tenancy is a "personal" property right and there
fore should receive enhanced property rights protection). If Radin's personality theory of
property is correct, then non-property owning residents of a neighborhood have a strong
incentive to undertake long-term neighborhood improvements because their homes and the
immediate environment are, in part, constitutive of their person. But even putting aside
Radin, Ellickson's assumption that residential tenants normally have short-term interests
and that property owners normally have long-term interests - even if true in terms of length
of tenure - begs the question of whose interests (in time) should take precedence. Non
resident property owners may not share an interest in community-directed projects because
their interest is in obtaining the maximum return on their investment. Landlords will thus
use BLID funds to favor potential (higher rent-paying) residents over current residents. In
the absence of rent-control mechanisms, landlords will favor those "improvements" that lead
to increased property values that will, in turn, lead to the ouster of current lower-income
tenants. Thus, the landlord's "long-term" interest in the value of his property is in direct con
flict with the tenant's "short-term" interest in staying in his home. In the presence of rent
control, landlords may have little incentive to make any improvements considering that any
monies that they expend may not be recouped. On the other hand, landlords who believe
that any further investment in a residential neighborhood would be wasted (i.e., those who
are "milking" current dilapidated housing by failing to invest in it) might instead simply re
distribute the monies from the BLID back to themselves or to other kinds of development
projects - for example, projects that seek to replace residential tenants with commercial
tenants.
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mandates that the federal government defer to local deviations from
constitutional norms. In fact, as Kessler shows, dualism requires a
more rigorous and far-reaching enforcement of federal norms than
current doctrine anticipates (at least as interpreted by the Second Cir
cuit) and requires special vigilance where unpopular groups seem to
be placed outside the political process.
Such vigilance is precisely what proponents of the Gang Congrega
tion Ordinance oppose in the name of fostering civic values. Yet, the
Gang Congregation Ordinance can be seen as a positive act of civic
engagement only by leaving out a particularly crucial constituency: the
individual gang members who are targeted by the ordinance. While
not literally disenfranchised, gang members are excluded from being
full participants in the community; they are nonpersons in the infor
mal, everyday public and civic life of the neighborhood.289 Of course,
community standards are always enforced by some majority against a
noncomplying minority - in this instance, gang members. The dualist
account thus always begs the important question: How do we define
the citizens whose voices are entitled to respect?
c. The Contraction of Public Space and the Rise of the Managed
Public Sphere
Local control in small-scale settings does not, in and of itself, lead
to increased civic engagement on the part of neighborhood residents.
Indeed, a reduction in the territorial scale of government may actually
result in an overall contraction of the public sphere. Kessler illustrates
how the proliferation of neighborhood-scaled institutions like BIDs
can result in the disenfranchisement of significant portions of the ur
ban population. Not only might these institutions literally restrict indi
vidual citizens' participation in a political process, but they might also
reduce the willingness of the individuals that live inside them to con
sider themselves part of a larger polity. Neighborhood governance
may be accompanied by neighborhood myopia, a reduction in the citi
zen's scope of interests down to his or her immediate concerns for who
moves in next door.290 The risk is that small-scale territorial units at
289. The police in Denver, Colorado, compiled a list of suspected gang members that
contained the names of two out of three African-American youths in the entire city between
the ages of twelve and twenty-four. See STEVEN DONZIGER, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME:
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 110 (1996). Consider the
impact on the public life of Denver neighborhoods if two-thirds of African-American youth
were subject to an antiloitering ordinance.
290. The Not In My Backyard ("NIMBY") attitude taken by many neighborhoods when
it comes to siting regional infrastructure needs, landfills, waste plants, low-income housing,
halfway houses, or other unpopular but regionally necessary services already shifts such un
popular services to poorer and less politically powerful neighborhoods. See, e.g. , Michael
Weeler, Negotiating NIMBY: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 1 1
YALE J . ON REG. 241 (1994) (discussing the failure o f Massachusetts's "innovative new land
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the neighborhood level will actually narrow the public sphere, both in
terms of who is included and how it is used.
Recall that public order norms (like the Gang Congregation Ordi
nance) are often defended on the ground that they enable community
life to flourish by securing the public arenas in which neighborhood
residents gather, interact, and converse. The primary services under
taken by BIDs - sanitation, street maintenance, and public security
- share the same goals, though with a more commercial focus. BID
projects are often intended to make the street more inviting, to en
courage the use of urban public spaces by making them cleaner, more
user friendly, and more pleasant.291 Thus, BIDs share the same con
cern for the quality of the public street and for enforcing norms of ci
vility as does the order maintenance approach to policing and
Ellickson's Red-Yellow-Green Zones. This approach adheres to a
rigid public/private line that emphasizes regulation of public decorum
over control of private lawbreaking. Order maintenance policing tar
gets street crime and the indications of street crime - unruliness in
public, loitering, graffiti, abandoned cars. It is less concerned with
lawbreaking in private spaces, and thus, by definition, it is less con
cerned with those places in which street disorder is controlled by other
means, such as in suburban neighborhoods.292
Yet the emphasis on street disorder reflects a particular cultural
conception of public and private space and the role of order in public
spaces. Order maintenance policing is itself invested in maintaining a
rigid public/private line. Deviant behavior is often behavior that seems
to cross or fudge this line. Camping, sleeping, or urinating on the
street are the most dramatic examples,293 but fixing one's car in the
street or putting living room furniture on one's porch294 are also signs
of disorder. Moreover, deviance from accepted standards of private
and public behavior is itself disorderly. Thus, talking loudly out-ofuse law to end costly NIMBY deadlocks over siting hazardous waste treatment plants"). This
same problem of NIMBY attitudes at the neighborhood level led Professor Chemerinsky to
oppose granting neighborhood councils power over local land use decisions in the proposed
Los Angeles City Charter. See Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 142-44.
291. Ellickson includes BIDs as an important mechanism for enforcing "street deco
rum," noting that " [a]lthough BIDs also engage in sanitation and business promotion, the
control of disorderly street people has emerged as one of their central functions." Ellickson,
Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 11 99.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 160-164.
293. Localities are particularly keen about preventing these kinds of activities. See
DAVIS, supra note 129, at 221-65.
294. See, e.g., Charles Osgood, North Carolina Town Looks to Clean up Porches, CBS
NEWS: SUNDAY MORNING, 1999 WL 16204113, (June 20, 1999) (reporting how town of
Wilson, N.C., has outlawed the use of non-outdoor furniture on front porches); Alan D.
Miller, Athens Jumps on Couches: Housing Code Overhaul Would Ban Porch Sofas, TH E
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 1 998, at 1A (describing a college town's attempt to ban the
use of living room furniture on front porches, a ban aimed primarily at students).
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doors or at the movies,295 using one's stoop as an extension of one's
living room, or playing in the fire hydrant on the street on a hot day
can all be signs of public and private normative decay.
Disorder in public spaces is seen as threatening. Professor Austin
has described how efforts at maintaining an ordered public sphere
with well-defined lines between private and public activities have af
fected black leisure and commercial activity by defining those leisure
and commercial activities as disordered, and then regulating them.296
Austin notes that black leisure, which often finds expression in com
munal gatherings in publicly accessible venues, is regularly associated
with threats to public health, safety, and welfare.297 Common re
sponses to the perceived threat of black gatherings range from privat
izing public spaces, to enforcing curfews, to shutting down venues that
attract predominantly black patrons. Black entrepreneurial commer
cial activity in the form of street vending or scavenging is also associ
ated with the breakdown of public order.298 The broken windows the
sis is often utilized to justify shutting down such activities. In effect,
the public street is regulated to cabin black "disorder" and enforce a
"privatized" and, in Austin's words, "white" conception of leisure and
economic activity.299

295. See Re&ina Austin, "Not Just for the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraints on Black
Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 702
(1998) [hereinafter Austin, Restraints] (describing African-American cultural tolerance of
speaking in movie theaters and white dismay at the practice); cf JACOBS, supra note 25, at
41 (expressing concern about the formalized management of public space and public lei
sure).
296. See Austin, Restraints, supra note 295, at 695-712; Regina Austin, "An Honest Liv
ing": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119,
2125 (1994) [hereinafter Austin, Vendors].
297. See Austin, Restraints, supra note 295, at 707-12.
298. See Austin, Vendors, supra note 296, at 2125. Austin's thesis finds support in
Mitchell Duneier's recent ethnographic study of street vendors, panhandlers, and scavengers
on Sixth Avenue in New York City. See MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK (1999). Duneier
describes how the Grand Central BID's influence was crucial in the city's passage of an or
dinance that restricted sidewalk vending in the district, seriously limiting the ability of black
street vendors operating on the lines between the formal and informal economy to make a
living. See id. at 231-52. He notes that BIDs have erected planters and other sidewalk furni
ture intended to prevent vendors from setting up their tables on the street. Id. at 317. In ad
dition, BID security guards, in cooperation with police, often harass vendors, panhandlers,
and the homeless by destroying their merchandise or possessions. See id. at 231-54.
299. Another term might be "suburban." In fact, BIDs are explicitly modeled on the
suburban shopping mall and the theme park, both of which create a managed environment
that is supposed to be clean, safe, and orderly. See Briffault, Government, supra note 259, at
424-29. The BID reflects an attempt to create "urban centers suffused with suburban val
ues." Id. at 428. BIDs are part of an overall "suburbanization of downtown," one of the
"most important urban processes of the 1990s," which includes BIDs, the creation of pedes
trian malls in downtown streets, and skyways and tunnels that link shopping with work with
transportation in controlled environments. Boddy, supra note 162, at 150. Referring to the
"malling of America," William Kowinski wonders, "What happens . . . when the chief com
munity centers of our time are such willfully artificial distortions of reality?" WILLIAM
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What makes public life possible for one neighborhood, however, is
different from what makes public life possible for another. The em
phasis on cleanliness, order, and security that is implicit in the Gang
Congregation Ordinance and other order enforcing laws (such as cur
fews, anti-cruising, and anti-vending laws), reflects a particular ac
count of public life, which may be foreign and even destructive to the
way minority neighborhoods experience public life.300 Instead of
making public life possible in these neighborhoods, the Gang Congre
gation Ordinance and other public order norms may actually disable it
by limiting associations in the only public venues available to urban
dwellers without providing real alternatives.301 Opponents of the ordi
nance would not be surprised at this outcome; they claim that this was
the very intention of an ordinance designed to protect white property
owners from black youth.302
It is also not a surprise that the Kessler court would restrict the
franchise to landowners in the Grand Central BID, considering that
the BID's primary purpose was to control, clean up, and secure the
sidewalks and other public spaces within BID territory. Ordered pub
lic space favors landowners much more than other kinds of residents,
who may need to use public places because they have nowhere else to
go. Thus, the court is correct in fearing that the BID's mission would
change if residents or other interested constituencies were permitted a
greater voice in its governance. The court is incorrect, however, when
it minimizes the political and social effects of public street mainte
nance "BID-style." The Grand Central BID, through its control of the
KOWINSKI, THE MALLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE GREAT CONSUMER
PARADISE 204 (1985).
300. Here I am echoing critiques (by feminist theorists and others) of the theoretical
concept of a unitary public sphere as a place of deliberative, rational, logical, and reasoned
debate. As one commentator states:
It follows that public life in egalitarian, multicultural societies cannot consist exclusively in a
single, comprehensive public sphere. That would be tantamount to filtering diverse rhetori
cal and stylistic norms through a single, overarching lens. Moreover, since there can be no
such lens that is genuinely culturally neutral, it would effectively privilege the expressive
norms of one cultural group over others, thereby making discursive assimilation a condition
for participation in public debate.
Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Ex
isting Democracy, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 17 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).
301. See Austin, Restraints, supra note 295, at 692. Indeed, order maintenance policing
and public order policies tend not to distinguish among different kinds of "disorder." For
example, Duneier argues that there is little empirical support for expanding the broken win
dows thesis from the control of physical disorder (such as abandoned cars) to the control of
social disorder in general (loitering, vending). DUNEIER, supra note 298, at 288-89. He finds
that the Sixth Avenue venders, scavengers, and panhandlers have developed economic roles,
complex work, and mentors who have given the normally "down-and-out" encouragement
to try to "live better lives." Id. at 312-17. This order-enforcing aspect of black street vending
is often overlooked by proponents of broken windows, particularly by police,•who often as
sociate disorder with blackness. See id. ; see also Roberts, supra note 28, at 790-811 .
302. See Amicus Brief in Opposition, supra note 205, at 4-5.
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public street, is engaged in defining and delineating the contours of
public space itself. This is far from being engaged in a mere aesthetic
enterprise.
Consider if Chicago, instead of drafting the Gang Congregation
Ordinance, had created Green Zones in which certain normally legal
activities would not be permitted, including congregating with two or
more persons with no apparent purpose; or alternatively if Chicago
allowed particular neighborhoods to create neighborhood associations
whose members could hire private security guards to patrol the streets
or to close them altogether in the evening.303 These proposals, even
more than the Gang Congregation Ordinance, would devolve stan
dards of street behavior down to the neighborhood level. They also
present in stark relief the question of what constitutes public space
and, by extension, what kind of public life and public norms the built
environment should foster.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's treatment of the Gang Congregation
Ordinance may have had more to do with its conception of the public
character of Chicago city streets than with any individual rights to loi
ter or travel the public way, which, as a practical matter, do not exist in
the vast majority of places that make up the metropolitan region.
Justice Stevens cited a number of urban activities that could be
reached by the ordinance, such as standing on the street comer talking
to friends, hailing a taxi, waiting for a telephone call, or waiting out
side the ballpark for an autograph.304 These activities are rarely seen
on suburban streets where there are few cabs, no public telephones,
and certainly no ballparks (except those surrounded by a vast sea of
parking lots). In metropolitan regions in which homeowners associa
tions are the most popular new form of development (decidedly
Green Zones), it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify spaces
anywhere outside of the central cities that are publicly accessible or
utilized in the way that the streets of Chicago are.305
303. See supra text accompanying notes 159-162. Under current Supreme Court doc
trine, neighboring residents would not be able to challenge street closings except by showing
racially discriminatory intent. See City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (holding
that absent discriminatory intent, African-American residents of city were foreclosed from
challenging street closings as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). In City of
Memphis, the residents of an all-white enclave, Hein Park, sought to close a street to traffic
heading toward a predominantly African-American neighborhood. The city argued that the
street closing would reduce traffic flow, increase safety to children, and diminish "traffic
pollution." One thousand citizens presented a petition to the city council in opposition to the
street-closing proposal. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 306 (1997).
304. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-60 (1999).
305. One commentator has described as an "attack" on downtown streets the networks
of raised pedestrian bridges, people movers, and tunnels that allow individuals to avoid the
city street altogether when moving from their car to their office to the mall and back to their
cars. See Boddy, supra note 162, at 150. Boddy observes that these skyways and tunnels have
created an "analogous city" that allows predominantly middle-class whites to avoid "the last
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Green Zones, like BIDs and other controlled spaces, are not pub
lic, if public means something more than who owns the street. Public
space implies access, a sense that the streets and sidewalks are, as
Carol Rose writes, places in which the people can assert "collective
public rights."306 Streets and sidewalks are valuable because they are
used by "indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons - by the public
at large"307 and are not managed (as Green, Yellow, and Red Zones
would be) by the government, or (as BIDs and private streets are) by
a nongovernmental or quasi-governmental association. Inherently
public space is space that "lends itself to activities that are somehow
sociable or socializing - activities. that allow us to get along with each
other. "308 A democratic, pluralist city needs these loci of interaction,
the places for bumping up against people that are different from us. In
contrast, the Red-Yellow-Green Zoned city - where we all live
among people who agree with us - does not. In that associational
city, we do not need to get along with each other because we already
live in neighborhoods of like minds, sorted by invisible boundary lines
that create and define the spaces in which we live.
It is difficult to call these zoned spaces a success for participatory
self-government, to hold them up as exemplars of civic-minded local
ism. There is an increased distance between neighbors and between
neighborhoods, as is illustrated by the popularity of gated communi
ties, homeowners associations governed in every detail by prearranged
contracts, and BIDs that take over city services and ensure territorial
security. These institutions indicate an alienation from, as opposed to
an enabling of, civic life. The well-defined lines between "us" and
"them" in zoned space indicate the failure of old-fashioned local gov
ernance, the inability for individuals to solve disputes or govern each
other at close quarters, and the atrophying of the social competencies
of the neighbor.
The dualist account of community welcomes the construction of lit
tle republics. The vitality of these little republics as true. loci for par
ticipatory governance, however, requires robust state intervention of

zone of physical contact" between people of diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds - the
public street. Id. at 150-51. Boddy further states:
Precisely because downtown streets are the last preserve·of something approaching a mixing
of all sectors of society, their replacement by the sealed realm overhead and the under
ground has enormous implications for all aspects of political life. Constitutional guarantees
of free speech and of freedom of association and assembly mean much less if there is literally
no peopled public place to serve as a forum in which to act out these rights.

Id. at 125.
306. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 774 (1986).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 776.
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the kind that is unlikely to materialize and that, if it did materialize,
would undermine the very localism that it seeks to foster.
Ill.

ALTERNATIVE LOCALISMS

We conceive of localism in vertical terms, as describing a set of
progressively nested authorities and the relationships between them.
Yet, as this Article has argued, the definitional work of "community"
is accomplished intersticially - at the borders between places. The le
gal rules for incorporating or excluding others generate both a com
munity's identity and its claims to self-govern. From this vantage, lo
calism describes the formation of neighboring communities and the
horizontal relationships between them. If it is the case that community
(as a normative concept) and communities (as a descriptive one) are
products of contested boundary-creating norms in demarcated space,
then the choice for courts and policy-makers is not between respect
for the local or the force of the universal, but between the competing
force of alternative localisms.
The local is an entrance control, a threshold that may or may not
require a normative ticket to be crossed. How the issue is framed is
quite important. The vertical question - "In which forum should this
decision be made?" - is vastly different from the horizontal question
- "What kinds of entrance controls are appropriately employed to
create a community?" The current doctrine asks the first question,
which produces answers that depend on the vertically defined unit of
government one happens to trust at a given historical time. A coherent
answer to the latter question requires a new vocabulary, one that ex
plicitly recognizes law's role in constituting social space and the recip
rocal relationship between space and community.
Here I offer some conceptual guideposts in thinking about this new
vocabulary. First, I argue that the language of individual rights is an
inadequate means of addressing the problems of exclusion and com
munity formation. The contest over the boundaries of community is
obscured when claims of belonging are translated into individualized
assertions of constitutional right. Second, I suggest a prominent role
for an anti-exclusion principle that is attentive to the spatial effects of
local entrance controls. This principle looks back to a time when it was
possible for a court to strike down the types of zoning regimes we now
take for granted because they served "to classify the population and
segregate them according to their income or situation in life,"309 and it

309. Ambler Realty Co. v. Viii. of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (D.C. Ohio 1924).
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looks forward to the formation of new doctrinal tools that can begin to
dismantle the superstructure of segregated space.310
A. From R ights to Belonging
The dichotomy of respect/force, deference/paternalism is a product
of a vertical conception of localism. There are only two possible exer
cises of centralized power in relation to a locality conceived of as an
inferior rung on a ladder of authorities. The central power can either
defer to local norms or override them. Proponents of the Gang Con
gregation Ordinance demanded the first exercise of federal power,
charging that the federal courts should not have interfered with the
norms adopted by the residents of Chicago's inner-city neighborhoods,
but instead should have deferred to the neighborhoods' lawmaking.
Perhaps surprisingly, localism arguments are not federalism argu
ments, though the themes sounded by those in favor of broader state's
rights are often articulated as a general suspicion of centralized power.
Neighborhood constitutionalism does not look primarily to the Consti
tution's structure for support, but instead draws upon substantive
theories of the benefits of decentralized authority, local autonomy,
and community self-determination. Indeed, the substantive defense of
localism strongly implies not only that federal power should not inter
fere with local norms, but also that federal power should be used to
prevent other centralized governments from interfering as well. De
spite the fact that local governments do not have any official constitu
tional status,311 a substantive localism requires that federal power be
employed to prevent states from overriding municipal norms or even
to prevent cities from overriding neighborhood norms.312 The logic of
310. For a post-integrationist theory based on the concept of racially identified spaces,
see Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segre
gation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1388-92 (1997).
311. The standard view is that municipal corporations are "instrumentalities of the
state," see EUGENE MCQUJLLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1 .58 (3d ed.
rev. 1987), and have no sovereign status independent of the state. Thus, the state legislature
could alter or eliminate municipalities at any time, like any other agency of the state. The
view that local governments are instruments of the state is traced to John F. D illon's 1872
Treatise on Municipal Corporations, in which Dillon asserted that " [a ] ll corporations, public
and private, exist and can exist only by virtue of express legislative enactment, creating or
authorizing the creating of the corporate body." JOHN F. DILLON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 52 (1872). "Municipal corporations are created by legisla
tive act." Id. at 95. What has become known as "Dillon's Rule" - that state enabling stat
utes are to be strictly construed, see id. at 101-03 - is the accepted wisdom today.
312. David Barron has recently made a related argument in the context of state-city re
lations. See Barron, supra note 34, at passim. Barron suggests that Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1990), which struck down a Colorado constitutional referendum that prevented the
state's localities from enacting antidiscrimination ordinances protecting gays and lesbians,
can be read in the context of a line of cases in which the Court has struck down state at
tempts to control the political discretion of towns and cities in the service of enforcing con
stitutional norms. See id. at 492-93.
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neighborhood constitutionalism requires that states defer to city
norms, that cities defer to neighborhood norms, and that neighbor
hoods defer to block-level norms as long as the criteria for deference
are met.313
The standard counter to the assertion of local autonomy is the
"rights response." Federal and state power should be used to override
local laws when they conflict with constitutional rights. Thus, oppo
nents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance repeatedly argued that
"bedrock" constitutional rights cannot be waived by majorities at any
level of government.31 4 Rights, guaranteed and enforced by a vertically
higher unit of government, protect the individual from oppressive lo
cal regimes. The state should defend individuals from local majorities
that have turned tyrannical. The archetypal image of the rights re
sponse to the assertion of localism is of the African-American child
attending a Little Rock high school flanked by United States marshals
and federal troops.
Proponents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance have reversed
this image, arguing that because the normally oppressed minority
community is now the local community, federal power in Morales is on
the wrong side. In this instance, localism is being used as what Joan
Williams calls a "forum shifting" strategy.315 The proponents of the or
dinance argue for increased deference to local decisionmaking, shift
ing the forum for regulation of the public street to the neighborhood
and away from federal courts because the federal government can no
longer be trusted to protect minority neighborhoods.
The rights response presupposes a localism conceived of as the re
lationship between nested vertical authorities. The debate is joined at
a point of conflict, between deference to local norms and the force of a
universalized right. But this response already concedes too much. By
asserting the individualist trump, the rights response has in fact al
ready accepted the challenge of working out the terms of deference to
the community even if it ultimately results in no deference at all. If we
take a step back, prior to this conflict between community and indi
vidual, we see that the initial forceful legal act is not the overriding of
local norms by a federal power protecting individual rights, but the
313. Thus, proponents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance do not invoke principles of
federalism, but something closer to the opposite of federalism: the Supreme Court should
have reversed the Illinois Supreme Court (which had held that the ordinance was unconsti
tutional) because the constitutional dictates of the federal polity require that certain kinds of
local communities be granted autonomy to adopt norms that differ from the state at what
ever level. Mark Rosen's argument that "liberalism demands that certain communities be
given powers to self-govern of the sort that would require some constitutional nonunifor
mity," Rosen, supra note 43, at 1190, certainly implies this position.
314. See Alschuler & Shulhofer, supra note 9.
315. Williams, supra note 29, at 87-90 (describing "forum shifting" in the local govern
ment context as shifting political power among different levels of government).
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adoption of a particular localism to the exclusion of other possible al
ternative localisms. The hardest questions are not vertical - choosing
between respect of the local or the force of the national (or universal)
- but rather horizontal - choosing between one iteration of the
community and numerous other possible iterations of the community.
Warth is a good example both of this choice of localisms and the
limits of the rights response as a counter to the assertion of local
autonomy. The Court's holding that Rochester residents did not have
standing to contest Penfield's adoption of an exclusionary zoning re
gime relied on the conclusion that the Rochester petitioners had no
interest in Penfield because as nonresidents they were not subject to
or affected by Penfield's zoning laws. By extension, they also had no
say in the adoption of Penfield's zoning laws. By rejecting the
Rochester petitioners' standing claims, the Court was not simply em
bracing an existing status quo; it was defining the appropriate commu
nity of normatively entitled persons. It was engaging in the forceful act
of privileging one localism among many, a localism predicated on
naturalized jurisdictional boundaries.
But what if the Court conceived of the relevant community as
more than j ust the territorially defined residents of Penfield? What if
the Court imagined a localism that was not defined in terms of a geo
graphically defined territory but in terms of substantive interests, in
this instance in terms of a temporally defined space? In granting
standing to potential residents of Penfield (who now live in
Rochester), the Court could have created a jurisdiction across time
(encompassing current and future residents of Penfield) instead of rei
fying the jurisdiction that it presumed existed across a particular space
(residents of Penfield).
This temporal conception of what constitutes the relevant locality
for standing purposes is one possible version of an interest-based lo
calism that is actually more "local" in light of the cross-border and
cross-temporal impact of Penfield's exclusionary policies. That is, it
more accurately reflects local interests - the interests of those indi
viduals most directly affected by the particular regulation. The Court
need only have reconceived the relevant standing community as
slightly more encompassing than the existent territorially defined
community.
This conception of a localism of interests is one of the animating
ideas behind proposals for cross-border voting in local elections.3 1 6
Under a cross-border voting regime, residents of each locality in a re
gion have a number of votes that they can cast cumulatively in any lo
cal election in a metropolitan region.3 1 7 The purpose of cross-border
316. Professors Frug and Ford are the leading advocates of such proposals. See Frug,
at 324-25; Ford, supra note 165, at 1909-10.

supra note 17,

317. See Frug, supra note 17, at 324-25.

November 2001]

Limits of Localism

463

voting is to reorient the local around interests, to make local govern
ment boundaries less rigid and more "permeable."318 For example, a
cross-border voting regime would allow potential residents of Penfield
who want to move to Penfield to allocate their votes to Penfield office
seekers who promise to eliminate exclusionary zoning laws. If exclu
sionary zoning in Penfield is not an important issue to Rochester resi
dents, then they might allocate only one vote to a Penfield office
seeker and their remaining votes to a Rochester office seeker who
might be promising, for example, better schools in Rochester. Each
individual in the region would have a say not only in what norms
should have priority, but also to which locality of interests each
wanted to belong.
Cross-border voting is problematic for a variety of reasons and
likely a political nonstarter.319 But the proposal highlights an intriguing
alternative to the current assumptions about the relevant local politi
cal community, a thorny issue that the Warth Court avoided by as
suming it away. By including the potential residents of Penfield in its
conception of who counted as a member of the relevant political
community, the Court had an opportunity to define a localism of in
terests. The relevant local j urisdiction could be termed "Penfield plus
those who want to live in Penfield" or "Penfield and Rochester minus
those who do not want to live in Penfield." Again, because the impact
of local exclusionary zoning regimes fall most heavily on those in the
mobility market,320 this alternative localism would actually better re
flect the values of local control by affirming the power that those most
affected by norms should have to adopt, challenge, and change those
norms.
I am not suggesting that we manipulate borders to give all inter
ested persons in a region the franchise, nor that we restructure local
governments on a regional scale by moving geographical boundaries
outward. What I am arguing is that the current vertical conception of
localism structures the choice for courts as one between the "local"
and the "central," when in fact the relevant community is always an
318. See Ford, supra note 165, at 1909.
319. There are obvious problems implementing cross-border voting regimes, not least of
which is the resistance of voters and candidates to think in cross-border terms. A further
drawback is the possibility that cross-border voting will merely move the relevant battles
over the distribution of local entitlements to the regional level. There is little evidence that
regional bodies will be more responsive to the distributive consequences of local government
entitlements. See Zelinsky, supra note 192, at 665-68 (arguing that regional and state institu
tions have shown little willingness to alter the distribution of local government entitlements).
Indeed, even fundamental shifts of local entitlements top-down by courts or state legisla
tures may have little effect on resistant local governments. See, e.g., Boger, supra note 167, at
1450 (discussing suburban localities' resistance to the New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount
Laurel decision invalidating local exclusionary zoning laws); Roisman, supra note 167, at
1387-89 (same).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 187-189.
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explicit political choice that exists in relation to (and to the exclusion
of) other equally plausible alternative communities. I am therefore
suggesting that when courts are faced with a choice among alternative
localisms they do not accept the default of jurisdictional boundaries, as
if those boundaries are neutral. Rather, courts should recognize that
the boundary-creating norm at issue creates the relevant local com
munity. It is not enough to say that one favors the local; all the work is
still to be done in defining which local. In a world in which the local is
based on interests rather than on territory, the Rochester plaintiffs in
Warth would be allowed at least to state a claim that they are part of
the relevant community, if not make it to a jury on that question.
Obviously, the Warth Court did not approach the case through a
localism lens. The Rochester petitioners did not assert what could be
called a horizontal claim - a claim that they belonged to the relevant
community and thus should have a say in the norms that the commu
nity adopted. Rather, they asserted a vertical claim - that their rights
as members of a more encompassing political community trumped the
local norm. This was the best they could do to make their claims le
gally cognizable, but it put the Court in the position (as all rights re
sponses do) of choosing between respect for local laws or the force of
federal rights.
Because the rights response does not contest the assertion of
community - it simply asserts a superior normative claim backed by a
more powerful political authority - it is seriously limited as a re
sponse to assertions of local autonomy. It cannot articulate harms that
inhere in the definition of the community itself, that is, harms that spill
over the boundaries of a neighborhood but that are caused by norms
that technically do not apply outside the jurisdiction's lines. And the
rights response is easily defeated, as it was in Warth, with the simplest
of standing questions: How can an individual's rights be violated if
that individual is not subject to the laws of the jurisdiction? The prob
lem for the Rochester petitioners is that they could never articulate a
specific individual harm sufficient to override the local norm embed
ded in a local government geography that put them on the wrong side
of the jurisdictional line. That is because the injury complained of was
that the boundary-creating norm itself - exclusionary zoning - put
them there in the first place.
A "claim to belong" is not readily cognizable. Yet, the language of
belonging is meant to focus attention on the formation and definition
of community in the first instance. In contrast to the rights response,
which conceives of rights as trumps deployed on behalf of the individ
ual from a place conceptually "outside" the community, a claim of
belonging challenges the implicit opposition between community and
individual - and between inside and outside - by redescribing the
community. A claim to belong challenges the contours of the relevant
political community and the entrance controls used to define it.
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Warth nicely illustrates how a claim to belong is incoherent when
translated into the language of rights as trumps, and how demands for
inclusion in the relevant political community look like "mere" prefer
ences to join. The lesson can be applied to Kessler and Smith as well.
In Kessler, the Second Circuit faced an explicit choice between alter
native localisms in the form of a voting rights claim brought by the
non-property owning residents of the Grand Central BID. As in
Warth, the issue for the court was framed in terms of a choice between
deference to a local rule and the force of federal power employed in
the vindication of individual rights. The real choice, however, was be
tween alternative localisms, the simplest being a localism in which the
non-property owning residents were included by being granted equal
voting rights. Other alternative localisms might grant the franchise
(and thus membership status) to employees who work full-time in the
BID zone, regardless of where they live, or to all New Yorkers who
have an interest in the BID. These localisms are equally as plausible as
the one the Second Circuit panel chose.
By restricting the franchise to property owners, the court chose a
localism that required it to interpret the BID's powers as insubstantial,
unobtrusive, and inconsequential to practically anyone, inside or out
side BID lines. The court adopted this emaciated version of sublocal
governance as a way of cabining the effects on outsiders of the draw
ing of BID territorial lines - "outsiders" who would, if affected
enough by BID policies, become "insiders." The court's decision was
therefore informed by a privatized, managerial model of the BID that
masked any alternative localism that would include these heretofore
outsiders. These alternative localisms are only visible if the BID is
viewed as a potential site for genuine collective governance, and if
BID activities are understood as not j ust occurring in public but as
creating the public.
Again, the harm done to the non-property owning residents in
Kessler cannot be sufficiently expressed in terms of individual rights;
the claim to belong is a collective harm, an assertion of a .counter
community. In contrast to the right to vote, a right to belong is inco
herent. Such assertions of belonging are, as the Warth Court found,
mere preferences to be included, not rights that a court can vindicate.
The same can be said of the "metaphysical" harm asserted by the
plaintiffs in Smith from the construction of an eruv in their neighbor
hood. The eruv harmed the plaintiffs by demarcating social space in
such a way as arguably to eliminate or overwhelm an alternative
community with which the plaintiffs identified and belonged, one
without a religious "aura" or "designation." Of course, the two emer
gent alternative localisms - non-religiously identified and religiously
identified - did not come into view until the Orthodox Jewish com
munity attempted to define a social space for themselves. The choice
between alternative localisms was not even apparent to residents of
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the neighborhood until the boundary-creating norm literally and figu
ratively demarcated the social space in which they lived. Indeed, the
demarcated space of the eruv comes into view only if one shares in the
normative commitments of the observant Jewish community.
The eruv is an invisible space, but no more invisible than j urisdic
tional lines defined territorially through zoning or conceptually
through limitations on the franchise. Like the exclusionary zoning re
gime in Warth and the property qualification in Kessler, the eruv cre
ates a wall - a jurisdictional boundary where territorial defense and
community definition are perceived of as coextensive. The eruv terri
torializes by defining a particular geography as normatively significant.
It emphatically constitutes an act - albeit small - of jurisdictional ar
rogation.32 1 Of course, the eruv is much more permeable than the
boundaries in Warth and Kessler. In fact, it can be said in Smith that
two boundary regimes coexist in one space: an Orthodox Jewish, re
ligiously identified regime demarcated by the eruv, and a secular, non
religiously identified regime demarcated by the jurisdictional bounda
ries of the town.322
Which brings us back to Morales. The battles over turf in the
inner-city neighborhoods of Chicago are equally battles over authority
and conflicts over space.323 In Smith, the non-Orthodox residents' fear
of being crowded out is real, just as in Morales, the nongang residents'
fear of being crowded out is being realized. And, in both cases, there
are valid claims on the part of the minority that its use of the same
space is entitled to respect. Once again, assertions of individual rights
fail to capture the nature of the conflict. In Morales, competing claims
to belong cannot be resolved with reference to one or the other's
321. Davina Cooper notes that the North London eruv was destabilizing to area resi
dents in part because "it resituated religious law within public decision making, and consti
tuted religious law as a legitimate basis for public action." Cooper, supra note 242, at 50. But
cf Weizman & Herz, Between City and Desert, supra note 233 ("It would be wrong to sug
gest that the eruv constitutes a form of signifactory imperialism, for, paradoxically, it is only
imperialism which insists that an object can mean only one thing, and that a boundary must
be observed by everyone. In the polyglot, multicultural city, readings of space and place do
not have to be linked to territory and urban organization; the act of communal interpreta
tion brings to the urban fabric an increase of meaning, rather than a reduction. At the heart
of this problem is not the question of imposing upon urban space an obscure religious prac
tice, but rather the willingness of city authorities to sanction the city as the site of multiple
readings.").
322. Cf Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil/. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(striking down on Establishment Clause grounds a statute creating special school district for
religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of strict form of Judaism). In Kiryas Joel,
unlike in Smith, the school district boundary and the religiously infused boundary were coex
tensive, not merely overlapping. Perhaps that accounts for their differing legal treatment
under the Establishment Clause.
323. For an interesting account of an analogous conflict over space and territory be
tween college students and nonstudents in Boulder, Colorado, see Lynn A. Staeheli &
Albert Thompson, Citizenship, Community, and Struggles for Public Space, PROF.
GEOGRAPHER, Feb. 1997, at 28-38.
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claim to be legitimate. Yet, our current localism, so strongly tied to a
defensible territory, is preoccupied with the drawing of jurisdictional
and literal boundaries that define "us" on one side of the geographical
line and "them" on the other side. The individual rights framework
and its corresponding doctrine ultimately fails to capture what is at
stake.324
B.

Toward a Doctrine of Local Citizenship

The capacity to imagine alternative localisms is hampered by the
absence of a doctrinal framework for analyzing entrance controls on
the one hand and claims to belong on the other. What does a doctrine
of local citizenship look like? A hint can be found in another opinion
authored by Justice Stevens and handed down one month before
Morales. In Saenz v. Roe,325 the Court, in a 7-2 decision, struck down a
California statute that limited the amount of welfare benefits newly
arrived families in the state could receive. For one year after his or her
relocation to California, a newcomer's benefits would be limited to the
amount he or she would have received in the state of prior residence.
The Court held that the statute violated the respondents' constitution
ally protected right to travel by creating an impermissible discrimina
tory classification based on length of residence in the state. Holding
that the right to travel "embraces the citizen's right to be treated
equally in her new State of residence," the Court forcefully affirmed
the right of " [c]itizens of the United States, whether rich or poor . . . to
choose to be citizens of the State wherein they reside."326
Saenz holds that states cannot erect entrance controls that serve as
barriers to entry for certain kinds of residents, namely poor newcom
ers. The right to travel, wrote Justice Stevens,
embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when tempo
rarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like any other citi
zens of that State.327

324. In Morales, this doctrine is a vagueness analysis that appears to be both unrealisti
cally expansive and yet easily circumvented. Indeed, despite the seemingly powerful reach of
the plurality's vagueness analysis and the expansive rhetoric of Stevens's opinion, Justice
O'Connor seemed to have little trouble drafting revised language that could - at least for
her purposes - avoid any future vagueness concerns. As indicated above, O'Connor's lan
guage was adopted by the city council in a subsequent version of the ordinance. See supra
note 7.
325. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
326. Id. at 505, 510-11 (internal quotations omitted).
327. Id. at 500.
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Reinvigorating the long-dormant Privileges and Immunities Clauses of
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that those
clauses were the source for a citizen's right to "go to and reside in any
State he chooses" and to enjoy the full privileges of citizenship af
forded to all residents.328 The Privileges and Immunities Clause " 'does
not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based
on length of residence.' "329
Contrast Saenz's articulation of the right of the citizens of the
United States to choose their state of residence with Warth's holding
that the citizens of the several states do not have standing to assert a
right to choose their locality of residence. In Saenz, the choice to move
from one state to another is not merely a preference, but a right that
cannot be burdened even by a slight differential in welfare benefits for
a period of one year. In Warth, however, the Rochester residents' as
sertion of a right to be able to choose to live in Penfield is consigned to
the pile of mere "preference;" the complete absence of a choice (let
· alone a minimal burden on that choice) is not a cognizable injury un- .
der Article III.
What is quite stunning is the radical disjuncture between Saenz's
rigorous attack on a statute that would make it marginally less attrac
tive for poor residents from other states to move to California and
Warth's equally rigorous defense of an exclusionary zoning regime
that makes it virtually impossible for poor residents from a nearby
town to move into Penfield. Both California's "waiting period" wel
fare statute and Penfield's fiscal zoning operate as entrance controls
that deter poorer newcomers from entering the jurisdiction. In both
cases the boundary regime favors current residents over potential
residents. Yet in Saenz the Court articulates a powerful right on behalf
of potential citizens to choose to enter - to be included - while in
Warth the Court articulates an equally powerful right on behalf of cur
rent residents to eliminate the possibility of entrance - to exclude.330
Doctrinally, Saenz and Warth can coexist because local govern
ments do not have any articulated constitutional status, let alone the
kind of status that states have in the federal system. Whereas the new
comer welfare recipients in Saenz can invoke a constitutional relation328. Id. at 502 (internal quotations omitted).
329. Id. at 506 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)).
330. Roderick Hills might argue that the difference between Saenz and Warth can be
explained by the Court's unease with allowing states to act like "affective communities." See
Hills, supra note 77, at 312-14 (arguing that it is appropriate for the Court to reject state dis
criminatory policies against newcomers if those policies are intended "to perpetuate the
state's current demographic composition for the sake of social or cultural cohesion"). On
Hills's theory, the concept of national citizenship is threatened if the states are allowed to
behave as affective communities, though not if neighborhoods or local govern'ments are. See
id. Hills does not explain, however, what happens if a state is entirely constituted of affective
communities that enforce entrance controls up to the state's borders.
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ship between the states and the federal government that arguably re
quires a right to entry for citizens of the United States into each of the
several states, the Rochester petitioners in Warth have no such rela
tionship to invoke and thus must wedge their claims to be included
into the poorly fitting framework of the Equal Protection Clause, with
its rigorous intent requirement.331 The default of local entrance con
trols can be taken for granted by the Warth Court because there is no
constitutional doctrine of local citizenship. Localities are all but invisi
ble to the Constitution;332 the irony is that this very invisibility provides
them with a power to exclude that even states - at whose sufferance
localities are said to exist - cannot exercise.
The Court's treatment of California's state-wide entrance control
provides one possible model for local citizenship. Indeed, the Saenz
Court's suspicion of entrance controls at the state level should also
hold for those entrance controls that operate at the local level. Saenz
is animated in part by an objection to the creation of multiple levels of
citizenship tied to one's status as a newcomer, a system that turns both
on one's relative level of poverty and on one's length of stay in a place.
The vocabulary of caste infuses the opinion, as does the counter
vocabulary of citizenship.333 That counter-vocabulary emphasizes that
331. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); City of
Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
332. This argument shares Professor Williams's view that local government is "constitu
tional[ly] vulnerable." Williams, supra note 29, at 87-90. Williams argues that local govern
ment is "vulnerable" because there has never been a "thoughtful discussion in American law
about the role of cities qua cities [in my terms: "localities qua localities"] within the federal
structure." Id. at 152. Because our constitutional doctrine has failed to articulate the role of
localities in the federal system, the contours of local power are defined by which other power
in the federal system - municipal, state, or federal - we want or do not want to constrain.
Thus, Williams argues that j udges and commentators have used the status of local govern
ment throughout history as a kind of cipher to express their beliefs about government power
in general. For example, Williams argues that the competing views of municipal power of
fered in the nineteenth century - Thomas Cooley's "inherent local government sover
eignty" and John Dillon's "local government as creature of the state" - reflected those
thinkers' distrust of state power (Cooley) and municipal power (Dillon). See id. at 87-100.
Williams also argues that the Burger Court's "quasi-constitutional" doctrine of local auton
omy articulated in Warth (which, like Cooley's, embodies an idea of local sovereignty) re
flected that Court's distrust of federal power, and that Justice Brennan's doctrine of munici
pal liability reflected Brennan's fears of government power in general. See id. at 121-38.
Similarly, it could be argued that the proponents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance have
adopted a form of localism that sees neighborhoods as autonomous entities in order to con
strain federal and state power because that power is preventing realization of certain policy
goals, namely the development of street-level norm enforcing policing.
333. See 526 U.S. at 503-04 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394
(1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting)) (" 'The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to

restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect
constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses . . . . He is not bound to cringe
to any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.' "); id. at 506-07 (stating that the Privileges and Immuni
ties Clause does "not tolerate a hierarchy of 45 subclasses of similarly situated citizens based
on the location of their prior residence."); id. at 507 (stating that "the State's legitimate in
terest in saving money provides no justification for its decision to discriminate among
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one's status as belonging to a community should not turn on whether
one's family has been here for generations or for only a day. It is a de
cidedly immigrant-friendly and integrationist vocabulary that rejects
the idea that jurisdictional lines defining prior-in-time residents should
be accompanied by entitlements to exclude. In short, Saenz rejects the
idea that there is - or should be - an "us" and a "them" defined by
state jurisdictional boundaries.
Of course, the right to travel is an unsatisfying articulation of this
more general geographical anticaste principle.334 The injury in Saenz
like all boundary-created injuries - is insufficiently captured by
the rights response. Instead, the injury can be described as the injury
of outsider status - as a claim to belong. This injury should be a fa
miliar one. It has been at the center of this country's struggle with
slavery, a basis for the challenge to Jim Crow, and a foundation for
civil rights.
Yet, despite these advances, the problem of the color line has not
been solved; it has instead recoalesced as the problem of differentiated
space.335 Invisible jurisdictional lines now do the work of de jure segre
gation.336 Indeed, outsider status is the central achievement of the suc
cessfully zoned metropolitan region. The Red-Yellow-Green Zones of .
the metropolitan area are a literal manifestation of how boundary
creating norms invariably define community in opposition to some
other place where "they" do not share "our values" or "our way of
life."
The process of imagining alternative localisms must begin with the
recognition that what is called "local" is always "interlocal." The
norms of community are a result of a complex social, political, legal,
and spatial dynamic between localities and one's placement in social
-

equally eligible citizens."); id. at 5 1 1 ("The States . . . do not have any right to select their
citizens.").
334. Cf Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT
257, 258 (1996) (grounding the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1990), in
an anticaste principle). The rhetoric of Romer is similar to the rhetoric of Saenz, particularly
the notion that a state "cannot . . . deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws," nor "make
them unequal to everyone else." It is "not within our constitutional tradition' to enact laws
"declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all oth
ers to seek aid from the government." Romer, 517 U.S. at 625. Justice O'Connor's "en
dorsement test" in the Establishment Clause context also embodies what Farber and Sherry
call the "Pariah Principle." See Farber & Sherry, supra, at 258. In Justice O'Connor's view,
the government can neither "send a message to nonadherents [to a particular religion] that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community," nor "mak[e] adherence to
religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community." See Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
335. See John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a
Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair, " 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1233-40 (1995); Ford,
supra note 165, at 1844; Ford, supra note 310, at 1388-92.
336. See Ford, supra note 310, at 1392.
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space indicates one's status as an insider or outsider, stakeholder or
nonstakeholder, citizen or noncitizen. We should be skeptical of local
autonomy when it is asserted in defense of exclusion and backed by
state power, and when it serves the purposes of metropolitan area
wide segregation. Thus, a doctrine of local citizenship would assess all
entrance controls for their caste-creating and -enforcing propensities.
As in Saenz, territorial discriminations that function to create degrees
of citizenship should receive careful judicial scrutiny. Enforcing a sub
stantive claim not to be excluded from vast parts of the metropolitan
region would go a long way toward dismantling the existing spatial or
der.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to place the Gang Congregation Ordinance
in the context of that spatial order and to challenge it. Morales is a
provocative case because it defies the usual assumptions about who
benefits from decentralized government. It is also a hard case: there is
no question that gang violence requires a powerful response from the
state.
The wise response to the complex social problems afflicting our
inner-cities, however, is not to mimic and reinforce the zoned spaces
of the metropolitan region by adopting the same version of local
autonomy that allows these spaces to flourish. The answer to the
problem of gang violence in the inner city is not "more localism," but
rather a rethinking of how that localism has already been deployed to
reinforce existing distributions of crime, municipal resources, and so
cial, economic, and symbolic capitol. The neighborhoods of inner-city
Chicago have already lost the metropolitan-area spatialist game, and
they will continue to do so as long as localism is equated with territo
rial defense.
We live in a society that relies heavily on boundaries. The Gang
Congregation Ordinance is the unfortunate outcome of - and is
modeled on - this boundary-creating impulse. Instead of an inclu
sionary concept, community has become a mechanism for building
high normative and literal walls in legal, social, and physical space.
The rhetoric of community has been employed to defend the current
allocation of resources, and for the most part that rhetoric has been
extremely successful for those who live in the vast Green Zones out
side the inner city. Indeed, the arguments for local power to depart
from constitutional norms merely serve to reinforce the separation
and isolation of the inner-city community and to stigmatize it - an ac
tual undermining of the rule of law which, as Robin West writes, oper-
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ates as a "bulwark against our human tendency" to claim that "some
but not others are members of our community of equals. "337
That is not to say that the problem of the "local" in society has an
easy solution. Local government theorists, like many legal and politi
cal theorists, have sought ways to reconcile our need for existing
within groups of our own making with our obligations to a wider citi
zenship, to reconcile the requirements for maintaining community in
the "little platoons"338 to which we belong and the requirements for
maintaining community within the larger society. This project is not
likely to be completed soon. Indeed, the boundary problem of local
government law - the problem of pluralism - has no ready answer.
The purpose of this Article has been to try to imagine something
other than the current platoons to which we are attached in a particu
lar spatial and temporal place - the metropolitan areas of the post
millennial United States. Existing assumptions about the foundations
of local government prevent us from imagining ourselves on the other
side of the normative wall, from understanding that "our" community
could be otherwise. A lack of imagination characterizes the apparent
opposition between the city and suburb in Warth, between religious
and nonreligious residents of the same town in Smith, and between
property owners and non-property owners in Kessler. This same lack
of imagination characterizes the oppositions between all neighbor
hoods, however defined, in a city that would require one particular
neighborhood to waive (or contemplate waiving) its constitutional
rights because it has no alternative. By examining the thresholds be
tween these communities and by beginning to debate the doctrinal cri
teria for assessing them, the law can better approach a solution to the
troubling harms of the lines we draw around us.

337. Robin West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 Q.L.R. 259, 276 (2000).
338. Robinson, supra note 13, at 269, 343 (quoting Edmund Burke).

